Arkansas – The Arkansas Supreme Court held that a trial court erred when it dismissed a complaint the Arkansas Attorney General had filed against the Arkansas Board of Corrections for violating the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), holding (among other things) that it was error to “order[] the Attorney General to invoke statutory procedures or ‘reach an accommodation’ for the Board’s hiring of special counsel for the current litigation.” In December 2023, the attorney general sued the Board, asserting that the Board violated FOIA’s open-meetings provision and failed to respond adequately to the attorney general’s open-records request. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a request that the circuit court enjoin the Board’s employment of a special counsel. The circuit court sua sponte found that the case could not go forward unless the attorney general certified special counsel for the Board. Noting that the attorney general “has sued his own clients,” the circuit court “found that the Attorney General had violated Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-16-702 (Repl. 2024), which establishes statutory duties surrounding appointment of special counsel, and ordered that the Attorney General ‘reach an accommodation’ about representation within thirty days or it would dismiss the complaint without prejudice.” The attorney general responded that under state law “it could not certify special counsel until the Board asked for legal representation. The Attorney General argued further that, in any event, it alone could not accommodate payment because additional authorization must come from either the Governor or the Legislative Council. In sum, the Attorney General argued he could not comply with the court’s order.” The circuit court disagreed. It rejected the attorney general’s motion to vacate the court’s order, found the attorney general “failed to make material and good faith efforts” to help the Board obtain special counsel, and accordingly dismissed the attorney general’s complaint without prejudice. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

After finding it had appellate jurisdiction, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the attorney general could not “legally comply” with the circuit court’s order because (as the attorney general argued) “his duty to represent the Board depended on the Board initiating and certifying its need for legal representation. Until that happened, he argue[d], the statute imposed no duties.” The Arkansas Supreme Court observed that, although state law provides that ‘[t]he Attorney General shall be attorney for all state officials, departments, institutions, and agencies.’ Ark. Code Ann. § 25-16-702(a),” that “duty depends on the relevant entity certifying its need for representation: when one of those entities ‘needs the services of an attorney, the matter shall be certified to the Attorney General for attention.’ Id.” The court added that “[a] separate provision of section 25-16-702 allows the Attorney General to employ special counsel to represent a state entity; but various other authorizations are required, including approval by the Governor and the Legislative Council[.]” The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that “[a]s much as the circuit court was ordering the Attorney General to certify the Board’s need for special counsel before the Board had made such a request, that was based on a clearly erroneous application of the law.” The circuit court likewise erred in assuming that the attorney general alone could control the purse and authorize the Board’s retention of special counsel. [Griffin v. Ark. Bd. Corrections, 711 S.W.3d 784 (Ark. May 22, 2025)]

California – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted the mandamus petition of California and other states through which they objected to an order requiring them to produce various nonparty state agency documents. A collation of state attorneys general (the State AGs) brought an enforcement action against Meta, alleging that “Meta designed intentionally addictive products that harm teenagers’ mental health.” During discovery, Meta sought production of some nonparty state agency documents under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, “arguing that the documents are within the control of the State AGs.” The district court rejected the State AGs’ objection “that they do not have legal control over independent state agency documents,” and ordered the State AGs to produce the requested documents. The State AGs filed a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to grant their objections, which the Ninth Circuit granted.

The Ninth Circuit “agree[d] with California and the State AGs that the discovery orders were clearly erroneous because they failed to require a showing of the existence of an attorney-client relationship between the Attorneys General and nonparty state agencies. Instead, the orders erroneously inferred the future existence of such a relationship as a result of Meta’s attempt to force the nonparty state agencies into producing documents under Rule 34. Without an affirmative showing that an attorney-client relationship presently exists, discovery of nonparty state agency documents should be conducted under Rule 45.” (Footnote omitted.) The court therefore granted mandamus relief for 20 states. The court denied “mandamus relief to the Pennsylvania AG because Pennsylvania law explicitly grants his office control over the documents of nonparty state agencies.” And it found the matter moot as to seven states “because the district judge already granted these states relief from the magistrate judge’s order.” [California v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the No. Dist. of Cal., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21618 (9th Cir. August 22, 2025)]

Missouri – The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) the attorney general sent under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) to Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region and Southwest Missouri (also known as Planned Parenthood Great Rivers of PPGR) “alleg[ing] violations of Missouri’s consumer protection law in the course of providing gender transition services to minors.” In particular, the CID claims that Planned Parenthood and others “may have used deception, fraud, false promises, misrepresentation, unfair practices, and/or the concealment, suppression, or omission of material facts within the scope of the MMPA.” Planned Parenthood filed a petition to set aside the CID under a provision of the MMPA. The trial court “concluded the AG was entitled to receive all requested documents not protected by HIPAA and ordered PPGR to produce such documents.” Both sides appealed.

The Missouri Court of Appeals first held that “the trial court properly found the CID to be enforceable because the CID is authorized under the MMPA.” “The AG is charged with investigating and prosecuting violations of Missouri’s consumer protection laws, including the MMPA. Acting as a civil enforcement agency with respect to the MMPA, the AG is empowered to issue CIDs, which are a type of administrative subpoena that ‘provide a form of pretrial discovery for the benefit of the attorney general.’” (Citations omitted.) The court disagreed with Planned Parenthood’s contention that the MMPA does not apply to medical services, which are “properly investigated as medical malpractice.” Not so: “Missouri courts have held that the broad language of the MMPA covers medical goods and services.” Relatedly, the court held that “the AG’s regulatory authority under the MMPA is not preempted or divested by the” State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts. Although the Board “regulates the practice of medicine in the state and may investigate and discipline holders of medical licenses for misconduct,” this “does not exempt” medical providers “from complying with consumer protection laws in their business practices, which the AG is responsible for overseeing.”

After rejecting various other arguments offered by Planned Parenthood, the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected its contention that “the CID runs afoul of the Missouri Constitution by violating the separation of powers in that it overextends the AG’s executive power beyond MMPA enforcement.” Specifically, Planned Parenthood contended that “the legislature has spoken on the legality of the issues in the SAFE Act, thus the CID reflects an arbitrary overreach by the AG in an effort to criminalize legal behavior.” The SAFE Act “creates a cause of action against health care providers . . . arising from the performance of gender transition surgery or the prescription or administration of cross-sex hormones or puberty-blocking drugs to minors.” The Missouri Court of Appeals found nothing in the SAFE Act that purported to oust MMPA actions connected to gender transition efforts. [Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region & Sw. Mo. v. Bailey, 715 S.W.3d 167 (Mo. App. Ct. May 6, 2025)]

New Jersey – The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the New Jersey Attorney General had statutory authority to “supersede control” of a county police department. In March 2023, shortly after a fatal police shooting involving officers of the City of Paterson, Attorney General Platkin sent a letter to the city’s mayor announcing that the office of the attorney general had “assumed responsibility for the day-to-day operations” of the city’s police department. The letter stated that General Platkin had selected a veteran New York Police Department officer, Isa Abbassi, to serve as the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the department. In two separate actions, later consolidated, Paterson’s mayor, public safety director, and police chief asserted that the attorney general lacked authority to supersede control of the department. The appellate court (to which the cases were transferred) ruled for the plaintiffs, holding that the attorney general lacked the authority to take control of the department. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.

The attorney general relied first on several general statutory provisions providing, among other things, that “[w]henever in the opinion of the Attorney General the interests of the State will be furthered by so doing, the Attorney General may (a) supersede a county prosecutor in any investigation, criminal action or proceeding, (b) participate in any investigation, criminal action or proceeding, or (c) initiate any investigation, criminal action or proceeding.” N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:17B-107(a). The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that, “[d]espite the Criminal Justice Act’s clear delegation of power to the Attorney General to oversee law enforcement and to supersede county prosecutors’ offices in certain circumstances, the Act does not expressly address the question before us: whether the Attorney General may supersede municipal police departments when local officials object to supersession.” The court likewise declined to resolve whether the attorney general can supersede local control of a police department over the local officials’ objection under other general provisions, an attorney general directive, and case law.

Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on “L. 2023, c. 94 (Chapter 94), which the Legislature adopted in the wake of the supersession to facilitate the OIC’s leadership of the Department.” “[T]he legislation was proposed because Abbassi, an NYPD officer, needed a waiver of the training requirements established by the Police Training Commission for all New Jersey police officers so that he could devote his full attention to his responsibilities as the Paterson Police Department’s OIC.” Chapter 94 provided that waiver and authorized those in Abbassi’s shoes to complete only such training as the attorney general requires. “In addition, in L. 2023, c. 74, the Legislature appropriated $10,000,000 as direct state services for ‘Paterson Police Department – State Costs,’ to cover costs incurred by the State in connection with operating the Department pursuant to the Attorney General’s supersession.” The New Jersey Supreme Court found that through these two actions, the state legislature “expressly acknowledged that the Attorney General had superseded control of the Department and took affirmative steps to ensure that the OIC would succeed in his crucial role in that supersession. The Legislature then specifically appropriated funds for the State’s operation of the Department during the period in which municipal control was superseded.” (Citation omitted.) The court concluded that “the Legislature’s appropriation of funds . . . express[ed] the Legislature’s intent that in this instance, the Attorney General’s supersession advances the Legislature’s goals and should proceed. On that specific ground, we do not find that the Attorney General’s supersession of the Paterson Police Department was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the record.” It therefore upheld the supersession. [Bulur v. N.J. Office of the Attorney General, 337 A.3d 1269 (N.J. July 23, 2025)]

Texas – The Texas Supreme Court held (among other things) that the Texas Attorney General had the authority to institute a quo warranto action alleging that Annunciation House, Inc. is violating Texas law by harboring illegal aliens. Attorney General Paxton invoked his statutory and constitutional authority “to examine Annunciation House’s records to verify this allegation and to initiate quo warranto proceedings that, if the allegations are proven, could lead to the revocation of Annunciation House’s charter and preclude it from operating.” Annunciation House is a charitable organization based in El Paso that operates several shelters around the city. In February 2024, state officials went to an Annunciation House shelter and gave Annunciation House’s director a “Request to Examine” its records, stating that failure to immediately comply would result “in forfeiture of Annunciation House’s right to do business in Texas as well as a criminal penalty.” After an exchange among attorneys, Annunciation House sought a temporary restraining order and a declaratory judgment that the request violated Annunciation House’s constitutional rights. The trial court granted the TRO, after which the attorney general filed a “Plea to the Jurisdiction, Answer, and Motion for Leave to File [Proposed] Counterclaim in the Nature of Quo Warranto.” Following discovery, the trial court granted Annunciation House’s motion for summary judgment and denied the attorney general’s requests for an injunction and for leave to file a quo warranto action. Among other things, the court held that the attorney general’s record request violated the First and Fourth Amendments and constituted religious harassment. The court rejected the attorney general’s quo warranto action for a variety of reasons, including that “Business Organizations Code §11.301(a)(5) provides the exclusive means of terminating a corporation’s existence for criminal violations, thus abrogating quo warranto in this area.” Without reaching the merits, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated the injunction that court had granted.

The Texas Supreme Court set out the history of quo warranto actions, and then explained that “those who framed and ratified our 1876 Constitution saw fit to elevate to a constitutional level the attorney general’s twin powers to inquire into the misuse of charter rights and to file legal actions addressing such misuse. Finally, the legislature has provided important context on what those duties include by providing statutory grounds for quo warranto to address a variety of corporate misdeeds. Neither the constitutional provision nor the statute has been materially modified for nearly 150 years.” The court then rejected the trial court’s conclusion that Business Organizations Code §11.301(a)(5)―which allows a court to enter a decree winding down a corporation’s business―“supplants” the attorney general’s power to bring a quo warranto action for illegal corporate acts. Reading §11.301(a)(5) to overcome the attorney general’s constitutional quo warranto power required a “cramped” reading of the relevant constitutional provision, one the Texas Supreme Court refused to give.

Specifically, Article IV, §22 of the Texas Constitution provides (in part) that the attorney general “shall especially inquire into the charter rights of all private corporations, and from time to time, in the name of the State, take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not authorized by law.” (Emphasis added.) Annunciation House asked the Court to limit this provision’s scope by construing its reference to the “exercis[e]” of “any power . . . not authorized by law” to cover only “demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage.” The court rejected that reading, finding that the clause “separately contemplates the exercise of a power not authorized by law, the demanding of taxes not authorized by law, and the collecting of taxes not authorized by law.” In reaching that conclusion, the Texas Supreme Court pointed to rulings by other state high courts, including in cases involving constitutional provisions with near-identical language.

Article IV, §22 next provides that the attorney general “shall, whenever sufficient cause exists, seek a judicial forfeiture of such charters, unless otherwise expressly directed by law.” Annunciation House argued that “it is the legislature, and not the attorney general, that decides when ‘sufficient cause exists [to] seek a . . . forfeiture.’” Again the Texas Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “‘sufficient cause’ in Article IV, §22 refers to [the attorney general’s] discretion under existing law without depending on specific determinations by the legislature, so long as the legislature has not clearly withdrawn a particular kind of action from quo warranto’s reach.” The court then emphasized that Article IV, §22 requires a legislative retraction of the attorney general’s quo warranto power to be “otherwise expressly directed by law,” creating a clear-statement requirement. The court found no such clear statement in Business Organizations Code §11.301(a)(5) or in Chapter 66 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The Texas Supreme Court went on to hold that (1) it was premature for the trial court to address Annunciation House’s insufficiency of the evidence argument; (2) whatever role the Religious Freedom Restoration Act plays in the case, it doesn’t “stop the attorney general from even filing the” action; and (3) the quo warranto action is not preempted by federal law or unconstitutionally vague. [Paxton v. Annunciation House, Inc., 2025 Texas LEXIS 436 (May 30, 2025)]

Texas – By a 2-1 vote, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the attorney general is not “entitled to pre-suit depositions as a matter of law due to its statutory visitorial powers” or “under the standards required by” Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202. As part of an investigation into “reports that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may have assisted with illegal border crossings,” the Office of Attorney General (OAG) served Catholic Charities of the Rio Grande Valley with a “Notice of Demand for Sworn Statement” “directing it to designate a representative to testify on a series of topics regarding alleged aid for illegal border crossings in violation of Texas law.” Catholic Charities declined to present a representative to testify under oath, but did provide over 100 pages of documents and a sworn statement from its Executive Director, Sister Norma Pimentel. OAG deemed that response insufficient. After efforts to reach an agreement broke down, OAG filed a Rule 202 petition for a pre-suit deposition in district court. “The petition claims the deposition was in anticipation of a possible quo warranto suit seeking forfeiture of the corporation’s corporate charter for violation of Texas law. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition[.]”OAG challenged that order by filing a petition for mandamus, which the Texas Court of Appeals denied.

The Texas Court of Appeals discussed some of the same constitutional and statutory provisions discussed in the prior case, which “delegates th[e] ‘visitorial’ right to examine corporate entities to the Attorney General.” See, e.g., Texas Const. art. IV, §22. Of particular relevance here, §12.153 of the Texas Business Organizations Code provides that “[t]he [A]ttorney [G]eneral may investigate the organization, conduct, and management of a filing entity or foreign filing entity and determine if the entity has been or is engaged in acts or conduct in violation of: (1) its governing documents; or (2) any law of this state.” Based on those provisions, “OAG claims it ‘is always entitled to take a pre-suit deposition of a corporate entity,’ because its constitutional and statutory power to ‘inquire into’ and ‘investigate’ corporate conduct ‘necessarily includes the authority to take pre-suit depositions.’” The Texas Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that no Texas court has so held and stating that it “declined to be the first.”

The Texas Court of Appeals noted that “the visitorial statutes say nothing about depositions or sworn testimony.” (Citation omitted.) By contrast, “[s]everal state laws expressly authorize the Attorney General to obtain pre-suit sworn testimony[.]” The court added that state law expressly authorizes the attorney general to examine corporate records upon written request “but do not do the same for oral testimony.” “Second, the Legislature could not have contemplated authorizing modern discovery-style depositions when the visitorial statutes were enacted, because they did not yet exist.” Finally, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied pre-suit depositions under Rule 202. The appellate court found that “Catholic Charities’s documents and answers provided enough information for the OAG to evaluate whether to file suit and a sufficient record on which the trial court had discretion to conclude that the benefit of taking the deposition did not outweigh its burden.” [In re Office of the Attorney General of the State of Texas, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 5786 (Aug. 4, 2025)]

Vermont – The Vermont Supreme Court denied a requested writ of mandamus that would have required the attorney general to provide yes or no answers to questions posed by the state auditor. While the auditor was auditing a Burlington tax increment financing (TIF) district, he perceived a gap in the TIF statutes and regulations. He therefore posed three questions to the attorney general. “In response, the Attorney General answered one question directly. She did not answer the other two questions as posed, but instead explained which entities had the statutory authority to give the Auditor a binding answer to the unsettled questions of law.” The auditor claimed that these answers violated the attorney general’s obligations under Vermont law, which provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall advise the elective and appointive State officers on questions of law relating to their official duties and shall furnish a written opinion on such matters, when so requested.” Verm. Stat. Ann. §159.  After the auditor threatened to sue the attorney general, the attorney general sent him a letter “explaining the statutes governing the provision of legal advice for the administration of TIF districts and stated that her responses constituted legal advice.” The auditor then filed suit, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the attorney general to provide the requested legal advice; a declaratory judgment to clarify the attorney general’s duties under §159; and a declaratory judgment that the auditor has the constitutional right to bring the action. The trial court dismissed each count, finding (as relevant here) “that mandamus was not available where the Attorney General met her obligation to provide some legal opinion on the question presented.” The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

After holding that the auditor “lack[s] inherent powers to retain counsel and sue,” the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that §159 gave the auditor “implied statutory authorization to retain counsel and sue for mandamus.” And “[t]he Attorney General is not exempt from mandamus review.” Stated the court: “Because 3 V.S.A. §159 compels the Attorney General to ‘advise … on questions of law,’ those entitled to that advice have the right to seek mandamus for it.” Critically, though, the court went on to hold that the auditor was not entitled to mandamus relief here, for the attorney general “has discretion to provide legal advice in accord with her judgment.” “Because the Attorney General did not give him a yes-or-no answer to the questions he asked, the Auditor asserts that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus. This misconstrues the obligations of the Attorney General pursuant to 3 V.S.A. §159. The provision requires the Attorney General to ‘advise’ on questions of law, not to ‘answer’ the questions as posed. The Auditor’s attempt to conflate ‘answer’ with ‘advise’ is unavailing because the statutory text requires the latter and not the former. The Attorney General need not provide definitive answers on unsettled questions of law, as argued by the Auditor. So long as the Attorney General ‘advise[s],’ no court may issue a writ of mandamus against her ordering her to provide different advice. 3 V.S.A. §159.” More generally, “[i]f mandamus were available to review the completeness or correctness of legal opinions of the Attorney General, courts would become de facto supervisors of the Attorney General’s legal advice. Such a role is not countenanced by the separation-of-powers principles embedded in the Vermont Constitution.” [Office of the Auditor of Accounts v. Office of the Attorney General, 2025 Vt. LEXIS 74 (July 11, 2025)]

Wisconsin – The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that “a law that prohibits the Department of Justice (DOJ) from settling most civil cases unless and until it receives the approval of the Joint Finance Committee” was unconstitutional as applied to “two specific categories of cases: civil enforcement actions and cases DOJ brings at the request of executive-branch agencies for programs those agencies are statutorily charged with administering.” In 2018, the state legislature enacted 2017 Wis. Act 369, §26 (codified at Wis. Stat. §165.08(1)), which provides that DOJ may not settle civil cases unless and until the joint committee on finance approves DOJ’s settlement plan. Labor unions and individual taxpayers filed suit arguing that the statute was facially unconstitutional. In Service Employees International Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 946 N.W.2d 35 (2020) (SEIU), the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected that facial challenge. About a year later, Attorney General Josh Kaul, DOJ, Governor Evers, and the Secretary of the Department of Administration (collectively, DOJ) filed this case, arguing that the settlement statute was unconstitutional as to the two categories of civil cases set out above. The trial court ruled for DOJ, but the court of appeals reversed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed in turn, ruling for DOJ on separation-of-powers grounds.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court first rejected the legislature’s contention that, because the state constitution declares that the Attorney General’s powers and duties “shall be prescribed by law,” “any power the Attorney General exercised was subject to legislative modification and, therefore, could not violate the separation of powers.” To the contrary, held the court (relying on SEIU), “just because the Legislature establishes the scope of the Attorney General’s litigation powers does not mean that it can assume the execution of those powers itself. As an executive official, then, the Attorney General’s constitutional role is to faithfully execute the law by prosecuting those actions the Legislature instructs him to by law.” (Citation omitted.) The court then had little difficulty concluding that DOJ’s litigation in the two categories of cases “is, rather straightforwardly, the execution of laws enacted by the Legislature.” And “[j]ust as the pursuit of these claims is unequivocally an executive function, so is the settlement of them. When the Legislature gives authority to the Attorney General to pursue these claims, it necessarily confers discretion on how to pursue the claims to completion, through settlement or otherwise.”

That left unresolved, however, the “key question”: “whether the Legislature also possesses this constitutional authority in at least some suits within the two categories.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded it does not. The legislature argued “that it has an institutional interest in revenue-producing settlements because, to perform its constitutional duty of setting the next year’s tax, it must account for all ‘sources of income’ to the state.” Disagreeing, the court stated that, “[w]hile undoubtedly the Legislature would be wise to account for all sources of income when determining the amount to tax in the coming year, it does not follow that the Legislature has a constitutional interest in controlling every executive function involving the collection of revenue, or even taxes. We fail to understand why the power and duty to levy taxes allows the Legislature to control the execution of the law.” The court added that, “if the Legislature has a constitutional interest in the execution of the laws every time an executive action involves money, there would be virtually no area where the Legislature could not insert itself into the execution of the law.” The court similarly rejected the legislature’s argument “that it has an institutional interest in settlements within these categories of cases because they could implicate public policy, in particular where the Attorney General could require as a term of a settlement that funds be paid to certain agencies or organizations that the Legislature may disagree with.” Stated the court: “In executing the law, executive branch officials must decide how to effectuate the law’s policies, and those decisions will necessarily have policy implications. The Legislature’s argument that it can step into the shoes of the executive when executive action impacts policy would eviscerate the separation of powers.” (Citation omitted.)

The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded by saying that “[i]f the Legislature is dissatisfied with the discretion it left to the Attorney General, it may amend the laws accordingly. In fact, the Legislature has done so with respect to some of the suits within the two categories in this case, instructing that any funds recovered go into the general treasury. See Wis. Stat. §§30.03; 49.49(6). However, the Legislature may not step into the shoes of the executive branch or otherwise control executive decisions made within the statutory authority simply because exercising that authority has policy implications. It is the ‘text of the statutes’ by which the Legislature announces its policy decisions and how they may be achieved.” (Citation omitted.) [Kaul v. Wis. State Legislature, 21 N.W.3d 513 (Wis. June 17, 2025)]