July 27, 2026 | Volume 33, Issue 21
This Report summarizes cases granted review on June 29 and 30, and July 20, 2026 (Part II).
Cases Granted Review
Viramontes v. Cook County, Ill., 25-238;
Grant v. Higgins, 25-566.
In these consolidated cases, the Court will consider “[w]hether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to possess AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles.” Cook County and Connecticut enacted laws that ban the possession of assault weapons, including AR-15s. Petitioners are individuals who would like to own weapons among those banned. In Viramontes, the district court granted summary judgment for Cook County, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 2025 WL 1553896. In Grant, the district court denied petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Second Circuit affirmed. 153 F.4th 213.
Looking to the two-step framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the Second Circuit first assumed that the assault weapons at issue fell within the meaning of the Second Amendment. It then concluded that there is a “longstanding tradition of restricting novel weapons that are particularly suited for criminal violence,” while also accounting for technological advances and unprecedented societal concerns. The Seventh Circuit likewise upheld the assault weapons ban, concluding that its prior decision in Bevis v. City of Naperville, 85 F.4th 1175 (7th Cir. 2023), controlled the outcome. Applying Bruen, the Seventh Circuit in Bevis reasoned that AR-15s are sufficiently similar to M-16 rifles, which District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), identified as falling outside of the Second Amendment’s protection because they are more like military weapons and not those used for self-defense. The Bevis court also reasoned that assault weapons restrictions are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of regulating dangerous weapons.
Petitioners in both cases argue that the lower courts incorrectly applied Heller and Bruen. Petitioners contend that AR-15s are among the most commonly owned firearms in the United States and therefore cannot be classified as “dangerous and unusual weapons” excluded from the Second Amendment’s protection. Petitioners also assert that the lower courts have improperly treated Heller’s “common use” principle as part of Bruen’s textual inquiry. Instead, petitioners argue, the “common use” standard was “derived from the history of restricting dangerous and unusual weapons,” making it part of Bruen’s historical-tradition analysis. Petitioners further maintain that the lower courts’ reasoning would permit legislatures to ban virtually any firearm, leaving little meaningful protection under the Second Amendment.
Respondents in both cases argue that the assault weapons bans are consistent with the Second Amendment, as the nation has a historical tradition of regulating exceptionally dangerous weapons. According to respondents, AR-15s possess characteristics that make them particularly dangerous, considering their militaristic features, popularity in mass shootings, and unsuitability for self-defense. Respondents assert that a weapon’s common ownership alone does not establish Second Amendment protection. The Viramontes respondents argue that the “common use” inquiry belongs at Bruen’s threshold textual inquiry. That is because “arms” under the Second Amendment incorporates limitations recognized in Heller and because Bruen discussed weapons in common use as part of its plain-text analysis before moving to step two. The Grant respondents maintain that “common use” under Heller “necessarily requires an analysis of a weapon’s actual use and functionality for self-defense—not its popularity in the abstract.”
Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota, 25-1017.
The two issues presented are: (1) “Does the National Voter Registration Act or a federal consent decree prohibit Arizona from requiring voter-registration applicants to produce ‘satisfactory evidence’ of U.S. citizenship when registering with a state registration form?” (2) “Does the National Voter Registration Act prohibit Arizona from implementing a program within 90 days of a federal election to cancel the registrations of voters who are not U.S. citizens?” The NVRA requires states to “accept and use” the federal registration form, limits state forms to information “necessary” to assess eligibility, and requires forms supplied to public assistance agencies to be “equivalent to” the federal form. Its 90-Day Provision bars, within 90 days of a federal election, “any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters.” In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013), the Court held that this mandate bars Arizona from demanding more of federal-form applicants than the form requires, while noting that “state-developed forms may require information the Federal Form does not.”
Following Inter Tribal Council, Arizona “added a requirement to its own [voter-registration] form to ensure its ability to verify citizenship.” It required county recorders to reject any state forms for voter registration that are “not accompanied by satisfactory evidence of citizenship.” The requirement applies only to state-form registrants. “Federal-form registrants whose citizenship can’t be verified are still given a ‘federal only’ designation that permits them to vote in federal elections, but not state or local elections.” Then, in a 2018 consent decree the Arizona Secretary of State agreed to issue a binding directive under then-applicable state law for all “County Recorders to accept State Form applications submitted without [documentary proof of citizenship].” In 2022, Arizona amended its election laws again. H.B. 2492 directs recorders to reject state-form applications lacking documentary proof of citizenship. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-121.01(C). And H.B. 2243 “requires the Secretary of State and county recorders to regularly check available databases to identify, and cancel the registrations of, any noncitizens on state voter rolls.” Id. §16-165. Eight consolidated suits followed. Petitioner Republican National Committee (RNC) intervened as a defendant to defend the two provisions. The district court enjoined both provisions, and a divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed. 129 F.4th 691.
As relevant here, the Ninth Circuit “panel reasoned that the 2018 [] Consent Decree was a ‘binding final judgment’ that ‘remain[s] in force’ and ‘permanently’ prohibits Arizona from enforcing its proof-of-citizenship requirement for state-form voter-registration applicants. The panel then went further, holding that the NVRA preempts the proof-of-citizenship requirement for state-form applicants. It reasoned that the proof requirement isn’t strictly ‘necessary to enable’ officials ‘to assess the eligibility of the applicant’ because the state form’s checkbox provides ‘proof of citizenship by an attestation.’ And it found that the proof requirement rendered the state form not ‘equivalent’ to the federal form because they are no longer ‘virtually identical.’ Finally, the panel held that the NVRA prohibited county recorders from removing noncitizens from the voter rolls within 90 days before a federal election. The panel reasoned ‘any program’ for the removal of ‘ineligible voters’ must be given ‘an expansive meaning.’” (Citation omitted.)
Petitioner RNC argues that Inter Tribal Council preserved the states’ authority to demand on their own forms information the federal form does not require. The RNC criticizes the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the NVRA’s requirement that state forms “may require only such identifying information . . . as is necessary to enable the appropriate State election official to assess the eligibility of the applicant” and administer voter registration and the election. (Emphasis added.) “’[T]here’s no reason to read ‘necessary’ information as meaning only the bare minimum amount of information. . . . Rather, in the ‘legal’ context, ‘necessary’ means ‘appropriate and well adapted to fulfilling an objective.’ And proof of citizenship ‘obviously would ensure the citizenship of the voter—a necessary qualification.’” (Citations omitted; some quotation marks altered.) Next, the RNC criticizes the Ninth Circuit’s holding “that requiring proof of citizenship violated the [NVRA] requirement that state forms supplied to public assistance agencies be ‘equivalent’ to the federal form.” In the RNC’s view, “a state form is ‘equivalent’ to the federal form if it has ‘the same effect for purposes of registration.’ . . . It makes no sense to permit States to develop their own forms but require ‘state public assistance agencies [to] use a form that is identical to the federal form.’” And the RNC argues that the 2018 decree, which rested on consent alone without any finding that Arizona’s requirement violated federal law, must yield to intervening legislation. On the second question, the RNC contends that the NVRA distinguishes eligible applicants, who become registrants and then either eligible or ineligible voters, from applicants who were never eligible. On that reading, noncitizens are not the “ineligible voters” the 90-Day Provision protects.
Three groups of respondents all argue that the same statutory provision governs both the federal and state forms, and that Inter Tribal Council already “rejected Arizona’s effort to demand documentary proof of citizenship as part of the federal form.” Thus, “[t]he Ninth Circuit correctly held that Arizona identified nothing in the NVRA’s text or the factual record that could justify Arizona’s differential treatment of state-form and federal-form registrants who do not provide documentary proof of citizenship.” Respondents further insist that “necessary” bears its ordinary meaning of essential, and that attestation is the presumptive minimum needed to assess eligibility. The Mi Familia Vota respondents add that a consent decree is a final judgment binding until modified or vacated and that petitioner never sought relief under Rule 60(b). The AZ AANHPI Equity, LUCHA, and Promise Arizona respondents argue that Arizona had itself authorized its Attorney General to settle federal litigation, and that the RNC, an intervenor whose standing no court has addressed, may lack Article III standing. The Democratic National Committee respondents argue that the 90-day ban is subject to three exceptions: for removals made at the registrant’s request, upon the registrant’s death, and, where state law so provides, for criminal conviction or mental incapacity. Critically, they say, Congress’s omission of any exception for citizenship-based removals is evidence that such removals are barred. They add that the provision guards against removing eligible voters too close to an election for the voter to learn of the error and correct it.
International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson, 25-840.
The Court will consider whether, as framed by petitioners, parents have standing to “challenge[] Washington laws designed to give runaway minors ‘gender-affirming treatment’ without parental notice or consent.” Petitioners are national organizations (International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. and Advocates Protecting Children) and five sets of Washington parents whose children have exhibited signs of gender dysphoria and who “seek to raise them according to their biological sex.” Petitioners challenge three Washington laws: (1) Wash. Rev. Code §71.34.530, (2) Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5599 (“ESSB 5599”), and (3) Substitute House Bill 1406 (“SHB 1406”).
Wash. Rev. Code §71.34.530 permits minors 13 and older to “request and receive outpatient treatment without” parental consent. In 2023, ESSB 5599 amended Wash. Rev. Code. §13.32A.082 (which governs parental notification requirements for minors sheltering at licensed youth shelters) by adding provisions addressing youth “seeking or receiving protected health care services,” including “gender-affirming treatment.” Once a minor is admitted to a licensed youth shelter, the shelter must notify the minor’s parents within 72 hours, but preferably within 24 hours. But if “compelling reasons” exist, including when the minor is seeking “protected health care services” such as “gender-affirming treatment,” the shelter may instead notify the Washington Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). DCYF must then “offer to make referrals on behalf of the minor for appropriate behavioral health services” and family reunification services. SHB 1406 requires that DCYF notify the parent that a report of a runaway child has been received and offer family reunification services as soon as possible, but no later than three days, after receiving a report. (Petitioners say, though, that “a good-faith effort” to contact the parents “only requires asking the child for the parents’ contact information—something few if any runaway children would provide.”) SHB 1406 also allows a minor to stay in a licensed shelter for up to 90 days absent parental permission if the shelter “is unable to make contact with a parent despite their notification efforts” or if the shelter “makes contact with a parent, but the parent does not request that the child return home.”
The district court dismissed for lack of standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 146 F.4th 841. The Ninth Circuit first rejected petitioners’ argument that the statutes constrained their ability to parent. Because the statutes do not require the parents to take any actions, “changes in parenting style are the result of voluntary actions,” that is, they are “self-inflicted.” The court of appeals disagreed that the statutes force the parents to censor their speech because the statutes do not regulate speech; the parents are permitted to discuss gender with their children. The court next rejected petitioners’ argument that the statutes have limited their access to relevant information about their children’s efforts to transition. The court reasoned that petitioners did not connect their alleged injuries to the statutory framework. The court also found that the parents had not sufficiently alleged future injury, as any future injury depended on a series of hypothetical events. As for IPEC, the court found that it lacked associational standing because the individual IPEC member on whose behalf IPEC brought suit asserted the same arguments as the individual parents.
Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding they lack Article III standing. They contend that the statutes “deliberately displace[] their decision-making role as to ‘gender transitions’ of their children” by allowing shelters and the DCYF to withhold parental notification and facilitate gender-affirming treatment without parental knowledge or consent. Citing Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U.S. 100 (2025), petitioners argue that they have Article III standing because “the parents [are] the objects of the challenged statutes.” The parents further argue that the statutes have a “current chilling” effect, as they have altered their parenting styles out of concern that their children will run away. Petitioners maintain that the laws “incentivize [their] children” to run away, creating a substantial risk of future injury. Finally, petitioners contend that the Ninth Circuit improperly discounted their allegations at the pleading stage instead of accepting them as true for a motion to dismiss. Petitioners ultimately urge that parents need not “’wait until their child has run away to a shelter and receiving life-altering treatment before they are afforded the opportunity to challenge the law.’”
Respondents argue that the Ninth Circuit correctly held that petitioners lack Article III standing because their injuries are speculative, rather than “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). Respondents contend that the statutes regulate licensed youth shelters and the DCYF, not parents, and that they do not authorize performing gender-affirming care without parental consent, withholding information from parents, or delaying reunification. According to respondents, ESSB 5599 merely changes which entity initially contacts parents, allowing DCYF to offer voluntary referrals for treatment and family reconciliation services while still requiring a good-faith effort to notify parents. Respondents also urge that Wash. Rev. Code §71.34.530 is consistent with the laws of more than 30 other states and is supported by Washington common law. Respondents maintain that petitioners’ alleged current injuries are self-inflicted, as the statutes impose no obligation onto the parents to change their parenting styles. They also maintain that the alleged future injuries depend on a speculative chain of hypothetical events and therefore are not “’certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.’”
Jouppi v. Alaska, 25-246.
This case involves Alaska’s criminal forfeiture of petitioner’s $95,000 airplane because petitioner―the pilot and owner of the plane, which was headed to a dry community―knew that one of his passenger’s grocery bags contained a six-pack of beer. The question presented is “whether, in determining whether a fine contravenes the Excessive Fines Clause, courts may consider the gravity of the underlying offense purely in the abstract or should consider the gravity of the specific defendant’s wrongdoing.” In United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), the Court held that a fine is unconstitutionally excessive “if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” Courts around the country have applied four factors discussed in Bajakajian in making the gross-disproportionality assessment: “(1) the nature and extent of the defendant’s crime and its relation to other criminal activity, (2) whether the defendant falls among the class of persons for whom the statute was principally designed, (3) the other penalties that might be imposed on the defendant under the applicable provisions of law, and (4) the nature and extent of the harm caused by the defendant’s offense.” This case concerns how courts should apply those factors.
Under Alaska law, a locality’s voters can prohibit the possession, sale, or transport of alcohol into and within it. A person commits the crime of importation if the person knowingly “send[s], transport[s], or bring[s]” alcohol into a local option community, or if the person attempts or solicits another to do so. In 2004, the Alaska Legislature amended its forfeiture statute to require forfeiture of aircraft used to commit that crime. In April 2012, Helen Nicholia booked passage to Beaver, a dry community, with petitioner Kenneth Jouppi and his company, Ken Air, LLC. Before the flight took off, Alaska State troopers served a warrant and found nine gallons of beer on board. Jouppi and his company were charged with misdemeanor importation. A jury convicted Jouppi. The trial judge imposed the minimum sentence allowed by statute: a $1,500 fine for Jouppi (and another $1,500 for his company) and three days’ imprisonment. The trial judge (following a remand and a hearing) also held that forfeiture of Jouppi’s plane under Alaska law would be an unconstitutionally excessive fine. The Alaska Court of Appeals vacated and remanded. It ruled that, “[r]ather than assuming without deciding that Jouppi’s culpability extended to all of the beer in his passenger’s luggage, the trial court should have resolved whether his crime ‘was, in substance, attempting to bring [only] a six pack of beer to a local option community.’” Further, said the court of appeals, the trial court failed to address whether Jouppi’s offense was related to other illegal activities. The Alaska Supreme Court granted review and vacated the court of appeals’ judgment, holding that forfeiting Jouppi’s airplane was constitutional “as a matter of law.” 566 P.3d 943.
The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that was so even if Jouppi was responsible only for one six-pack and his actions weren’t related to other illegal activities. Applying the Bajakajian factors, the court found that (1) Jouppi “knowingly transported a six-pack of alcohol in plain view while acting in his professional capacity as the operator of an air taxi company and the pilot of the airplane”; (2) Jouppi was “clearly within the class of persons targeted by the statute: airplane owners and pilots who knowingly facilitate the importation of alcohol for consumption in a dry village”; (3) the values of Jouppi’s airplane was only 9.5 times the maximum fine; and (4) given the harms caused by alcohol abuse in Alaska, “the illegal importation of even a six-pack of beer causes grave societal harm.”
Jouppi argues that “[m]ost courts, following this Court’s lead, share the same premise: that the standard focuses, not on the gravity of the offense in the abstract, but on the actual defendant’s conduct. The Alaska Supreme Court, meanwhile, hews to a minority view that instead looks to the gravity of the defendant’s offense at a stratospheric level of generality.” Jouppi supports the former approach. He criticizes the Alaska Supreme Court’s reasoning, saying that “the court dismissed as ‘not particularly relevant whether Jouppi’s offense was part of a larger pattern of criminal activity’—despite this Court’s describing as ‘highly relevant’ whether a defendant’s offense ‘was unrelated to any other crime.’ It compared the airplane’s value to the very sort of maximum sentences Bajakajian eschewed. It ignored that, with a six-pack violation to his name, Jouppi’s ‘culpability relative to other potential violators’ of the statute was glaringly ‘small indeed.’ And it turned its back on the ‘extent of the harm caused by Jouppi’s illegal conduct’ in favor of ‘the harm . . . addressed in the legislative history’ decades before.” (Citations omitted.)
Alaska counters that the Alaska Supreme Court faithfully applied Bajakajian. First, “Jouppi’s offense was serious and related to other criminal activity. The Alaska Supreme Court noted that Jouppi acted knowingly and in his professional capacity as a pilot and business owner, and there was alcohol in plain view.” Second, “[t]he statute targets persons like Jouppi. The defendant in Bajakajian did not fit into ‘the class of persons for whom the statute was principally designed.’ In contrast, Jouppi was precisely the type of person for whom Alaska’s forfeiture statute was designed.” (Citation omitted.) Third, “[a] ratio of less than ten to one between the property’s value and the maximum fine is not grossly disproportional.” (Alaska adds that the jury convicted Jouppi’s company, which faced a maximum fine of $500,000.) And fourth, “[a]lcohol importation to Alaska’s dry communities causes serious harm.”
Hoffman v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., 25-159.
At issue is whether, in private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act―which authorizes private companies to condemn land to build certain natural-gas infrastructure―just compensation is determined by reference to state or federal law. Respondent WBI Energy Transmission is a private natural-gas company that “holds a certificate of public convenience and necessity that allows it to use eminent domain to acquire rights-of way that enable it to construct, operate, and maintain a natural-gas pipeline.” WBI used that authority to condemn an easement across ranchland owned by petitioners and their families. Litigation ensued, leading to a settlement on the value of the taken property, but leaving open the question of fees and costs. “Petitioners said these costs should be recoverable because state law governed compensation and North Dakota law authorizes the payment of a property owner’s reasonable fees and costs as part of a compensation award. WBI disagreed, arguing that federal law should control[,]” and that “the federal government need not pay a condemnee’s fees and costs when it condemns property itself.” (Citation omitted.) The district court ruled for petitioners. It concluded that neither the Natural Gas Act nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure answer the question. It then concluded that state law should fill in the interstices of the federal statute. The court applied North Dakota law, which it found makes the condemnor liable for reasonable costs and attorney’s fees. The Eighth Circuit reversed. 132 F.4th 1058.
“The [Eighth Circuit] reasoned that a private entity exercising the federal power of eminent domain under the NGA ‘step[s] into the federal government’s shoes’ and ‘inherit[s] all its rights and obligations.’ When the federal government conducts a taking, the court observed, the Just Compensation Clause does not require it to pay attorney’s fees. The court further explained that, although some federal statutes mandate compensation above the constitutional floor by requiring attorney’s fees for certain federal takings, the NGA provision at issue does not.” (Citations omitted.) Disagreeing with the district court, “[t]he court of appeals explained that ‘when it comes to eminent domain, congressional silence leaves no gaps to fill’ with state law or federal common law on the measure of just compensation. Instead, ‘any gaps are filled by the Fifth Amendment itself.’” (Citations omitted; some quotation marks omitted.)
Petitioners argue that the Eighth Circuit erred for multiple reasons. First, “to the extent there is a special rule for eminent domain statutes, it is the opposite of the one adopted below. Delegations of the eminent domain power are in derogation of property rights and therefore must be strictly construed against the condemnor and in favor of the property owners.” Second, “the only reference the [Natural Gas Act] makes to choice of law is to order courts to follow the practice and procedure of the states in which they sit.” Third, the federal government “only invok[ed] the federal eminent domain power directly for the first time in the latter half of the 19th century.” Fourth, petitioners maintain that Congress has “legislate[d] around the general rule that state law governs compensation in these cases.”
WBI counters that, under PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594 U.S. 482 (2021), “[a] delegee exercising eminent domain simply stands in the shoes of the federal government, and its rights and obligations are no more and no less than those of the federal government in an identical proceeding.” And “[j]ust compensation under the Fifth Amendment does not include attorneys’ fees.” Further, says WBI, the Natural Gas Act “does not mention ‘just compensation,’ or provide that compensation must be paid for taken property at all. 15 U.S.C. §717f(h). The obligation to pay comes from the delegation of the federal ‘eminent domain’ power, which is bounded by the federal constitutional minimum of just compensation.” WBI also points to other parts of the Natural Gas Act, and other, related statutes, that expressly deviate from the federal standard for just compensation―creating the negative inference that there is no such deviation here. The United States, in an amicus brief invited by the Court, agrees that certiorari is warranted because there’s a circuit conflict, but agrees with WBI on the merits.
Grand v. University Heights, Ohio, 25-965.
At issue is whether “the takings finality rule th[e] Court articulated in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985), . . . applies to free-exercise claims.” Daniel Grand sought to host a minyan―a gathering of at least 10 Jewish adults to pray―in a room at his home in University Heights. When the mayor of the town, Michael Brennan, found out he notified the city’s law director, who sent out a cease and desist order to Grand, demanding that Grand cease using his home as “a place of religious assembly” for use as a “synagogue” without a special use permit. The order threatened legal action for non-compliance. Grand canceled his planned minyan and submitted a permit application. But after an initial public hearing on the permit, Grand withdrew his permit application “because he did not want to submit to a second (inevitably hostile) public spectacle, and because he realized that the permit would require him to convert his home into a house of worship and he could no longer live there.” Grand instead filed suit some months later against the city and several officials alleging a variety of claims including a violation of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The district court dismissed his claims for lack of ripeness because he failed to fully exhaust his permit-appeal rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. 159 F.4th 507.
Citing Williamson County, the Sixth Circuit stated that “[i]n the land-use context, one important factor in a dispute’s fitness for judicial decision is a ‘finality’ requirement—a concrete and final decision by the local authorities.” Put another way, “land use challenges are generally unripe until the ‘relevant administrative agency resolve[s] the appropriate application of the zoning ordinance to the property in dispute.’” The court of appeals then concluded that Grand failed to allow the city’s local agencies to “reach[] a final decision about the application of the City’s zoning rules to Grand.”
Grand argues that “[n]o one needs a permit to pray in their home with friends.” He therefore “suffered a cognizable, constitutional injury” when the city issued its cease and desist letter, which targeted his religious practice. Obtaining a permit wouldn’t cure the problem, for “the permit would require him to convert his home into a house of worship and he could no longer live there.” But his goal was to pray with friends at his home. And “if ‘free exercise’ means anything, the government cannot require you to seek a permit to pray in your home with friends.” That means, he says, that “’[a]pplying the finality requirement to [his] claim makes no sense,’ because a final zoning decision ‘would not change the ultimate harm that Grand alleged: discrimination.’” Grand further maintains that the underpinning of the Williamson County finality requirement doesn’t apply here. The Williamson County rule seeks to ensure that there has actually been a taking, which you can’t know “unless and until the zoning agency has finally determined whether and how to enforce a restriction that diminishes a property’s value or otherwise interferes with property rights.” By contrast, he says, “[a]n individual’s right to free exercise does not depend on when zoning authorities issue a final decision. A citizen does not have to wait for government permission to engage in religious expression.” (Citations omitted.)
Apple Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., 25-1311.
The Court will resolve whether a court may hold a party in civil contempt for violating an injunction’s “spirit,” or whether a court must ground a civil contempt finding on the violation of an injunction’s plain text. In 2020, Epic Games sued Apple for state and federal antitrust violations related to its digital app store. The district court concluded that Apple had not violated federal antitrust laws, but that its in-app payment system’s anti-steering provision violated California’s Unfair Competition Law. The anti-steering provision barred developers from steering their users to other alternatives. The court’s order declared that Apple was “hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from prohibiting developers from [] including in their apps and their metadata buttons, external links, or other calls to action that direct customers to purchasing mechanisms, in addition to In-App Purchasing.”
In the present case, Epic Games alleged that Apple violated this injunction by (most importantly) charging up to a 27% commission on link-out purchases. The district court agreed and held Apple in civil contempt. Though the injunction did not mention commissions explicitly, Apple had violated the “spirit” of the injunction by charging one on link-out purchases that was prohibitively high. The district court barred Apple from “imposing any commission or any fee on purchases that consumers make outside an app.” The Ninth Circuit reversed this zero-commissions rule but affirmed the contempt finding against Apple for charging 27% on linked-out transactions. 161 F.4th 1162. The court of appeals agreed that “the text of the [i]njunction does not address commissions at all,” but ruled that “[p]arties may be held in contempt for violating the spirit of an injunction.” The court pointed to Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis v. United States, 266 U.S. 17 (1924), which said that an injunction’s terms should be “read in the light of the issues and the purpose for which the suit was brought.”
Apple contends in its petition that the Ninth Circuit improperly relied on findings that it had violated the “spirit” of the injunction rather than its plain text. According to Apple, “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s ‘spirit’ rule is wrong and conflicts with the basic principles undergirding contempt, this Court’s caselaw, and Rule 65, while depriving parties of the clear notice that is required before imposing a civil contempt sanction.” In particular, Apple insists that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s ‘spirit’ rule flouts” the Court’s statement that “principles of ‘basic fairness requir[e] that those enjoined receive explicit notice’ of ‘what conduct is outlawed’ before being held in civil contempt.” On top of that, says Apple, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 requires that an injunction “state its terms specifically; and . . . describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or required.” “Courts assessing civil contempt should, therefore, ‘read court decrees to mean rather precisely what they say.’”
Epic Games rejects this reading of the circuit court’s analysis. In its view, “the court found that the commission violated the express terms of the district court’s order.” The Ninth Circuit began its contempt analysis by considering the injunction’s text, and found that it barred Apple from prohibiting developers on its platform from steering. The court agreed with the district court’s finding that the commission had a prohibitive effect. Epic emphasizes findings that Apple’s 27% link-out commission rate was calculated to ensure that “every linked-out transaction [would be] more expensive to a developer than an [in-app purchase] transaction at 30% commission.” The courts agreed that this “was intentionally designed to make [] steering mechanisms prohibitively expensive.” In Epic’s view, “[the injunction] was ‘silent’ on commissions only in the same sense that an injunction against selling ‘alcohol’ to minors is silent about selling minors beer.”
Montoya Palacios v. Liggins, 25-1223.
At issue is “[w]hether a habeas challenge to immigration detention is a ‘civil action’ within the meaning of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), rendering a prevailing petition eligible for an award of attorney’s fees.” Kevin Montoya Palacios fled El Salvador and entered the United States. In 2023, an immigration judge found him removable but, at the same time, granted his request for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture. ICE agents nonetheless detained Montoya Palacios when he reported for a routine check-in in December 2025. Montoya Palacios soon thereafter filed a habeas petition, which the district court granted in January 2026. Montoya Palacios’s habeas petition had requested “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the [EAJA].” The EAJA provides that “in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort),” “a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses.” 28 U.S.C. §2412(b). The district court denied the request based on circuit precedent holding that a habeas petition is not a “civil action” for purposes of the EAJA. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unreported opinion.
The prior Fourth Circuit precedent, Obanda-Segura v. Garland, 999 F.3d 990 (2021), reasoned that habeas actions are “unique, hybrid proceedings.” And, said the court, “that uniqueness makes it ambiguous whether habeas proceedings fall under ‘any civil action’ with the Equal Access to Justice Act.” Given that “ambiguity” and “courts’ obligation to construe the waiver of sovereign immunity narrowly,” the court concluded that habeas petitions do not fall under the EAJA.
Petitioner Montoya Palacios argues that “[h]abeas actions challenging immigration detention have long been considered civil actions” under Supreme Court precedent. That understanding dates back to at least 1883, when the Court stated in Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, that “a statute referring to ‘any civil suit or proceeding’ encompassed habeas actions seeking release from confinement due to criminal prosecution.” Montoya Palacios maintains that two textual clues in the EAJA confirm that habeas actions are covered. First, the statute applies to “any civil action,” which gives the term expansive scope. Second, the EAJA speaks of “any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort).” That express exception, he says, creates a negative inference that there are no additional exceptions.
The U.S. Solicitor General, representing respondent, agrees that certiorari is warranted because of a circuit split but defends the Fourth Circuit decision on its merits. The Solicitor General relies on Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487 (1971), which ruled that “though habeas corpus is technically ‘civil,’ it is not automatically subject to all the rules governing ordinary civil actions.’” The Court therefore declined to read 28 U.S.C. §1391(e)―which provided for nationwide service of process in a “civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States”―as covering habeas proceedings. The Solicitor General emphasizes that waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, and asserts that the same result as in Schlanger should obtain here.
Wassily v. Blanche, 25-842.
The Court will resolve whether 8 U.S.C. §1159(b)―which provides a pathway to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status to aliens “granted asylum”―applies to noncitizens who were “granted asylum,” but whose asylum was later terminated. Petitioner Tamer Wassily is a native and citizen of Egypt who was granted asylum due to religious persecution in Egypt. After he was convicted of stalking and child endangerment, the government sought to terminate his asylum. An immigration judge did so, but also granted Wassily’s application for adjustment to LPR status. The Bureau of Immigration Affairs reversed, holding “that Wassily was categorically ineligible to adjust to LPR status because his asylum had been terminated before his adjustment application was adjudicated.” Wassily filed a petition for review in the Second Circuit, which denied the petition by a 2-1 vote. 150 F.4th 100. (In the Second Circuit, Wassily’s case was consolidated with another similarly situated alien, petitioner Byron Velasquez Arreaga.)
Under 8 U.S.C. §1159(b), the government “may adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence the status of any alien granted asylum” who applies for adjustment and meets certain requirements. The Second Circuit reasoned that “‘the status of any alien granted asylum’” referred to a present condition, such that “only noncitizens with current asylum status [can] adjust to [LPR] status.” “In fact,” said the court, “if Congress intended to permit anyone previously granted asylum to become a lawful permanent resident, . . . there would be no need for Congress to use the word ‘status’ at all.” The Second Circuit found this interpretation supported by a neighboring provision’s use of the word “granted” to refer to then-existing asylum status. “Read in that context, section 1159(b)’s reference to ‘the status of any alien granted asylum’ is best understood as simply extending another benefit to a noncitizen with current asylum status: the opportunity to adjust to lawful permanent resident status.”
Petitioners Wassily and Arreaga argue that §1159(b) speaks of “any alien granted asylum.” They say that “any” has an “expansive meaning” and that “granted,” “when used as a past-tense verb, refers to something that has happened in the past.” Further, “’[n]owhere in this section does Congress require that an alien’s asylum, once granted, still must be in effect at the time he applies for adjustment of status.’” Petitioners also make a structural argument: “Section 1159(b)(2) provides that an applicant for adjustment of status must have been ‘physically present in the United States for at least one year after being granted asylum.’ In this paragraph, ‘granted asylum’ can only refer to a completed, historical event, not a continuing, present status.” (Citation omitted.) And they maintain that “Section 1159(b) also imposes two express continuing-status rules unrelated to asylum status.” Relatedly, petitioners assert that “’three times within § 1159,’ Congress ‘specif[ied] when a noncitizen must maintain a predicate status in order to be potentially eligible for adjustment of status.’ Yet it did not do so here.” (Citation omitted.) Petitioners add that the Second Circuit’s reliance on the word “status” “begs the question of what ‘status’ is being adjusted: ‘current asylum status’ or something else—like ‘non-LPR status’ or the status of having once been ‘granted asylum.’”
The United States agrees with the Second Circuit majority but supported a grant of certiorari because the circuits are divided on the question presented.
RiseandShine Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 24-1016.
At issue is whether, in assessing whether an alleged trademark infringer’s use “is likely to cause confusion” under 15 U.S.C. §1114, trademark strength is a question of fact or a question of law. Section 1114 prohibits competitors “[f]rom marking their goods in a way that is ‘likely to cause confusion’ or ‘mistake’ with another’s trademark.” A trademark’s strength, i.e., its level of distinctiveness, is a key factor. Petitioner―RiseandShine Corporation (Rise Brewing)―sued PepsiCo, alleging trademark infringement after Pepsi launched a caffeine drink “[u]sing the word RISE in large, bright capital letters printed on a light-colored upper third of the can, just as in Rise Brewing’s product.” The district court applied the eight-factor test set forth in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), to determine the “likelihood of confusion” and issued a preliminary injunction. It found that the RISE mark was “suggestive” of inherent distinctiveness, had acquired marketplace distinctiveness, and Pepsi’s product was “confusingly similar in appearance.” Pepsi appealed, and the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. 41 F.4th 112.
“Considering likelihood of confusion under the same Polaroid factors, the Second Circuit held that the district court committed ‘legal error’ ‘in its evaluation of what is often the most important factor—strength of Plaintiff’s mark—as well as in its finding of similarity in the appearance of the products.’” On remand, the district court granted Pepsi’s motion for summary judgment. Rise Brewing appealed, “arguing that the Second Circuit could not have decided strength of the mark as a question of law because strength is a question of fact. The Second Circuit disagreed and affirmed” in an unpublished order. The court reaffirmed that “the inherent strength of a mark is a question of law, stating ‘in no uncertain terms that a mark’s inherent strength is a legal question.’” The court of appeals then ruled that the mark “RISE” was “an inherently weak mark for a coffee product because of the mark’s logical association with the product.” The court also held that “no reasonable jury could find that the primary significance of the mark ‘RISE’ is to identify RiseandShine as the source of the product,” and that the “strength-of-mark Polaroid factor strongly favored PepsiCo.”
Petitioner Rise Brewing claims that under 15 U.S.C. §1114 the strength-of-mark consideration is a question of fact. Rise Brewing asserts that the Second Circuit decision “flouts this Court’s precedent.” It maintains that “[i]n United States PTO v. Booking.com B.V., this Court explained that the ‘character’ of a trademark—whether it is ‘generic (or not generic)’—’depends on its meaning to consumers,’ which considers how ‘consumers in fact perceive the term’ in the marketplace. 591 U.S. 549, 550 (2020). And this Court has consistently held that the ‘[a]pplication of a test that relies upon an ordinary consumer’s understanding of the impression that a mark conveys falls comfortably within the ken of a jury.’ Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 574 U.S. 418, 422 (2015). In other words, a trademark’s conceptual strength is squarely a factual question.” Rise Brewing also says that the Second Circuit decision will cause forum shopping, as its “solitary approach”―which conflicts with 12 other circuits―“favors parties that want to avoid juries.”
NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy Staff
- Dan Schweitzer, Director and Chief Counsel
- Reagan Dewey, Law Clerk
- Riley Gamble, Law Clerk
- Ego McLain, Law Clerk
- Joshua Whitlock, Law Clerk
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