-
Director, Center for Supreme Court AdvocacyNational Association of Attorneys General
May 6, 2024 | Volume 31, Issue 10
This Report summarizes opinions issued on April 12, 16, and 17, 2024 (Part I).
Opinion
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 22-193.
The Court unanimously held that although an employee must show harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury satisfies a significance test. Petitioner Sergeant Jatonya Calyborn Muldrow worked in the St. Louis Police Department’s specialized Intelligence Division from 2008 through 2017. In her role, “she investigated public corruption and human trafficking cases, oversaw the Gang Unit, and served as head of the Gun Crimes Unit.” She was also deputized as a Task Force Officer with the FBI, which provided her with an unmarked take-home car and the authority to pursue investigations outside St. Louis. In 2017, a new Intelligence Division commander had Muldrow transferred out of the unit to replace her with a male officer he believed would be better suited for the Division’s dangerous work. Muldrow’s rank and salary remained unchanged in her new role, but her responsibilities, perks, and schedule changed. Muldrow brought a Title VII suit against the city challenging her transfer from the Intelligence Division, claiming it was based on gender discrimination. She alleged that she had been moved from a “premier position” into a less “’prestigious’ and more ‘administrative’ uniformed role.” The district court granted the city summary judgment. Applying a heightened-injury standard, the court stated that Muldrow failed to prove that the transfer effected a significant change in working conditions that produced a material employment disadvantage. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, after agreeing that “Muldrow had to—but could not—show that the transfer caused a ‘materially significant disadvantage.’” In an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court reversed and remanded.
The Court concluded that the text of Title VII does not impose a heightened-harm threshold when challenging an employment transfer. Title VII explicitly prohibits discrimination based on sex regarding the terms or conditions of employment. The Court noted that to “discriminate against” means to treat worse, as it requires a transferee to “show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” But the text does not require the transferee to show that the harm incurred was significant. The Court found that requiring an elevated threshold for harm adds words to the statute that Congress enacted “so that the law as applied demands something more of her than the law as written.” Rather, held the Court, the statutory language merely required Muldrow “to show that the transfer brought about some ‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or condition.” The Court observed that the “some” injury standard applied to the present circumstances would be easily met if appropriately preserved and substantiated. It emphasized the change in Muldrow’s employment from a “plainclothes job in a prestigious specialized division” to a “uniformed job . . . less involved in high-visibility matters and primarily performing administrative work” alongside the loss of a regular schedule and her take-home car.
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion noting that Title VII requires a plaintiff to show a harm that is more than trifling. He questioned the Court’s reading of the Eighth Circuit’s decision because he did not read the decision to have required a heightened-harm requirement, but instead required that “a plaintiff must have suffered an actual disadvantage as compared to minor changes.” He noted that that standard “aligns with the Court’s observation that a plaintiff must show ‘some disadvantageous change in an employment term or condition.’” He said there was a little practical difference between that and the Court’s holding.
Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion agreeing with the judgment, but criticizing what he called an “unhelpful opinion.” He found “little if any substantive difference between the terminology the Court approves and the terminology it doesn’t like” based on the definition of injury and harm incorporating some degree of significance. Justice Kavanaugh also filed a concurring opinion to note that even when a transfer does not change an employee’s compensation, it does change the terms, conditions, or privileges. Therefore, if made based on the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, it violates Title VII. Thus, while agreeing with the Court in rejecting a significant-harm standard, he disagreed with a some-harm standard as the text of Title VII does not require a separate showing of some harm.
NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy Staff
- Dan Schweitzer, Director and Chief Counsel
- Melissa Patterson, Supreme Court Fellow
- Amanda Schwartz, Supreme Court Fellow
The views and opinions of authors expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily state or reflect those of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). This newsletter does not provide any legal advice and is not a substitute for the procurement of such services from a legal professional. NAAG does not endorse or recommend any commercial products, processes, or services.
Any use and/or copies of the publication in whole or part must include the customary bibliographic citation. NAAG retains copyright and all other intellectual property rights in the material presented in the publications.