
November 17, 2026 | Volume 34, Issue 3
This Report summarizes cases granted review on November 6 and 13, 2026 (Part I).
Cases Granted Review
Mullin v. Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, 26-239.
The Court granted review on two questions. The first is whether Presidential Proclamation 10888 and its implementing guidance―which bar people illegally entering the country through the southern border from applying for asylum―are lawful. The second is whether the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provision barring lower courts from blocking the operation of the INA’s removal provisions, 8 U.S.C. §1252(f)(1), prohibits the class-wide relief the district court entered.
Section 1182(f) of the INA allows the President to suspend the entry of any class of aliens whose entry would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. Section 1185(a)(1) makes it unlawful for an alien to enter or depart the country except under the rules and limitations the President prescribes. Separately, the INA provides that any alien physically present in the United States, “irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum,” and that the Executive “may grant asylum” to an eligible alien. 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). Relying on Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a), President Trump issued Proclamation 10888 on his first day in office. It suspended the entry of aliens “engaged in the invasion across the southern border” and directed officials to “repel, repatriate, or remove” them. It also barred them from invoking INA provisions that would permit their continued presence, including the asylum statute. Through informal guidance (three emails, a memorandum, and training materials), the Department of Homeland Security instructed that covered aliens may not apply for asylum or obtain withholding of removal.
Three immigrant-advocacy organizations and 13 individual aliens filed a class action challenging the Proclamation and guidance, though not the suspension of entry itself. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs in substantial part. It certified a class of all individuals who are or will be subject to the Proclamation and who are or will be present in the United States, a definition that reaches aliens who have not yet entered the country. It vacated the guidance to the extent the guidance authorized removals outside the INA’s procedures and cut off or restricted access to asylum, withholding, and torture protections. It also enjoined agency officials from removing class members through “non-statutory repatriation or removal proceedings” or without complying with the asylum statute. A divided D.C. Circuit panel affirmed, with a modified class definition. 174 F.4th 81.
The D.C. Circuit held that Section 1182(f) addresses entry, not removal, and that Section 1185(a)(1)’s references to “departure” cover aliens’ own departures, not forcible removals. Aliens who enter in violation of the Proclamation therefore must be removed under the INA’s regular or expedited removal procedures. On asylum, the court accepted that asylum decisions are ultimately discretionary. It held, however, that the INA does not permit “categorical, ex ante denial of asylum” and that the discretion must be exercised case by case. The court added that even a valid categorical denial would not justify cutting off the right to apply, because aliens who are statutorily ineligible may still apply. It also held that any such blanket determination would require notice-and-comment rulemaking. Finally, the court held that Section 1252(f)(1) did not bar the injunction. The injunction, it reasoned, restrains action under the Proclamation and enforces provisions outside the INA’s removal part. The D.C. Circuit stayed its mandate, so the Proclamation’s asylum restrictions remain in effect.
In its petition, the government does not defend the guidance’s bars on withholding of removal and torture protection, which the courts below unanimously held unlawful. The government argues that because granting asylum is wholly discretionary, the President may announce in advance that asylum will be denied to aliens who violate the entry suspension. The INA does not require the government to accept applications that would be futile, it says, because “[p]rocess is not an end in itself” and there is no “right to demand needless formality.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983) (citation omitted). Nor, the government contends, does anything in the statute require that the discretion be exercised case by case. The government further argues that the power to suspend entry under Section 1182(f) necessarily includes the power to expel those who evade the suspension. The government cites Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), and asserts that Section 1185(a)(1)’s authority over departures independently supports repatriation. On Section 1252(f)(1), the government contends that the court of appeals cannot have it both ways. If repatriation must proceed under the removal provisions, then the class-wide injunction compels the government to carry out those provisions, which Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543 (2022), forbids.
Respondents counter that the INA gives every alien present in the country the right to apply for asylum regardless of manner of entry. According to respondents, Congress allowed categorical limits on asylum only if the Attorney General or the DHS Secretary adopts them by regulation and consistent with the asylum statute. They add that the futility rationale appears in neither the Proclamation nor the guidance, and that for decades the Executive Branch took the position that Section 1182(f) does not authorize eliminating asylum rights. On Section 1252(f)(1), respondents argue that the injunction restrains only action under the Proclamation, which rests on INA provisions outside the removal part of the statute.
Robinhood Markets, Inc. v. Sodha, 25-944.
At issue is whether “an issuer can be found liable under the misleading-omissions prong of Section 11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq., based on a determination that the issuer failed to disclose interim financial information that is material within the meaning of Section 11(a), without an additional inquiry to determine whether the omission rendered any affirmative statement misleading.” Petitioners operate an online securities and crypto exchange platform that primarily focuses on retail investors. In late 2020 and into early 2021, the number of users on petitioners’ platform—and the resulting revenue—spiked due to a surge in interest by retail investors in so-called meme stocks and crypto currency. Amid the spike, in July 2021, petitioners filed an initial public offering (IPO). In the registration statement (the filing containing the requisite disclosures during an IPO), petitioners disclosed its metrics for the first quarter of 2021—which included the spike—as well as certain metrics about its second quarter performance. Petitioners also disclosed that there was a risk that the spike in its metrics was not long-term. Following its IPO, in the third and fourth quarters of 2021, petitioners’ user and revenue metrics returned to their pre-spike baselines, and the stock price dropped.
Respondents filed a class action lawsuit under Section 11(a) of the Securities Act, which imposes strict liability when a registration statement “omit[s] to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” 15 U.S.C. §77k. Respondents alleged that petitioners knew, but failed to disclose, that its interim user and revenue metrics showed that those metrics were decreasing when petitioners filed the IPO, and that omitting those interim metrics rendered petitioners’ disclosed metrics misleading. The district court dismissed the case, adopting the First Circuit’s standard in Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1210 (1st Cir. 1996), that because the interim metrics petitioners had when the IPO went forward were not an “extreme departure” from the disclosed metrics, those interim metrics did not render the disclosed metrics misleading. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court applied the wrong standard under Section 11(a). 154 F.4th 1019.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “‘[t]he materiality of information is different from the issue of whether a statement is false or misleading.’” Agreeing with the Second Circuit’s approach in In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993), however, the Ninth Circuit held that “‘where the disclosure duty arises from the combination of a prior statement and a subsequent event, which, if not disclosed, renders the prior statement false or misleading, the inquiries as to duty and materiality coalesce.’” The Ninth Circuit further opined that, “[l]ike the Second Circuit, we find it ‘difficult to imagine a circumstance where [a] prior statement would not be rendered misleading’ in light of an undisclosed event if the ‘undisclosed information is material.’” The Ninth Circuit held that because “all the omissions challenged by [respondents] involve the relationship between a prior statement concerning a particular time period and an event subsequent to that time period,” respondents’ allegations did “not require [the court] to draw a distinction between materiality and the duty to disclose,” and petitioners were “required to disclose ‘material’ interim information.” In so holding, the Ninth Circuit also rejected the First Circuit’s “extreme departure” standard for interim metrics, instead adopting the Second Circuit’s test: “whether ‘a reasonable investor would view the omission as significantly altering the total mix of information made available.’”
Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted Section 11(a) to improperly require disclosure of all material information. Petitioners point to the text of Section 11(a), which states that omissions of facts can create liability in only two circumstances: (1) where the omitted fact is “required to be stated” in a registration statement or (2) where the omitted fact is “necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” 15 U.S.C §77k. According to petitioners, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion essentially reads out the requirement that the omitted information make disclosed information “not misleading” by requiring only an inquiry into materiality. Petitioners further assert that the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners L.P., 601 U.S. 257 (2024), where the Court held that “pure omissions” cannot result in liability under Rule 10b-5, which, like Section 11(a), prohibits omission of a “material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5(b).
Goldman Sachs Bank v. Brown, 25-1408.
The question presented is “[w]hether, and under what circumstances, a bankruptcy court may override the [Federal Arbitration Act] and refuse to honor a valid arbitration agreement with respect to” a claim that a creditor violated the automatic stay. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code automatically stays “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(6). Section 362(k) lets a debtor sue for actual and, in some cases, punitive damages over a willful violation of that stay. Separately, §105(a) gives bankruptcy courts general power to enforce the Code, including by holding violators of the stay in contempt. The Federal Arbitration Act makes arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. §2. Under Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226–27 (1987), another federal statute overrides the Act only if Congress intended it to. That intent may be shown by the statute’s text, its legislative history, or “an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.”
Respondents Rhea Ann Brown and Gregory Kevin Maze held Apple Card accounts issued by petitioner Goldman Sachs. Their card agreements included an arbitration clause. Respondents do not dispute that the clause is valid or that it covers their claims. Brown filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy; Maze filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Respondents allege that, despite notice of the filings, Goldman Sachs kept trying to collect for months. By the time respondents sued Goldman Sachs in bankruptcy court, for themselves and a proposed nationwide class, Brown’s repayment plan had been approved, and Maze had received a discharge and his case was closed. Citing §§362(k) and 105(a), they sought a declaratory judgment, an injunction, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. The bankruptcy court denied Goldman Sachs’s motion to compel arbitration. It held that because the claims arise directly from the bankruptcy (making them “core” claims), it had discretion to keep them. The district court affirmed, concluding that arbitration would conflict with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. A divided Fourth Circuit panel affirmed. 170 F.4th 249.
The Fourth Circuit said that although a claim’s “core” status may not automatically rule out arbitration, it “present[s] a high bar to deny the bankruptcy court’s discretion.” The court also found that arbitration would conflict with several of the Code’s purposes, including keeping disputes in one forum and protecting debtors during bankruptcy. Further, found the court, arbitration would blunt the deterrent effect of punitive damages. The court distinguished MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006), which required arbitration of a similar claim brought by a debtor whose Chapter 7 case was already over.
Goldman Sachs argues that the Fourth Circuit adopted a blanket rule. It urges instead the case-by-case approach of Hill, which asks whether arbitration would interfere with a particular bankruptcy. It also argues that a claim’s “core” status should carry no independent weight in deciding whether arbitration conflicts with the Code. It relies on Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 510 (2018), which requires a “clear and manifest” congressional intent to override the Federal Arbitration Act. Under that standard, it argues, §362(k) says nothing about arbitration, and the Fourth Circuit relied on general policy concerns rather than anything Congress said. Goldman Sachs adds that arbitrators can award punitive damages, and arbitration would not affect how either bankruptcy is administered. Bankruptcy courts, it notes, keep their §105(a) power to hold violators in contempt, and state courts can also hear §362(k) claims.
Respondents counter that Goldman Sachs concedes that an arbitration agreement cannot take away a bankruptcy court’s §105(a) power, and that they sought relief under §§105(a) and 362(k). Goldman Sachs’s position, they argue, would therefore split one dispute between an arbitrator and a court. They stress that Brown’s Chapter 13 case is still open, so the stay is still in effect and any recovery could become part of her bankruptcy estate. They also compare the automatic stay to the discharge injunction, which bars efforts to collect discharged debts. The Second Circuit has upheld bankruptcy courts’ refusals to send discharge-injunction disputes to arbitration. In re Anderson, 884 F.3d 382, 389–92 (2d Cir. 2018); In re Belton, 961 F.3d 612, 615–17 (2d Cir. 2020).
NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy Staff
- Dan Schweitzer, Director and Chief Counsel
- Lee Green, Supreme Court Fellow
- Erica Connolly, Supreme Court Fellow
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