Connecticut et al. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals et al. Civ. Action No. (D.Conn. Dec. 15, 2016)
Twenty states filed a federal lawsuit against six generic drug manufacturers, alleging that they entered into long-running and well coordinated illegal conspiracies in order to unreasonably restrain trade, artificially inflate and manipulate prices and reduce competition in the United States for two drugs: doxycycline hyclate delayed release, an antibiotic, and glyburide, an oral diabetes medication. The lawsuit was filed under seal to avoid compromising a continuing investigation. In the complaint, the states allege that the misconduct was conceived and carried out by senior drug company executives and their marketing and sales executives. The complaint further alleges that the defendants routinely coordinated their schemes through direct interaction with their competitors at industry trade shows, customer conferences and other events, as well as through direct email, phone and text message communications. The states further allege that the drug companies knew that their conduct was illegal and made efforts to avoid communicating with each other in writing or, in some instances, to delete written communications after becoming aware of the investigation. The states allege the anticompetitive conduct, including price-fixing and price maintenance, market allocation and other anticompetitive acts, caused significant, harmful and continuing effects in the country’s healthcare system. The states sought an injunction to prevent the companies from engaging in illegal, anticompetitive behavior and also sought equitable relief, including disgorgement. An additional 20 states joined the complaint in March 2017.
New York et al. v. Cephalon, No. 2:16-cv-04234 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2016)
In May 2015, the FTC settled a “pay-for-delay” suit against Cephalon for injunctive relief and $1.2 billion, which was paid into an escrow account. The FTC settlement allowed for those escrow funds to be distributed for settlement of certain related cases and government investigations. In August 2016, forty-eight states filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Cephalon alleging anticompetitive conduct by Cephalon to protect the profits it earned from having a patent-protected monopoly on the sale of its landmark drug, Provigil. According to the complaint, Cephalon’s conduct delayed generic versions of Provigil from entering the market for several years. The complaint alleged that as patent and regulatory barriers that prevented generic competition to Provigil neared expiration, Cephalon intentionally defrauded the Patent and Trademark Office to secure an additional patent, which a court subsequently deemed invalid and unenforceable. Before it was declared invalid, Cephalon was able to use the patent to delay generic competition for nearly six additional years by filing patent infringement lawsuits. Cephalon settled those lawsuits by paying competitors to delay sale of their generic versions of Provigil until at least April 2012. Consumers, states, and others paid millions more for Provigil than they would have had generic versions of the drug launched by early 2006, as expected. A settlement was filed with the complaint, which includes $35 million for distribution to consumers who bought Provigil.
Maryland et al. v. Perrigo Company, No. 1:04CV01398 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004)
The FTC and states alleged that the companies had entered into a “pay-for-delay” arrangement, whereby Perrigo paid Alpharma to withdraw its generic version from the market for Children’t ibuprofen.According to the complaint, in June 1998, Perrigo and Alpharma signed an agreement allocating to Perrigo the sale of OTC children’s liquid ibuprofen for seven years. In exchange for agreeing not to compete, Alpharma received an up-front payment and a royalty on Perrigo’s sales of children’s liquid ibuprofen. The FTC received $6.25 million to compensate injured consumers. The states received $1.5 million in lieu of civil penalties. the parties were enjoined from future agreements.
Hawaii v. American International Group (AIG) Inc., No. 08-1-0191-01 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1st. Dist. Jan. 29, 2008)
State court proceedings to implement settlement reached with AIG, resolving alleged bid-rigging and false insurance quotes, as well as payment of secret “contingent commissions” to brokers. See also NY v. AIG, Ohio v. AIG, Hawaii v. ACE Holdings.
In re DDAVP Antitrust Litigation
33 states investigated “pay for delay” allegations relating to DDAVP, a drug used to alleviate bed-wetting. States alleged that Aventis, holder of the patent for the medication, engaged in a scheme to delay the regulatory approval and sale of a generic version of DDAVP, in violation of state and federal antitrust law. States and defendants entered into a settlement under which states received $3.45 million, not as a civil penalty and defendants did not admit guilt.
Hawaii v. ACE Holdings, Inc., No. 07-1-2015-10 (Cir. Ct. 1st Cir. Hawaii, Oct. 25, 2007)
Consent decrees filed by states in state court required $4.5 million payment and conduct relief to remedy alleged bid-rigging and false insurance quotes, as well as payment of secret “contingent commissions” to brokers.
Texas et al. v. Organon (Remeron), No. 04-5126 (D.N.J. 2004)
Plaintiff states settled with drug maker Organon USA, Inc. and its parent company, Akzo Nobel N.V., resolving antitrust claims involving the antidepressant drug Remeron between June 2001 and October 2004. The states’ complaint alleged that Organon unlawfully extended its monopoly by improperly listing a new “combination therapy” patent with the U.S. Federal Drug Administration. In addition, the complaint alleged that Organon delayed listing the patent with the FDA in another effort to delay the availability of lower-cost generic substitutes. The $26 million settlement resolved claims brought by state attorneys general, as well as a private class action brought on behalf of a class of end payors. Organon also agreed to make timely listings of patents and to submit accurate and truthful information to the FDA.
Richardson v. Akzo Nobel (In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation), 1:09-cv-02112-TFH(D.D.C. 2009)
As part of a private class action lawsuit, states, as parens patriae for their citizens, reached a settlement with vitamin manufacturers accused of fixing prices on certain vitamins (The vitamins affected by this alleged price fixing conspiracy are: vitamin A,
astaxanthin, vitamin B1 (thiamin), vitamin B2 (riboflavin), vitamin B3 (niacin), vitamin B4 (choline chloride), vitamin B5 (calpan), vitamin B6, vitamin B9 (folic acid), vitamin B12 (cyanocobalamine pharma), betacarotene, vitamin C, canthaxanthin, vitamin E, and vitamin H (biotin), as well as all blends and forms of these vitamins) sold purchased between 1988 and 2000. This case is related to the case New York et al. v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,et al. with different defendants.
In re Marsh & McLennan
Plaintiff states alleged that Marsh, an insurance broker, made collusive arrangements whereby brokers entered into agreements with insurers to receive undisclosed compensation and engaged in anticompetitive conduct in the market for commercial liability insurance. March agreed to reveal all commissions paid, and to pay the states $7 million.
Florida v. Travelers Companies, Inc. (Leon County Court)
Plaintiff states filed identical complaints and consent orders in their respective state courts. See case listings under other settling states. The complaint alleged that Travelers
participated in a bid rigging scheme in which broker Marsh & McLennan predesignated which insurance company’s bid would “win” a particular account. To create the appearance of a competitive bidding process, Marsh would instruct certain insurers to submit inflated, intentionally uncompetitive bids. These schemes gave commercial policyholders, including large and small companies, nonprofit organizations, and public entities, the impression that they were receiving the most competitive commercial premiums available, when they were actually being overcharged.
Additionally, Travelers was involved with a “pay-to-play” arrangement centered on their
payment of contingent commissions, in addition to standard commissions and fees, to insurance brokers. Contingent commissions, often undisclosed to consumers, provided an incentive for brokers to steer business to the insurer who offered the most lucrative contingent commissions, often in violation of their clients’ interests.
States settled for $6 million plus injunctive relief mandating disclosure of types and amounts of compensation.
