June 4, 2026 | Volume 33, Issue 14
This Report summarizes opinions issued on May 26 and 28, and June 1, 2026 (Part I); and cases granted review on June 1, 2026 (Part II).
Opinions
Pitchford v. Cain, 24-7351.
By a 5-4 vote, the Court held in this Batson case that the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably ruled that petitioner Terry Pitchford waived his right to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for exercising peremptory strikes against four black jurors. The Court therefore granted habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §§2254(d)(1) and (2). In 2004, 18-year-old Pitchford and his teenaged accomplice (both of whom are black) committed an armed robbery of a grocery store, during which the white store owner was shot and killed. Pitchford was charged with capital murder under a felony-murder theory of liability. During jury selection at Pitchford’s trial in Mississippi state court, the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against four of the five black potential jurors. In response, Pitchford’s counsel raised a Batson objection. The trial court asked the prosecutor for race-neutral reasons for striking each of the four black potential jurors. As the prosecutor offered reasons for striking each of the jurors, the trial court declared each to be race neutral. Upon hearing the prosecutor’s reason for the last strike, the trial court stated that “[t]he Court finds that to be race neutral as well,” and pivoted to the defense’s peremptory strikes. At the close of jury selection, defense counsel sought “to reserve . . . [their] Batson objection.” The court responded, “I think you already made those, and they are clear in the record. For the reasons previously stated, first the Court finds there to be no—well, all the reasons were race neutral as to members that were struck by the district attorney’s office. And so [] the Court finds there to be no Batson violation.” The empaneled jury—consisting of 11 white jurors and 1 black juror—convicted Pitchford of capital murder and sentenced him to death.
In the trial court, Pitchford filed a motion for a new trial that raised numerous issues, including Batson,” but the trial court summarily denied the motion. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that, although Pitchford had made a prima facie case at step one of his Batson objection, he could not satisfy step three because in the trial court he waived his arguments that the prosecutor’s proffered explanations were pretextual. A federal district court granted habeas relief after concluding that the Mississippi Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Batson‘s three-step inquiry and had unreasonably determined that Pitchford waived his Batson objection. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s waiver finding was both reasonable and correct. In an opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court reversed and remanded.
The Court agreed with the district court’s determination that “the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established Batson precedents and unreasonably determined that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes.” The Court found that “in this capital case, the Mississippi trial court never conducted the essential third step of Batson,” under which “defense counsel has an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason as pretextual, and the trial court in turn decides whether the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for striking a juror is pretextual in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.” Thus, the Court concluded under §2254(d)(1) that the state courts’ adjudication of Pitchford’s Batson claim ran afoul of clearly established federal law.
Turning to the factual determinations under §2254(d)(2), the Court further held that “the Mississippi Supreme Court’s conclusion that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reasons was unreasonable” because the trial court “did not afford Pitchford’s counsel a sufficient opportunity” to do so. The Court found that “Pitchford did object to the explanations provided” by the prosecution “when he raised the issue again and confirmed it was on the record” at the end of jury selection. The trial judge “twice cut off defense counsel[‘s]” attempt to further develop the pretext argument “and ended the inquiry” by “explicitly assur[ing] Pitchford’s counsel that the Batson objection was preserved.” Thus, no reasonable jurist could “conclude that Pitchford waived the Batson argument.” In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected Mississippi’s contention that Pitchford’s defense counsel preserved a Batson objection but not the comparative-juror pretext argument developed for the first time on appeal. The Court found this argument “slices Batson way too thin” and noted that any objection following a prosecutor’s assertion of facially neutral reasons to strike potential jurors “necessarily would include a pretext argument.” The Court further held that Pitchford adequately raised the comparative-juror pretext argument “that he was prevented from making during jury selection” via his new-trial motion, which asserted that the prosecutor “deselected black people from the jury panel who had the same familial, living, social or marital circumstances as whites who were not.”
Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch admonished the majority for disregarding AEDPA’s well-settled “constraints.” First, the dissent asserted that after the state had offered its reasons for striking each juror and the court had accepted them as race neutral, “Pitchford did not object to that direction or otherwise seek to make a step three showing.” And following jury selection, after the court agreed that the Batson objection was “in the record,” defense counsel merely “reiterated their earlier statistical argument” that only one of the empaneled jurors was black even though the county is approximately 40 percent black.” The dissent insisted that it was not until after trial had concluded that Pitchford “for the first time . . . briefly introduced a new comparative juror argument . . . in one sentence.” The Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling was thus based upon the fact that Pitchford had not adequately presented his comparative juror argument to the trial court in the first instance. The court could not be faulted for “failing to discern whether the State’s race-neutral reasons were overcome by rebuttal evidence and argument never presented.”
Given the foregoing, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the state court adjudication neither unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedents nor unreasonably determined that Pitchford had in fact waived his comparative juror pretext argument at step three of Batson. First, said the dissent, Mississippi’s rule that “any Batson argument not adequately presented in a trial court is ‘waived’” comports with Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991), which held that “states enjoy authority to fashion their own preservation rules governing Batson claims.” And under subdivision (d)(2), the state courts’ determination that Pitchford failed to offer—or even attempt to offer—a comparative juror argument is consistent with the record (which reflects only a statistical argument) and defense counsel’s prior statements in a sworn affidavit that she “failed to challenge the prosecution’s reasons as pretextual at trial” and “did not . . . do anything to . . . reserve” the pretext argument. Finally, Justice Gorsuch emphasized that the majority opinion did not dictate “what further proceedings may be appropriate on remand” and noted that, to ultimately prevail on a habeas claim under §2254(a), Pitchford “must show his trial was in fact infected by a Batson violation.”
Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, 24-935.
The Court unanimously held that “a worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey can qualify” as an exempt transportation worker under §1 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Flowers Foods makes and sells baked goods to stores throughout the United States. Angelo Brock had distribution rights to Flowers products within Colorado and worked as a “last-mile” carrier, moving products from Flowers’s warehouse to Colorado customers. Brock filed a class action in federal district court claiming that Flowers violated state and federal law by misclassifying him and others as independent contractors. Flowers moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Tenth Circuit found applicable §1 of the Act, which provides that the Act cannot be used to compel arbitration in disputes involving the “contracts of employment” of any class of workers “engaged in . . . interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. §1. The court concluded that Brock fell within that class of workers. In an opinion by Justice Gorsuch, the Court affirmed.
The Court addressed whether someone can be “engaged in . . . interstate commerce” without crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that do. The Court recounted prior cases since 2019 that refused to narrow the exception in §1. See, e.g., Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022) (airline baggage handler fits in §1 exception). The Court rejected Flowers’s theory that Saxon created a bright-line rule that a worker must either cross state lines, or interact with a vehicle that does, to fall within the exemption. The Court reasoned that “‘engage’ meant to ‘take part in’ something or to be ‘employ[ed]’ or ‘involve[d]’ in that thing.” And the Court noted that interstate commerce does not just involve “crossing state lines, but intrastate activity too.” The Court accepted Flowers’s argument that §1 of the Act is not coterminous with the Commerce Clause, but found case interpreting that clause to be probative. The Court cited several historic examples, including a case holding that a steam ship transporting, solely within one state, goods destined for another state “was engaged in commerce between the States.” The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870). In short, “individuals can sometimes be direct, necessary, and active participants in moving goods ‘from . . . points in one state’ to ‘points in another state’ without crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that do.”
The Court dismissed Flowers’s contentions that Brock shouldn’t qualify for the exemption based on the factual details of their business arrangement. Specifically, Flowers argued that it conducts business with Brock through a distribution agreement with his independent company, and “Brock orders, purchases, and takes title to Flowers’s goods, before selling them to local stores.” The Court noted that, while other lower court cases have focused on similar facts, Flowers mentioned these only “in passing” and did not seek a ruling on their legal significance. Instead, Flowers focused on its bright-line theory “that an individual can never qualify for § 1’s exemption unless he crosses state lines or interacts with vehicles that do.” The Court concluded that the statute contained no support for that argument.
Whitton v. Dixon, 25–580.
By a 7-2 vote, the Court summarily reversed an Eleventh Circuit decision that “considered not only the evidence that was presented to the jury at Whitton’s trial, but also evidence the jury never saw” when it denied habeas relief on the ground that any Giglio error was harmless. In 1990, Gary Whitton was sentenced to death for stabbing James Maulden. At trial, Florida prosecutors called two jailhouse informants who claimed Whitton confessed. One of them falsely testified that he had never been previously arrested. Based on that false testimony, Whitton filed a motion for postconviction relief in state court alleging a violation of Giglio v. United States. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). “To succeed on a Giglio claim, a defendant must prove that the prosecutor presented false testimony against him; that the prosecutor knew that the testimony was false; and that there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the false testimony affected the verdict.” The state postconviction court denied relief and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Whitton then sought federal habeas relief. The district court denied relief because the informant’s arrest was as a juvenile, and Florida juvenile criminal records are generally inadmissible to attack a witness’s credibility. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief but on a different ground. It held that the testimony violated Giglio, but noted that the Florida Supreme Court found that even without the informant’s testimony, the evidence against Whitton was “overwhelming.” The Eleventh Circuit thus held that Whitton was not prejudiced by any Giglio error because the informant’s testimony was entirely immaterial to the jury’s verdict. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit considered evidence that suggested the blood stains on Whitton’s boots had the victim’s DNA, which was never presented to the jury. In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated and remanded.
The Court held that the Eleventh Circuit “should not have considered the post-trial DNA evidence in assessing whether the Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined that [the jailhouse informant’s] testimony was immaterial to the jury’s verdict.” The evidence was not presented to the jury and thus sheds no light on whether, or how, the informant’s testimony influenced the jury’s verdict. The Court noted that the Florida Supreme Court had not considered the new DNA evidence, and the Eleventh Circuit should not have done so in evaluating the state court’s determination. The Court specifically expressed “no view on whether the Florida Supreme Court’s determination was reasonable in light of the evidence that was presented at trial.” The Court remanded for the Eleventh Circuit to consider that and other arguments in the first instance.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito except for Part III–B, dissented. After recounting the state’s evidence against Whitton, Justice Thomas noted that Whitton had failed to exhaust this claim in state court before adding it to his habeas petition. Justice Thomas argued that the Eleventh Circuit only “added a single additional aside on a point that some would find notable” when addressing the new DNA evidence, and the court “did not claim to ascribe any particular legal weight to this fact.” The dissent then found any error in the Eleventh Circuit mentioning the DNA harmless for two reasons: the overwhelming evidence against Whitton and his failure to exhaust the claim.
Justice Thomas also noted the Court’s general practice of not granting certiorari when it is “evident that the resolution of the conflict could not change the result reached below.” In his view, the per curiam opinion “will have no real-world effect.” The Eleventh Circuit can deny relief for several other reasons, including that the new evidence confirming Whitton’s guilt means that “law and justice” did not “require” relief. See 28 U.S.C. §2243. Justice Thomas then asserted that the “Court has increasingly granted summary relief in certain cases based on lower court errors that seemingly had no effect on the outcome of the case.” He contrasted that with the Court’s practice of “routinely declin[ing] to provide relief to law-abiding Americans when it would actually matter, even after lower courts conspicuously flout this Court’s precedents in ruling against them.” Justice Thomas then walked through three examples of such cert denials. (Justice Alito did not join in the portion of the dissent discussing one of those denials).
Fernandez v. United States, 24-556.
By a 6-2-1 vote, the Court held that the district court erred in finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582 based upon a collateral attack challenging the validity of a prisoner’s conviction. In 2013, Joe Fernandez was convicted of murder-for-hire and sentenced to two consecutive life sentences for his role in the assassination of two gang members. Specifically, Fernandez’s cousin and alleged co-conspirator, Patrick Darge, identified him as the contracted “backup shooter” who killed both victims by firing 14 rounds after the primary shooter’s gun jammed. At trial and throughout postconviction proceedings, Fernandez maintained his innocence and argued that Darge was framing him to protect the real second shooter, Darge’s brother. Fernandez pointed to the fact that the government had dismissed murder charges against Luis Rivera, another alleged co-conspirator whom Darge had implicated as the getaway driver, as evidence that the government’s case was weak due to credibility concerns with Darge. Federal courts evaluating Fernandez’s direct appeal and 28 U.S.C. §2255 habeas petitions rejected his constitutional claims, sufficiency of evidence challenges, and claim “that he was actually innocent because the testimony against him was not credible.” Fernandez then filed a motion for compassionate release under §3582(c)(1)(A), which provides federal courts with discretion to reduce a term of imprisonment if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” This request was based on his claims of actual innocence and unreliability of the testimony inculpating him. The district court granted the motion, citing “a certain disquiet” the judge felt about whether Darge’s testimony had been truthful, “strong concerns” about the government’s decision to charge the getaway driver with a lesser offense, and doubt “that the jury’s verdict was correct.” The Second Circuit reversed, holding that “challenges to the validity of a conviction are not cognizable as ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ under section 3582(c)(1)(A)” but must instead be adjudicated under §2255 collateral review. In an opinion by Justice Barrett, the Court affirmed.
The Court held that a “prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through [] §2255, not [] §3582,” because “the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’” contemplated in §3582(c)(1)(A). In so holding, the Court emphasized that Congress enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme for bringing collateral attacks on federal convictions, and imposed “tight procedural constraints” on such challenges. Thus, it reasoned, if a prisoner were allowed to “circumvent” the rigorous procedural requirements of postconviction relief or effectively relitigate claims under §3582―which imposes only the “single procedural requirement” to present a “request for release to the Bureau of Prisons”―it would “wholly frustrate explicit congressional intent.” The Court pointed to Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), and Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), which held that claims falling “close to the core of habeas corpus” must be litigated under §2255, even where such claims “came within the literal terms” of 42 U.S.C. §1983 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
The Court further explained that its interpretation comports with the text and structure of §3582. The name for §3582(c)(1)(A)—“Compassionate Release”—highlights its focus on granting mercy rather than righting legal wrongs. Congress and the Sentencing Commission expressly discussed the availability of relief based only on a prisoner’s personal circumstances, such as terminal illness, advanced age, safety risk, and rehabilitation. This is consistent with the Bureau of Prison’s role in the process, as that entity’s “institutional expertise lies in the daily lives of prisoners,” rather than legal analysis or evidentiary review. These factors cumulatively support the conclusion that the invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying compassionate release.
Finally, the Court rejected Fernandez’s arguments that (1) because §2255 and §3582 offer different forms of relief, there is no conflict in making both available; and (2) even if §3582 does not ordinarily allow compassionate release for reasons that would support a §2255 motion, actual innocence claims are an exception because “a factual showing of actual innocence ‘ha[s] never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation.’” The Court explained that rather than helping him, the difference between habeas relief (which would set aside a prisoner’s conviction) and compassionate release (which would not) actually “highlights the mismatch between the error Fernandez alleges and the remedy he seeks.” As the Court explained, “[i]f a conviction is invalid, the fitting remedy is to vacate it, as §2255 allows. That §3582 does not offer this remedy is evidence that it is not a suitable vehicle for the claim.” With regard to actual innocence, the Court left open the question “whether a prisoner may assert a freestanding actual innocence claim under §2255,” but held that because such a claim necessarily challenges the legal or factual validity underpinning a conviction, “a compassionate release motion is not a vehicle” for raising it.
Justice Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the Court’s interpretation of §3582(c)(1)(A) for “many of the reasons explained in Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion,” but concluded that the judgment below should be affirmed on a different ground: that “[a] motion for compassionate release cannot justify a reduced sentence if it relies solely on facts a court already considered in imposing the initial sentence, rather than any changed circumstances that developed after sentencing.” She explained that the statute generally prohibits “modify[ing] a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed,” and a consideration that was already part of the previous “sentencing calculus” by definition cannot be a reason to “warrant” a change of sentence.
Justice Jackson penned a lengthy dissenting opinion. She criticized the majority for “arbitrarily restrict[ing]” the statutory discretion granted to courts “by grafting an atextual rule onto §3582(c)(1)(A).” Justice Jackson argued that the Court’s focus on the primacy of §2255 cannot be justified by prior precedents and “gives short shrift” to the legislative history and broad statutory language of §3582 itself. She described §3582(c)(1)(A) as “a straightforward grant of discretion” that “vests district courts with authority to reduce a prisoner’s sentence” for any “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” This limitation to granting relief is based on degree, not on the kind of circumstance. And the text of §3582(c)(1)(A) contains no reference to §2255 or mention of a “habeas-based constraint” on its sentence-modification authority. Likewise, Justice Jackson wrote, the legislative history from §3582’s 1984 enactment and 2018 amendment contains no indication that the district court’s compassionate release authority was curtailed by the existence of potential habeas relief. Instead, this provision was intended as a “safety valve” that broadly permitts judges to correct “unfairly harsh sentences” under the sentencing guidelines where “unusual” circumstances warrant it. As Justice Jackson saw it, the situation of “[a]n innocent man stuck in prison for life” was “both sufficiently unusual and sufficiently forceful” to authorize compassionate release under the statute. Furthermore, she emphasized that habeas relief and compassionate-release authority need not be interpreted as mutually exclusive because they “operate differently, exist for different reasons, and ultimately yield different results.” In other words, “habeas nullifies a conviction as a matter of law, while compassionate release shortens a sentence as a matter of grace.”
Rutherford v. United States, 24-820.
By a 6-3 vote, the Court held that compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A) is not available to a prisoner who complains about a “sentencing disparity created by Congress’s nonretroactive change to §924(c)’s mandatory penalties.” The First Step Act of 2018 reduced penalties for certain drug and firearm offenses going forward, meaning individuals sentenced for those offenses before the First Step Act may face mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment decades longer than they would have received after the Act’s enactment. Convictions under 18 U.S.C. §924(c), which proscribes using or carrying a firearm during certain felonies, previously mandated a 25-year consecutive sentence for a “second or subsequent” §924(c) conviction, even if it occurred in the same case as the first §924(c) conviction. The First Step Act sought to alleviate this “stacked” sentences practice, but prospectively only. Meanwhile, §3582(c)(1)(A) allows a district court to reduce a prison term “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable” if the court finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” In 2023, the Sentencing Commission issued a policy statement concluding that the disparity produced by the First Step Act can justify a reduced sentence under §3582(c).
Daniel Rutherford was convicted of multiple felonies he committed in 2003, including §924(c) convictions, for which he received mandatory sentences. In 2021, Rutherford moved for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act, arguing that his 32-year stacked sentence was unusually long and too punitive because, had he been sentenced after the First Step Act, he would have received 14 years for his two §924(c) convictions. Rutherford acknowledged he did not qualify for the reduced penalties but invoked the Act as a ground for compassionate release under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). While his case was pending, the Sentencing Commission issued its policy statement that supported Rutherford’s interpretation of §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied Rutherford’s motion. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding the nonretroactive provision of the statute “unambiguous” and that it would make no sense to “construe Congress’s nonretroactivity directive as simultaneously creating an extraordinary and compelling reason for early release.” In an opinion by Justice Barrett, the Court affirmed.
The Court found that any disparity created by Congress’s nonretroactive amendments do not satisfy a definition of “extraordinary”; indeed, “nonretroactive amendments to criminal penalties are the norm.” See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (the “ordinary practice” is to “withhol[d] that change from defendants already sentenced”). Any disparity caused “is an unexceptional feature of a system in which nonretroactivity is the default.” The Court likewise found nothing “compelling” in Congress’s “deliberate decision not to extend newly reduced penalties to those already sentenced.” Moreover, the Court noted, compassionate release is generally defined by a prisoner’s personal circumstances, such as a terminal illness.
The Court rejected Rutherford’s argument that Congress’s prohibition on just one factor, rehabilitation, in the statute meant that “Congress impliedly authorized the district court to consider all other relevant information.” The Court reasoned that a choice to rule out one item does not mean “the rest of the universe is on the table.” Instead, breaking from past sentencing practices gave Congress a particular reason “to single out this factor.” The Court also disclaimed the policy statement by the Sentencing Commission. “[T]he Commission’s policy statements must be ‘consistent with’ the governing statute, and courts have a duty to ‘independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress.’ We are not bound to follow the Commission’s guidance when it ‘exceed[s its] statutory authority’ by adopting a definition of a term that is inconsistent with the statute.” (Citations omitted.) In short, while the Commission can “give meaning” to the compassionate release statute, its “interpretation must land within the statutory goalposts.” Its 2023 policy statement did not.
Justice Sotomayor issued a dissenting opinion, which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Sotomayor emphasized that Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for prisoners to receive compassionate release. She described the Court’s role as limited to ensuring that the “Commission does not act unreasonably.” She then found that the Commission acted reasonably in crafting a narrow policy requiring “consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances.” Justice Sotomayor found it “obvious” that if a defendant would face a significantly lower sentence for the same conduct today it would undoubtedly inform a court’s decision on whether to reduce his sentence. Justice Sotomayor concluded by criticizing the majority’s reading of the First Step Act’s lack of a retroactivity provision, noting that the law also amended parts of the compassionate-release statute: “Congress easily could have specified that its nonretroactive changes should not be considered in compassionate-release determinations” but it did not. Justice Sotomayor charged the majority with failing to “explain why exactly the Commission’s case-by-case approach is inconsistent with Congress’s categorical nonretroactivity decision.” She also emphasized that the small number of compassionate release petitions granted for sentencing disparities caused by any change in law―only 98―means the Commission’s policy had “not opened the floodgates.”
Margolin v. National Association of Immigration Judges, 25-767.
The Court unanimously and summarily reversed a Fourth Circuit decision for “violat[ing] the principle of party presentation.” An association of immigration judges challenged in district court an Executive Branch policy regulating the judges’ work-related speech. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) requires federal employees to bring most work-related grievances to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), not to federal district court. The judges argued that this case need not first be presented to the MSPB because the issue was not “the kind of work-related claims that Congress intended to steer out of district court.” The district court dismissed the judges’ claims, finding them covered by the scheme channeling claims to the MSPB. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. It held that the case need not be presented to the MSPB, but on a different ground not argued by the judges. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that due to changing circumstances―namely, the President’s firing of MSPB members and subsequent lack of a quorum―the MSPB might not be “functioning as Congress intended.” The court also noted that recent Executive Branch arguments that the MSPB is not politically independent of the President, see Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415 (2025), call “into question the constitutionality of a critical aspect of the CSRA, and the continued vitality of the statute’s adjudicatory scheme.” In a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed and remanded.
The Court reiterated that the principle of party presentation directs federal courts to decide “only the questions presented.” The Court noted that it had recently reversed the Fourth Circuit for the same reason. See Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7 (2025). On this record, the Court found that the Fourth Circuit erred again, for the plaintiff judges had conceded that the CSRA is intended to channel covered claims to the MSPB, and the question presented was thus whether the judges’ claims were covered. The Fourth Circuit, however, transformed the judges’ “argument that the CSRA did not channel its claims into one that the CSRA might not—in light of current conditions—channel any claims . . . without giving either side a chance to address its theory.” The Court admonished the Fourth Circuit that its “drasti[c] departure from the principle of party presentation constitute[d] an abuse of discretion.”
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Barrett, concurred to address “why the Fourth Circuit’s decision was also wrong on the merits.” In Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012), the Court held that “covered employees appealing covered agency actions” must “proceed exclusively through the statutory review scheme.” The judges conceded they were covered employees, and the Fourth Circuit found that the workplace policy at issue was a covered agency action. Thus, under Elgin, the judges must go through the CSRA scheme. Justice Thomas criticized the Fourth Circuit’s “strained” attempt to avoid dismissing the case and concluded that “[s]tatutes change only when Congress changes them, not when judges decide that they no longer vindicate Congress’s purposes.”
Cases Granted Review
Maxwell v. Thomas, 25-5930.
At issue is “[w]hether a claim regarding application of time credits under the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5195–5208 (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. §§3631–3635), seeking accelerated transfer to a halfway house or home confinement, can be brought in a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2241.” The First Step Act created a new system of time credits that inmates can earn by participating in recidivism-reduction programs and other productive activities. For prisoners eligible to earn time credits, the Act provides that the credits “shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody,” i.e., placement in a residential reentry center or home confinement, “or supervised release.” Meanwhile, §2241 authorizes federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state or federal prisoner who “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
William Maxwell is a federal prisoner serving a 240-month sentence for conspiring to violate RICO and obstruct justice and conspiring to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. In 2022, Maxwell filed a habeas petition under §2241 contending, in relevant part, that he should be transferred to a halfway house or home confinement under the First Step Act. The district court dismissed his petition, finding that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies on this claim. In a per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial on different grounds. 133 F.4th 453. Relying on Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596 (5th Cir. 2020), the court of appeals held that §2241 was “not a proper vehicle” for petitioner to seek “transfer to a halfway house or home confinement” because “neither form of relief would entitle him to accelerated release.” Under the Fifth Circuit’s “bright-line rule,” “if a favorable determination of the prisoner’s claim would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release, then the proper vehicle is a civil rights suit.”
Both Maxwell and the United States agree that the Fifth Circuit’s bright-line rule conflicts with applicable Supreme Court precedent. The Court has held that habeas is available where the relief sought would “terminate custody, accelerate the future date of release from custody, [] or reduce the level of custody.’” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 534 (2011) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 86 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)). As the United States acknowledged, “[t]o the extent the court of appeals determined that petitioner could not challenge BOP’s execution of time credits under the First Step Act through a habeas petition solely because application of those credits would not accelerate his release from custody,” it “would be inconsistent with” Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023). Jones held that §2241 properly encompassed a prisoner’s claim “that he is being detained in a place or manner not authorized by the sentence, that he has unlawfully been denied parole or good-time credits, or that an administrative sanction affecting the conditions of his detention is illegal.” Maxwell further notes that there is an entrenched circuit split on the question presented, with the Fifth Circuit rule in conflict with decisions from the First, Second, and Third Circuits. (The United States argued that certiorari should nonetheless be denied because of vehicle problems, an argument the Court implicitly rejected by granting certiorari.)
NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy Staff
- Dan Schweitzer, Director and Chief Counsel
- Kevin Morrow, Supreme Court Fellow
- Michael Butera, Supreme Court Fellow
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