Introduction

On June 30th, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Apple, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc.1 In its petition, Apple submitted two issues for the Court to resolve. The first asked whether courts could hold parties in contempt for violating the “spirit” of injunctions.2 The Court will review this question alone. The second, which the Court will not review, asks: “Whether the Ninth Circuit has properly created an ‘antitrust’ or ‘competition’ exception to Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025), and the longstanding equitable principles on which CASA rests, or otherwise disregarded CASA’s limits.”3 By not considering the second question, the Supreme Court has left the door open for other parties to resurrect this challenge in their own antitrust cases. This article will discuss the applicability of the CASA decision to antitrust enforcement, the limits it might impose on the injunctive relief courts can provide, and options state enforcers can use to shore up their own suits against similar challenges.

Injunctive Scope under Trump v. CASA, Inc.

In CASA, the Supreme Court found that universal injunctions “likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has granted to federal courts” under the Judiciary Act of 1789.4 This decision limited the scope of injunctive relief courts could provide. While courts retained authority to provide complete relief, the Court clarified that injunctions could be crafted only to provide that relief to the plaintiff.5 Such an injunction might benefit nonparties, but these benefits would be “merely incidental.”6.  Additionally, only the plaintiffs could later sue to enforce the injunction.3 Any nonparties wishing to assert their rights had to sue separately.

On December 11th, 2025, approximately six months after the CASA decision, the Ninth Circuit ruled against Apple in its dispute with Epic Games over the scope of an injunction.7 The trial court had previously found that Apple violated California’s Unfair Competition Law by prohibiting developers on Apple’s app store from encouraging customers to make purchases from the developer rather than from Apple.8 The trial court enjoined Apple from .3 After the trial found Apple in contempt of this injunction, Apple appealed. Epic Games prevailed before the Ninth Circuit on the theory that this injunction barred Apple from prohibiting link-out purchases.9 Epic persuaded the court that Apple had violated the injunction by charging a commission on link-outs so costly (up to 27%) that it amounted to a prohibition.10 The Ninth Circuit found that the district court’s contempt remedy, an order prohibiting Apple from collecting any commission on link-outs, was an abuse of discretion.11 But it affirmed the finding of contempt, and affirmed that, once revised, the order would apply to the rate chargeable for “all linked-out purchases and not just to Epic Games or links out to the Epic Games Store.”12

Apple relied on the CASA ruling in its petition to the Supreme Court from this judgment. Its petition asserted that the Ninth Circuit flaunted the Supreme Court’s decision by recognizing antitrust as an exception to CASA’s general rule.13 In its case, this supposed exception resulted in a court order forbidding Apple from prohibiting link-out purchases not just for Epic Games and its subsidiaries, but for all developers on the platform.14 To a company as large as Apple, and to others likely to bring similar challenges, this difference is of tremendous significance. It is the difference between just one party or an entire industry becoming free of Apple’s control. It is therefore no surprise that Apple opposed the injunction based on CASA. Other large defendants in similar situations will surely be tempted to do the same.

But there are reasons to be skeptical of Apple’s analysis. The Ninth Circuit distinguished its decision from CASA on several grounds. In response to Apple’s CASA argument, the Court explained that its decision to enjoin Apple’s behavior towards all developers was “consistent with CASA’s underlying principle because its ‘scope is tied to Epic’s injuries’ as a developer and games distributor…”15 The court determined that Epic was injured when Apple prevented other app developers from linking out to Epic’s own digital games store.3 To provide complete relief to Epic, an injunction had to be constructed broadly enough to address this harm.3 This reasoning may partially explain the Supreme Court’s decision not to review this issue. Even if the Ninth Circuit has created an antitrust exception to CASA, this particular injunction may have been proper without one.

The Ninth Circuit’s explanation that the specific facts in Apple v. Epic justifies a broad injunction that passes muster under CASA did not prevent it from commenting on CASA’s applicability to antitrust injunctions. Epic’s antitrust litigation against Apple has proceeded concurrently with its case against Google concerning Google’s own prohibitions against link-outs in the Google Play store.16 In its Apple ruling, the Ninth Circuit cited its finding in Google to distinguish its broad behavioral injunctions from CASA’s limits. “In that case,” it explained, “we determined that ‘the scope of a permanent injunction following a finding of antitrust liability is hardly comparable to that of a preliminary injunction on a constitutional question.’”14 Further, “CASA’s holding about district courts’ authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 has no bearing on whether the district court here exceeded its equitable powers under Section 16 of the Clayton Act.”3 In short, the Ninth Circuit saw no CASA issue with its remedy in Apple’s case, but it was also not persuaded that CASA applied. Under this theory, CASA might be limited, at least in antitrust cases, when 1) injunctions followed a finding of liability or 2) the court’s equitable authority derived from the Clayton Act instead of the Judiciary Act. If these limits do not constitute an antitrust exception to CASA, what they create at least rhymes with one.

Whether one agrees with Apple that this constitutes an antitrust exception or not, the question of CASA’s applicability in antitrust cases endures and is sure to be raised again. Does CASA leave room for an antitrust exception, given that the antitrust laws protect, “competition, not competitors[?]”17 Does the Clayton Act create a source of equitable authority separate from the Judiciary Act?18 Do indirect anticompetitive effects permit courts to structure broad remedies on behalf of state enforcers exclusively? The answers to these questions may be long in coming, but they could transform the path to antitrust remedies in the future.

Futureproofing Strategies

Because antitrust litigation often takes years to resolve, it may be helpful to prospectively consider strategic options available in the event that courts apply CASA as Apple requests. The unsettled questions raised in Apple’s petition will likely recur until they are answered. An answer which strictly applies CASA to antitrust enforcement may limit the scope of behavioral remedies available to redress anticompetitive harms. Narrow behavioral injunctions tailored only to protect the parties could, in some cases, leave consumers without the protection they have enjoyed prior to CASA. This disruption risks undermining years of effort and expense on the part of state attorneys general offices. Fortunately, antitrust enforcers looking to inoculate their cases against CASA challenges have several options available.

Parens Patriae

Parens patriae standing may be the government’s most powerful tool for ensuring behavioral injunctions protect the public. Unlike the universal injunction, parens patriae standing is derived from legal origins predating the Constitution.19 American legislatures inherited it from the English monarch’s royal prerogative to take legal action on behalf of those otherwise incapable of representing themselves.3 Congress explicitly granted state attorneys general this standing for antitrust suits in the Clayton Act,20 and several states have since followed suit. Because parens standing allows states to bring civil actions on behalf of their state’s residents, behavioral remedies can be fashioned to protect those residents. Particularly in large, multi-state actions, it is not difficult to imagine courts providing remedies that resemble broad pre-CASA injunctions.

For states to assert parens patriae standing, they must show a quasi-sovereign interest, meaning one which is distinct from the interests of particular private parties.21 Courts recognize a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in 1) the physical and economic wellbeing of its residents and 2) securing observance of terms under which it participates in the federal system.22 The Supreme Court made it clear that violations of the antitrust laws can implicate either of these interests in Georgia v. Pennsylvania. R.R. Co.23 There, the Court recognized Georgia’s right to sue as parens patriae under the antitrust laws to redress harms to both “the economy of Georgia and the welfare of her citizens… as a result of this alleged conspiracy.”24

Suits brought as parens patriae present a clear way for states to secure injunctive relief on behalf of their citizens from antitrust harms. But do they conflict with CASA? CASA’s ruling limits the relief that courts can grant under the Judiciary Act to the parties in the case. Courts have previously allowed states to secure injunctive relief on behalf of their constituents with parens patriae standing.25 While the Supreme Court could doubtless find that this device isn’t compatible with the understanding of “party” it espouses in CASA, this reading would be of dubious historical merit given the deep traditional roots of the doctrine. Such a literal reading would also undermine the utility of other types of litigation by proxy, such as guardian ad litem proceedings and shareholder derivative suits. In short, parens patriae standing is strongly grounded in the American legal tradition. Where applicable, it should enable state enforcers to obtain broad injunctive relief.

But parens patriae standing is only available to government enforcers. While state attorneys general can employ this in their own cases, parens patriae doesn’t provide a vehicle for courts to enjoin anticompetitive behavior when private plaintiffs like Epic Games sue directly. Where appropriate, attorneys general wishing to secure broad behavioral remedies alongside these plaintiffs can consider intervening to extend the Court’s injunctive reach.26

Class Actions

Attorneys general can also provide support for broad behavioral remedies sought by private plaintiffs in class actions. Class actions avoid conflict with the CASA rule by ensuring that large classes of plaintiffs are included as parties to the suit. Courts are then empowered to impose broad injunctions to accord these plaintiff classes complete relief. Class actions are not just an intuitive adaptation to the CASA decision, they’re the Supreme Court’s sanctioned alternative to universal injunctions.27

States can support private antitrust class actions by filing amicus briefs where appropriate and weighing in on proposed settlements.28 While this avenue to broad behavioral injunctions places attorneys general in a supporting role, it can still be cost-effective. This method requires states to spend less time and resources on separately seeking behavioral remedies for identical behavior, though the attorney general’s power to sway the outcome lies in its ability to persuade and influence the court rather than any hard power it might exercise in other strategies. While class actions that recover damages for violations of the antitrust laws can preclude recovery by the state on behalf of class members for those violations, injunctions are not subject to the same constraints.29

Settlement Agreements

When suing under standing other than parens patriae (e.g., as an indirect purchaser), state enforcers can seek settlement agreements that include broad behavioral restrictions. The CASA decision limited the power of federal courts to grant injunctions in excess of complete relief to the parties,30 but did not limit the types of contractual arrangements that parties can make. If CASA ultimately limits the scope of relief that can be obtained through antitrust litigation, settlements will remain a viable option for seeking behavioral remedies broader than those applicable to the immediate state plaintiffs.

Structural Remedies

If CASA is found to tie the court’s hands on behavioral antitrust remedies, states can pursue structural alternatives. The debate over whether behavioral or structural remedies should be preferred is far older than the CASA decision.31 Divestitures, merger-blocks and the like aim to permanently place target entities in market positions that incentivize competition, fair play, and innovation. These remedies can be easier to administer than behavioral injunctions, which may require back-end compliance monitoring. As Apple’s own case shows, behavioral remedies may also require additional litigation to enforce. If CASA means that courts can only enjoin behavior towards parties to the case, the public utility of behavioral remedies is substantially curtailed. Structural remedies, however, do not involve nonparties to a suit. Rather than enjoining misbehavior toward broad categories of parties, they remove the incentives and opportunities that precipitate anticompetitive action in the first place. While some courts prefer behavioral remedies because they are less dramatic and more easily reversible than structural ones, those courts may change their tune if such remedies are seen as constrained by CASA.

Conclusion

Apple’s appeal may well be the first of many to challenge the scope of behavioral antitrust remedies under CASA. Regardless of how the issue is ultimately resolved, attorneys general will continue to have pathways to delivering broad relief to their constituents. Parens patriae standing provides an avenue to secure broad injunctive relief even under a strict application of the CASA limits. Where it doesn’t apply, states can continue to pursue broad protection for their citizens without risking a CASA conflict by supporting appropriate class actions, negotiating effective settlements, and seeking structural remedies for violations of the antitrust laws.

Endnotes

  1. Apple Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 25-1311, 2026 LX 382299 (June 30, 2026). [↩]
  2. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at i, Apple Inc. v. Epic Games Inc., (2026) (No. 25-1311). [↩]
  3. Id. [↩][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩]
  4. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 837 (2025). [↩]
  5. Id. at 852. [↩]
  6. Id. (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 717 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring[↩]
  7. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 161 F.4th 1162, 1191 (9th Cir. 2025). [↩]
  8. Id. at 1172. [↩]
  9. “Link-out purchases” or “link-outs” refer to transactions where a customer on Apple’s app store is directed to complete their purchase in another digital marketplace, such as the Epic Games Store. [↩]
  10. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 161 F.4th at 1187 n.9. [↩]
  11. Id. at 1186–87. [↩]
  12. Id. at 1193. [↩]
  13. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 26. [↩]
  14. Apple, 161 F.4th at 1193. [↩][↩]
  15. Id. at 1192. [↩]
  16. In re Google Play Store Antitrust Litig., 147 F.4th 917 (9th Cir. 2025). [↩]
  17. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). [↩]
  18. The Ninth Circuit certainly seems open to that interpretation. See supra note 22. Apple’s petition points to the text of the Clayton Act to argue otherwise. Supra note 2 at 30 (noting that under 15 U.S.C. § 26 private parties may obtain relief “‘when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief… granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings.’”). [↩]
  19. Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57–58 (1890). [↩]
  20. 15 U.S.C. § 15c; 15 U.S.C. § 26. See Burch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 633, 634–35 (4th Cir. 1977).  [↩]
  21. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601–7 (1982). [↩]
  22. Id. at 607. [↩]
  23. 324 U.S. 439 (1945). [↩]
  24. Id. at 450. [↩]
  25. Burch, 554 F.2d at 634–35 (citation omitted). See also In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., 605 F. Supp. 3d 672, 680 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (“Preventing antitrust harms to a state’s citizenry is a recognized quasi-sovereign interest.”) (emphasis added). [↩]
  26. Intervention is procedurally governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To intervene with parens patriae standing, the state must show that it is more than a “nominal party” by articulating a quasi-sovereign interest of its own. Snap, 458 U.S. at 607.  [↩]
  27. See Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. at 847-50 (distinguishing class actions, which developed from the English bill of peace, from the universal injunctions). [↩]
  28. 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (requiring notice of class action settlements to appropriate state officials). [↩]
  29. See In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., No. 18-md-02843-VC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39249 at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2023) (“[A] private class action settlement cannot prevent a state from pursuing a lawsuit against the defendant based on the same conduct to vindicate its police powers [for example, to impose penalties or obtain injunctive relief]. But it should be equally obvious that Facebook could argue that New Mexico is barred from obtaining a financial recovery on behalf of residents who participated in this class action settlement.”) (internal citation omitted). [↩]
  30. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. at 852. [↩]
  31. See John E. Kwoka Jr, Revisiting Structural Remedies, 39 Antitrust Magazine 1, 38 (2024), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrust_law/resources/magazine/2024-fall/revisiting-structural-remedies/. [↩]

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