June 27, 2025 | Volume 32, Issue 15

This Report summarizes opinions issued on June 12, 2025 (Part I); and cases granted review on June 6, 2025 (Part II).

Martin v. United States, 24-362.

In this Federal Tort Claims Act case, the Court unanimously held that (1) the “law enforcement proviso” contained in 28 U.S.C. §2680(h) applies only to the intentional-tort exception described in that subsection; and (2) the Supremacy Clause is not a defense to a claim brought under the Act. Under the FTCA, persons injured by federal employees may sue the United States for damages. “The statute achieves that end by waiving, in 28 U.S.C. §1346(b), the federal government’s sovereign immunity for ‘certain torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.’” There are 13 exceptions to that waiver of immunity. Relevant here are the discretionary-function and intentional-tort exceptions provided for in 28 U.S.C. §2680(a) and (h), respectively. The discretionary-function exception bars any FTCA claim “based on the exercise of an official’s ‘discretionary function,’” while the intentional-tort exception bars FTCA claims alleging one of 11 enumerated torts. Section 2680(h), describing the intentional-tort exception, also contains a “law enforcement proviso.” That proviso “countermands the exception”—that is, the waiver of governmental immunity remains effective—”with respect to six intentional torts (including assault, battery, false imprisonment, and false arrest) against ‘investigative or law enforcement officers.’” If a claim falls within the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, the government is liable if a “’private individual under like circumstances’ . . . would be liable” under applicable law, which is ordinarily state tort law.

“In the predawn hours of October 18, 2017,” a six-member SWAT team with the Federal Bureau of Investigation “raided the wrong house in suburban Atlanta.” The correct house was located at 3741 Landau Lane. The SWAT leader used his personal GPS to navigate to that location, but the GPS led him instead to 3756 Denville Trace, where Curtrina Martin, her partner, and their seven-year-old son lived. Upon arriving at Martin’s residence, “the agents neither noticed the street sign for ‘Denville Trace,’ nor the house number, which was visible on the mailbox at the end of the driveway,” or that a different car was parked in the driveway. The SWAT members “breached the front door” of Martin’s house, “detonated a flash-bang grenade,” and dragged Martin and her partner from the bedroom closet, where they had gone to hide. “Left with personal injuries and property damage,” but no compensation, Martin sued the United States under the FTCA, “alleging that the officers had committed various negligent and intentional torts.” The district court granted summary judgment to the government. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. When it considered the applicability of the §2680 exceptions, it applied the law-enforcement proviso to the intentional-tort exception and the discretionary-function exception. It reasoned that the law-enforcement proviso “does not just override the intentional-tort exception, it also overrides all the other exceptions in §2680, the discretionary-function exception included.” The court found that the proviso had “spared” Martin’s intentional-tort claims. Then, rather than assess whether the discretionary-function exception applied to the surviving intentional-tort claims, the Eleventh Circuit considered those claims’ merits and found no intentional-tort liability. In reaching that conclusion, the court reasoned that “the government had a winning Supremacy Clause defense.” The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Martin’s negligence claims because it found that the discretionary-function exception applied to them, thereby negating the waiver of governmental immunity. In an opinion by Justice Gorsuch, the Court vacated and remanded.

The Court first held that the law-enforcement proviso applies only to the intentional-tort exception in §2680(h), not to any other §2680 exception. The Court pointed to the proviso’s placement within the list of enumerated exceptions. Section 2680 lists 13 exceptions in separate subsections. Yet the proviso is located solely within subsection (h), which describes only the intentional-tort exception, and even appears within the same sentence as the intentional-tort exception. “Given that arrangement, an ordinary reader would naturally presume that the proviso modifies only subsection (h).” The Court added that there is no reason to think otherwise, particularly when there are numerous other “textual clue[s]” that confirm this natural reading. For example, each subsection within §2680 is a “stand-alone sentence ending in a period.” That demonstrates that each subsection operates “as a ‘distinct,’ ‘structurally discrete’ provision” such that “it is hard to see how the law enforcement proviso might apply beyond” the subsection in which it is placed. The proviso’s contents are an additional clue: they correspond to the issues mentioned in the intentional-tort exception while not mentioning any of the issues underlying the other exceptions. Also, ruled the Court, the proviso’s second sentence expressly limits the proviso to “this subsection,” subsection (h). The Court thus concluded that the Eleventh Circuit erred by applying the law-enforcement proviso to the discretionary-function exception.

Regarding the second question presented, the Court held that the government cannot defeat an FTCA claim by invoking the Supremacy Clause as a defense. “The Supremacy Clause supplies a rule of decision when federal and state laws conflict.” In the FTCA context, there is generally no legal conflict to resolve. As the Court explained, the “FTCA is the ‘supreme’ federal law addressing the United States’ liability for torts committed by its agents,” and its “liability rule incorporates state law.” The Court acknowledged that there may be the rare instance in which a conflict arises, but that is not the case here. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s application of the Supremacy Clause as a defense to governmental liability was erroneous.

The Court concluded by mapping the Eleventh Circuit’s course on remand. In accordance with the general practice for assessing FTCA claims, the Eleventh Circuit must consider: (1) whether the intentional-tort claims that have already survived the intentional-tort exception also survive the discretionary-function exception; and (2) whether Martin’s negligence claims survive the discretionary-function exception under the correct view that the law-enforcement proviso does not apply to (and override) that exception. For any claims that survive that analysis, the Eleventh Circuit must then determine liability under Georgia state law.

Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice Jackson joined, to address whether the discretionary-function exception would apply to Martin’s claims. Justice Sotomayor noted that there are still some areas of disagreement about the exception’s application that warrant the Court’s attention. On the facts, she believed the exception would not apply because the SWAT leader’s conduct (using his personal GPS, not confirming the officers’ location at the correct house, and “terrorizing the home’s occupants”) likely did not involve the “kind of policy judgments that the discretionary-function exception was designed to protect.”

A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School Dist. No. 279, 24-249.

The Court unanimously held that schoolchildren bringing suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of “bad faith or gross misjudgment,” but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts. A.J.T. is a teenage girl who suffers from a rare form of epilepsy that severely limits her physical and cognitive functioning. Her seizures are most frequent in the morning, such that she “can’t attend school before noon,” but is “alert and able to learn” from noon until 6 p.m. At her previous school district, A.J.T. received accommodations that included permitting her to avoid activities before midday and receiving evening instruction at home. But when she moved to another school district in 2015, school administrators at Osseo Area Schools denied her educational accommodations, including evening instruction. A.J.T. received only 4.25 hours per day of instruction, as compared to the 6.5 hours for other students. In 2018, the school administrators proposed further cutbacks on the length of A.J.T.’s school day. “Realizing that an agreement was beyond reach,” her parents filed a complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) alleging that the school refused to provide A.J.T. a free appropriate public education. An administrative law judge, the district court, and circuit court all ruled for A.J.T. and her parents in that action. Next, A.J.T. and her parents sued the school district and school board (collectively, the District) alleging violations of Title II of the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

The district court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment. The district court acknowledged that A.J.T. is a “qualified individual with a disability” who “was denied the same length school day as her nondisabled peers based on her disability.” But the court held that she failed to state a prima facie case because she did not show that school officials “acted with bad faith or gross misjudgment.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that when “alleged ADA and Section 504 violations are ‘based on educational services for disabled children,’ a school district’s simple failure to provide a reasonable accommodation is not enough to trigger liability.” Relying on its precedent, the Eighth Circuit held that “a plaintiff must prove that school officials acted with ‘either bad faith or gross misjudgment,’ which requires ‘something more’ than mere non-compliance with the applicable federal statutes.” Because A.J.T. had not alleged conduct rising to the level of bad faith or gross misjudgment, the court concluded that “summary judgment was proper.” In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court vacated and remanded.

The Court began by explaining that “[o]utside the context of elementary and secondary education,” the general approach of the circuit courts, including the Eighth Circuit, is that to obtain compensatory damages under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act a plaintiff must show “intentional discrimination,” satisfied by proof that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.” The normal standard “does not require a showing of personal ill will or animosity toward the disabled person.” The Court then analyzed how the Eighth Circuit had come to apply a heightened intent standard for ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims concerning educational opportunities. The Court traced it to Monaham v. Nebraska, a 1982 Eighth Circuit case which found “something more than a mere failure to provide” the free appropriate public education was necessary and held that the “something more” is “bad faith or gross misjudgment.” The Court noted that Monaham “was not alone in its instinct to try to ‘harmonize’ the IDEA’s specific guarantee of a free appropriate public education . . . with more broadly applicable antidiscrimination laws.” Two years later, the Court issued Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (1984), which applied “virtually identical reasoning” to hold that the IDEA was “the exclusive avenue” through which a child with a disability could challenge the adequacy of her education. Congress disagreed, however, and two years later overturned Smith by enacting 20 U.S.C. §1415(l), which “‘reaffirm[ed] the viability’ of federal statutes like the ADA or Rehabilitation Act ‘as separate vehicles,’ no less integral than the IDEA, ‘for ensuring the rights of handicapped children.’” The Court noted that the plain text of §1415(l) “makes clear that nothing in the IDEA ‘restrict[s] or limit[s] the rights [or] remedies’ that other federal laws, including antidiscrimination statutes, confer on children with disabilities.”

The Court criticized the Eighth Circuit because in “imposing a higher” “bar for claims based on educational services” versus “other disability-discrimination contexts” that court “read the IDEA to implicitly limit the ability of children with disabilities to vindicate their independent ADA and Rehabilitation Act rights.” The Eighth Circuit thus made “it more difficult for disabled schoolchildren to secure the statutory remedies provided by Congress.” The Court noted that the District changed its position, and no longer defended the decision below, “[p]erhaps sensing the likely fate of Monahan’s asymmetric rule.” The District instead argued that bad faith or gross misjudgment is “the correct standard across the board” for injunctive relief and damages, “both in schools and out.” The Court found, however, that this contention was neither resolved below nor encompassed by the petition for certiorari. The only question presented was whether a heightened standard was appropriate in the context of educational opportunities. The Court agreed with A.J.T. that “it would be unfair at this point” to allow the District “to switch gears and seek a ruling from us that the standard should be” bad faith or gross misjudgment “across the board.” The Court thus concluded that its “decision is narrow” but “does not diminish its import for A.J.T. and ‘a great many children with disabilities and their parents.’” The Court held that those challenges do not face “a more stringent standard of proof than other plaintiffs to establish discrimination.”

Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Kavanaugh joined. He believed the Court correctly resolved the question presented and noted that he would be willing to consider the additional issues raised by the District in a future case where they were properly before the Court. Among them was the District’s “constitutional objection, arguing that the Constitution compels a plaintiff to prove intent to discriminate before a court may find a violation of Title II or Section 504 or award any kind of relief.”

Justice Sotomayor also authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Jackson joined. She wrote to also agree with the Court’s resolution of the question presented and its decision not to address the District’s new arguments that the “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard is appropriate because the statutes require a showing of “improper purpose” or “animus.” She expressed her belief that this argument is flawed, as the statutes’ text and history, and the Court’s precedent, “foreclose any such purpose requirement.”

Rivers v. Guerrero, 23-1345.

The Court unanimously held that 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)―which imposes stringent gatekeeping requirements on “second or successive habeas corpus applications”―generally applies when a prisoner seeks to amend his initial habeas application while it is pending on appeal. In 2012, Danny Rivers was convicted of sexual abuse of a child, two forms of indecency with a child, and possession of child pornography. After unsuccessful direct appeal and state habeas proceedings, Rivers filed his first federal habeas petition, claiming prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and due process and equal protection violations. The district court denied the petition. Rivers asked the Fifth Circuit for a certificate of appealability, which the court granted as to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. While his appeal was pending in the Fifth Circuit, Rivers received his client file from his trial counsel. It contained a state investigator’s report that discussed two computer documents Rivers believed were related to his conviction. One document was labeled “not child porn.” Rivers then filed another, second-in-time, habeas petition in the district court, which included the state investigator’s report. A magistrate judge recommended that this second-in-time petition be treated as a “second or successive” application for §2244(b) purposes. Rivers objected and argued that the new filing should be treated as an amendment to his initial habeas petition because the judgment was still pending on appeal. The district court disagreed and concluded that the filing was a second or successive petition. That court transferred the filing to the Fifth Circuit to determine whether §2244(b)(2)’s gatekeeping requirement for successive petitions had been satisfied. Rivers appealed the district court’s transfer order, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that “the timing of Rivers’s second-in-time petition d[id] not permit him to circumvent the requirements for filing successive petitions under §2244.” In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court affirmed.

The Court explained that §2244(b) prohibits petitioners from filing a subsequent petition that relitigates the merits of previously denied claims. If the subsequent petition contains a “new claim,” it can only proceed if it “relies on a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law” or “alleges previously undiscoverable facts that would establish [the petitioner’s] innocence.” A petitioner seeking to so proceed “must first go to the court of appeals and make a ‘prima facie showing’ that the petition satisfies one of §2244(b)(2)’s exceptions, and that court has to grant authorization for the petitioner to proceed in district court.” After finding that it had jurisdiction over the case, the Court turned to the merits.

The Court rejected Rivers’ contention that his filing should not be considered a second or successive petition because it “was submitted during the pendency of his appeal of the judgment related to his first habeas petition.” The Court ruled that its “case law establishes instead that whether a filing qualifies as a second or successive application generally turns on the existence of a final judgment with respect to the first petition, not the status of an appeal.” The Court noted that it had previously said that “an amended petition, filed after the initial one but before judgment, is not second or successive” for §2244. See Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504 (2020). The Court then distinguished Banister, upon which Rivers relied. Banister arose in a “materially different context,” addressing “whether a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)—i.e., a motion filed within 28 days that seeks to correct an error in the District Court’s judgment prior to an appeal—should be construed as a second or successive filing under §2244(b).” Banister ruled that “Rule 59(e) motions are ‘attendant on the initial habeas application’ itself and ‘hel[p] produce a single final judgment for appeal.’ Thus, they are not themselves properly considered to be second or successive filings under AEDPA.” (Citation omitted.) “When properly understood, then, our decision in Banister actually supports the rule that Rivers resists.”

The Court also found that “purpose and history” did not support Rivers’ interpretation. The Court noted that if the “line is drawn” at the end of appellate review, a petitioner could file “any number of new applications” during the pendency, “prolonging the case seemingly indefinitely.” The Court found that “would promote inefficiency by encouraging piece-meal litigation, and would thus make it substantially more difficult to produce a single final judgment for appeal.’” In sum, the Court held that after the judgment has been entered in an initial habeas petition proceeding, a second-in-time filing that asserts new habeas claims generally qualifies as a second or successive petition for §2244(b). The Court then rejected “Rivers’s appeal to historical habeas doctrine . . . because, prior to AEDPA, there was no clear or consistent practice regarding how new habeas-related filings were treated during the pendency of an appeal.”

Rivers raised “an additional theory” in his merits briefing, not covered under the question presented. Rivers argued that second-in-time filings that request amendment of the initial habeas petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 do not qualify as second or successive filings under §2244(b). The Court declined to address this argument for two reasons. First, Rivers had failed to present the argument in his petition for certiorari or to the courts below. Second, the Court found that the factual predicate necessary for the Rule 15 argument was lacking. Jurisdiction had transferred to the Fifth Circuit. The district court was “powerless to grant” a Rule 15 motion even if it had been asked to do so and the “Fifth Circuit had no proclivity to remand the matter to the District Court in any event.”

Soto v. United States, 24-320.

The Court unanimously held that the Barring Act’s settlement provisions, including its limitations period, do not apply to combat-related special compensation (CRSC) claims because the CRSC statute, 10 U.S.C. §1413a, provides its own settlement provisions. The Barring Act provides a “default” rule for settling certain claims brought against the U.S. Government, including claims that involve retired pay and military service members’ pay. The Barring Act has a six-year statute of limitations. The Barring Act does not apply if “’another law’ creates a separate settlement process”; in that case, that other law “displaces the [Barring] Act’s settlement mechanism.” The CRSC statute was enacted in 2002 and amended in 2007. As amended, the statute allows a qualifying retired veteran to receive special compensation up to a certain amount for a disability attributable to a combat-related injury. Unlike the Barring Act, the CRSC statute does not have a statute of limitations.

United States Marine Corporal Simon Soto was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). His physicians attributed the PTSD to Soto’s combat experiences, which included two tours of duty in Iraq. Soto medically retired from the military in 2006. The Department of Veterans Affairs “assigned him a 100-percent disability rating for his PTSD.” In June 2016, Soto applied to the Navy for CRSC compensation for his combat-related PTSD. The Secretary of the Navy approved the claim in October 2016 and authorized retroactive compensation. But because the Secretary applied the Barring Act’s statute of limitations to the claim, Soto’s retroactive compensation was limited to only six years. Soto challenged that determination in federal district court in a class-action lawsuit, arguing that the Barring Act did not apply to CRSC claims. He claimed that “he was therefore entitled to retroactive CRSC payments for the months dating back to January 1, 2008,” when the amended version of the CRSC statute became effective and rendered him eligible for CRSC compensation. The district court entered summary judgment for Soto and similarly-situated certified class members. It found that the CRSC statute displaces the Barring Act because the CRSC statute constitutes “another law” that provides “’its own settlement mechanism.’” The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the CRSC statute “fails to confer settlement authority” because it “’only establishes who may be eligible for CRSC payments, not how claimants can have those claims settled.’” In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court reversed and remanded.

The Court held that the CRSC statute is “another law” for settling CRSC claims and thus displaces the Barring Act’s default settlement process. In reaching this conclusion, the Court asked whether the CRSC statute provides its own settlement mechanism for CRSC claims. The answer to that question turned on whether the statute “confers settlement authority.” It is undisputed that, in the public-transactions-and-accounts context, “to settle” means to administratively determine the amount due on a claim, which is a determination that also involves determining a claim’s validity. A statute thus “confers settlement authority so long as it vests an entity with the power to determine both a claim’s validity and amount due.” The Court held that by demanding more than this two-prong showing, the Federal Circuit “impos[ed] undue requirements on Congress’s ability to confer settlement authority.” The Court added that, to confer settlement authority by statute, Congress need not include any magic words such as “settle” and “’need not state its intent in any particular way.’”

Next, based on the CSRC statute’s text, context, and structure, the Court found that the CRSC statute confers settlement authority on the Secretary of the military department from which the applicant retired. That is, the CRSC statute vests the applicable Secretary with the power to determine the validity and amount due a CRSC claim. First, the statute directs the applicable Secretary (1) to determine if the applicant is eligible for CRSC compensation, which necessarily involves determining if the applicant has satisfied all procedural and substantive requirements for the benefits; and (2) to pay each eligible applicant. Given these statutory requirements and directives, the Court reasoned that, in this context, “determining a claimant’s eligibility is tantamount to determining the validity of [an applicant’s] claim.” Thus, the CRSC statute satisfies the first requirement for a conferral of settlement authority. Second, the CRSC statute instructs the applicable Secretary to pay a specific monthly amount based on the maximum amounts and “special rules” specified in the statute. The Court interpreted this statutory directive to mean the applicable Secretary is vested with the authority to determine “the amount due” on an eligible applicant’s claim, which satisfies the second requirement for a conferral of settlement authority.

Thus, the Court concluded, the CRSC statute—taken as a whole—“establishes a self-contained, comprehensive compensation scheme” that includes a “separate settlement mechanism, i.e., ’another law.’” As such, the CRSC statute displaces the Barring Act. In turn, the Barring Act’s statute of limitations does not apply to limit an eligible applicant’s retroactive CRSC compensation. Further, nothing in the CRSC statute’s eligibility criteria mentions time limits. The Court opined that “it is not extraordinary to think that Congress wished to forgo a limitations period” in this context given the “defined group of exceptionally deserving claimants” affected.

Parrish v. United States, 24-275.

The Court unanimously held that a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline has run but before the court grants reopening does not need to file a second notice after reopening. The requirement to file a timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Normally, litigants must file a notice of appeal with 60 days “after the entry of” the “judgment, order[,] or decree” when the United States is a party. One exception is that when “a party entitled to notice” of a decision “d[oes] not receive such notice . . . within 21 days of [the decision’s] entry,” the district court may “reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the [reopening] order,” if no party would be prejudiced by the reopening. 28 U.S.C. §2107(c).

Donte Parrish was incarcerated in federal prison when a group of inmates attacked and killed another inmate. An incident report found Parrish partly responsible, and he was placed in segregated confinement for 23 months. When he received a hearing many years later, the hearing officer expunged Parrish’s disciplinary record and found he had committed “[n]o prohibited act” during the incident. Parrish then filed a suit in district court, seeking damages for his time in segregated custody. The district court dismissed his suit, holding that Parrish’s claims were either untimely or unexhausted. The day after the district court entered its judgment, Parrish was released from federal custody and transferred to a state penitentiary. He did not receive the court’s original mailing, and did not receive the district court’s opinion and judgment dismissing his lawsuit for three months. Parrish promptly sent a letter to the district court explaining that he had not received the judgment because of his transfer, and stated “I’m filing this notice of appeal.” The Fourth Circuit recognized that his notice of appeal was untimely, but construed the filing as a motion to reopen the time to file an appeal under §2107(c). On remand, the district court granted the motion to reopen for 14 days. Both parties agreed that the district court properly reopened Parrish’s time of appeal and that no prejudice would result from reopening. And both parties agreed that the Fourth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Fourth Circuit held, however, that Parrish needed to file a second notice of appeal once his appeal window was reopened and that his failure to do so deprived the court of jurisdiction. The circuit court reasoned that “reopening under §2107(c) ‘provides for a new 14-day window for filing a notice of appeal, running from the date of the district court’s order granting the reopening.’ Parrish’s first notice was untimely with respect to the original appeal period and he failed to file an appeal within the reopened period, so, the court held, it lacked jurisdiction to hear his case.” (Citation omitted.) In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court reversed and remanded.

The Court agreed with Parrish and the government that Parrish did not need to file a second notice of appeal; simply put, “[a] notice filed before reopening is granted . . . is merely early.” The Court noted that it has “long emphasized” that “the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits,” and “imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, to which appellate court.” The Court also noted that for over a century it has adhered to the principle that “an adequate but premature notice of appeal” “relates forward to the entry of the document that renders an appeal possible.” The Court found that a contrary result would not only “subvert congressional design,” but also “make little sense.” “[T]here is little value and significant harm in dismissing appeals on the basis of prematurity alone.” The Court held that “[s]ending another notice would amount to nothing more than ‘empty paper shuffling.’”

The Court also recognized that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are consistent with the relation-forward principle. Rule 4(a)(2) states that a notice filed “after the court announces a decision or order,” but “before the entry of judgment or order,” relates forward to the date the judgment is entered. Rule 4(a)(4) also states that if a notice of appeal is filed before the district court has ruled on specified post-trial motions, the notice of appeal will relate forward to the date of the “order disposing of the last such” motion. Thus, the Court held that “nothing in the Rules suggests any intent to abrogate the relation-forward of premature notices of appeal.” The Court acknowledged that the Rules do not speak specifically to this issue, but “that context includes not only the background relation-forward principle but also the Rules’ own emphasis on function over form.” The Court stated that the Rules Committee could recommend a change if it disagrees, noting that the committee is “apparently considering the issue presently.” Thus, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and found Parrish’s notice of appeal “did all that was required of it.”

Justice Jackson authored a concurrence, which Justice Thomas joined. She wrote to explain why she believed it was unnecessary to resort to “ripening or relation-forward principles.” She asserted that “when a late litigant submits a proposed filing along with a motion that asks the court to accept it, the substantive document does not come ‘too early.’” Instead, “it comes contingent upon the court’s granting the accompanying motion, with an understanding that, if the motion is granted, the filing will be docketed.”

Justice Gorsuch authored a dissent. He would have dismissed the case as improvidently granted and allowed the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules to solve the problem presented by this case.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch, 24-416.

In an 8-1 decision, the Court held that the United States Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. §6330(d)(1) when no proposed levy is at issue. The Internal Revenue Service may levy, or seize, a taxpayer’s property to satisfy an existing tax liability. But before it may do so, the taxpayer is entitled to a “collection due process hearing.” The hearing provides the taxpayer with the opportunity to be heard by an appeals officer on “any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy.” 26 U.S.C. §6330(b)(3). The Tax Court may then review the appeals officer’s determination. Section 6330 governs these proceedings.

Jennifer Zuch untimely filed her 2010 federal income tax return and reported no outstanding tax obligations. Although married at the time to Patrick Gennardo, Zuch filed separately. Gennardo’s own married-filing-separately tax return “reflected a substantial balance due.” The IRS applied the couple’s estimated payments totaling $50,000 to satisfy Gennardo’s tax liability. Zuch later amended her 2010 tax return and reported additional income that resulted in her own tax liability of $28,000. Zuch claimed that the couple’s estimated tax payments of $50,000 should be used to cover her tax liability, but the IRS disagreed because it had already allocated those estimated payments to Gennardo’s account. Following Zuch’s refusal to pay the $28,000 balance, the IRS proposed to levy her property. Zuch then requested a collection due process hearing. At her hearing, Zuch argued that the IRS should have applied the estimated tax payments towards her account instead of Gennardo’s account. The appeals officer rejected her argument. Zuch appealed to the Tax Court. As the appeal was pending, years passed and Zuch filed other annual tax returns. Some of those subsequent returns revealed that Zuch had overpaid taxes for the corresponding year. Rather than issuing Zuch a refund for overpayment, the IRS credited Zuch’s account with the overpaid amounts. “As these credits accumulated, Zuch gradually paid down the [$28,000] balance, and when it hit zero, the IRS moved to dismiss the Tax Court proceeding as moot.” The Tax Court granted the motion to dismiss. Zuch appealed to the Third Circuit, which vacated the dismissal. The Third Circuit reasoned that the “IRS’s decision not to pursue the levy did not moot the Tax Court proceedings,” as there was still a dispute about the underlying tax liability because Zuch “still disputed the IRS’s allocation of the $50,000 in estimated tax payments to [Gennardo’s account].” In an opinion by Justice Barrett, the Court reversed and remanded.

Relevant here is §6330(d)(1), which states that the Tax Court “shall have jurisdiction” to “review” an appeals officer’s “determination.” 26 U.S.C. §6330(d)(1). The Court concluded that “determination,” as used in that provision, refers simply to a “decision as to whether a levy may go forward.” That means that “if there is no longer a proposed levy, there is no adverse determination of which the taxpayer may seek review in the Tax Court.” In reaching that conclusion, the Court looked at §6330(c)(3). According to that subsection, an appeals officer must consider three criteria—the “input”—when making the decision regarding whether the proposed levy is justified—the “output.” That input-output relationship led the Court to conclude that “determination” refers to the ultimate decision of whether the proposed levy is justified, not to the considerations that go into making that decision.

The Court also looked at the overall statutory scheme and found it consistent with its interpretation. It explained that, for taxpayers disputing a tax liability, the “ordinary course” is to sue for a refund. Section 6330 provides another option for the taxpayer, but only when the IRS has proposed a levy to satisfy a tax liability. Section 6330’s title and contents reveal an “unwavering focus on levies.” Considering that statutory context, the Court reasoned, “it would be strange if a taxpayer could raise a §6330 appeal to resolve tax disputes that no longer have any connection to an ongoing levy.” Also, §6330 “does not authorize the Tax Court to order a refund or to issue a declaratory judgment that resolves disputes about tax liability.” Because the Court found that Zuch’s “dispute about [her] estimated tax payments was an input” consideration related to the overall levy decision, it was not a “determination” for purposes of §6330(d)(1). The Court noted that the Tax Court initially had authority to review the estimated-tax-payment dispute, but only as part of its review of the levy determination; that authority was gone once the proposed levy was gone.

Justice Gorsuch dissented. He believed that there was still a live dispute before the Tax Court, referring to Zuch’s estimated-tax-payment issue, and that its resolution could have benefited Zuch. He based this opinion on four grounds. First, nowhere in §6330(d)(1) does the word “levy” appear; conversely, Congress used “levy” 30 times elsewhere in §6330. He opined that this shows Congress would have used the word “levy” in §6330(d)(1) had it intended to hinge the Tax Court’s jurisdiction on the presence of a levy. Second, in his opinion, §6330 is written such that the scope of a “determination” includes any taxpayer-raised challenges to the underlying tax liability. Third, the IRS’s present position (aligned with the majority) contradicts its past position (aligned with his dissent). Justice Gorsuch commented that the IRS’s change of mind is suspect because it corresponds to what is favorable for the agency. Fourth, §6330(e)(1) permits the Tax Court “to enjoin any action or proceeding . . . in respect of the unpaid tax or proposed levy to which the determination being appealed relates.” Justice Gorsuch believed that that provision’s use of “or” suggests that the Tax Court could enjoin any IRS action, even one not involving a proposed levy.

Justice Gorsuch additionally criticized the majority for stating that Zuch still has recourse in the form of a refund suit. He stated that such a suit is “a trap for the unwary.” He explained that a taxpayer needs to exhaust her administrative remedies for a refund before she can seek relief in the courts. But there is a statute of limitations for administrative refund claims: the later of either three years from the tax return’s filing or two years from the tax payment. He maintained that for taxpayers like Zuch who are actively litigating their claims in a §6330 proceeding, it is understandable that they would not believe it necessary to additionally file a separate administrative claim for a refund relating to the same tax liability. These taxpayers thus risk the statute of limitations expiring on their administrative refund claims while their §6330 proceedings are ongoing. He noted that other circumstances compound this problem for Zuch. Zuch apparently was not notified by the IRS that her 2013-2016 and 2019 tax returns revealed an overpayment of taxes or that the IRS intended to apply those overpaid amounts towards her 2010 tax liability. She did not learn this information until years later when the IRS moved to dismiss her Tax Court proceeding. Justice Gorsuch thus believed that the Court’s opinion has given the IRS “a roadmap for evading Tax Court review and never having to answer a taxpayer’s complaint that it has made a mistake.”

Cases Granted Review

Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections v. Smith, 24-874.

At issue is whether and how courts may consider the cumulative effect of multiple IQ scores in assessing a claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In Atkins the Court ruled that individuals with intellectual disabilities could not receive the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In Alabama, a defendant must prove three things by a preponderance of the evidence to satisfy an Atkins claim: “[1] significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ of 70 or below), [2] significant or substantial deficits in adaptive behavior[,] [and] [3] [that] these problems . . . manifested themselves during the developmental period. (i.e., before the defendant reached age 18).” This case focuses on the first prong.

In 1997, respondent Joseph Smith beat his victim to death with a hammer in order to rob him. Smith was convicted of capital murder. The pre-Atkins jury recommended a death sentence. In the federal habeas proceeding that followed, Smith alleged a claim under Atkins. In all, he has obtained five valid IQ scores: 75, 74, 72, 78, and 74. Relying on both the “Flynn effect” and a downward adjustment for error, Smith’s expert testified that Smith’s IQ was “around 70.” Alabama argued that the court should consider that Smith took five IQ tests and scored above 70 on each. Alabama’s expert testified that “multiple sources of IQ . . . contributes to the construct of validity indicating what a true IQ score is for an individual.” The district court held that the scores were not “strong enough to conclude that Smith is not intellectually disabled.” The court found that Smith had “scores as low as 72,” which “could mean his IQ is actually as low as 69.” Finding that it was a “close case,” the court looked to additional evidence to satisfy the first prong under Alabama’s test. The court ruled, based on his adaptive deficits, that Smith’s “actual function [was] comparable” to that of someone who is intellectually disabled. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the lower court could “move on” from the first prong without proof of an IQ of 70. Because Smith had a score “as low as 72” his IQ “could be” 69. The panel found it improper to “consider anything other than the lower end of an offender’s standard-error range.”

Alabama sought review from the Supreme Court, which granted the petition, vacated the Eleventh Circuit judgment, and remanded for the panel to clarify the ambiguity in its opinion. The Eleventh Circuit issued a new opinion 10 days later, “reject[ing] any suggestion” that the first prong is satisfied whenever “the lower end of the standard-error range for [the] lowest of multiple IQ scores is 69.” The Eleventh Circuit explained that a court must consider adaptive skills if it cannot “rule out the possibility” of disability based on “the body of evidence that [the] IQ scores represent.” The court held that the district court had conducted “a ‘holistic’ review” and thus correctly moved on to adaptive deficits only after finding that Smith’s scores did not “foreclose the conclusion that he has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.”

Petitioner, the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Correction, argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling “eviscerated the most important prong of Atkins.” He submits that the ruling relaxes a defendant’s burden so that he has to prove only a “possibility” of a 70 IQ and wrongly injects evidence of adaptive deficits into the first prong. The Commissioner believes a court should “account for the conjunction of an offender’s scores,” and should not rely on what each score might suggest separately.” Specifically, he asserts that “[t]he average of [Smith’s] scores is 74.6, and both the median and modal scores are 74. . . . The average provides ‘a rough approximation of a composite score,’ although it may be slightly higher. On balance, the evidence suggests that Smith’s IQ is likely to be higher than 70, and his claim fails at prong one under Alabama law.” (Citation omitted.) The Commissioner asks the Court to clarify that it “did not command courts to ignore the import of multiple IQ scores.” He notes that, “[e]ven if courts must apply ‘the [standard error of measurement]’ as a matter of constitutional law, they should still consider the effect of multiple IQ test scores to narrow the error range.”

Smith counters that the Commissioner mischaracterizes the lower courts’ rulings and that neither court “deemed prong one satisfied solely because of a single IQ score.” Smith argues that the Commissioner seeks a precise math calculation, such as the mean or medium of the IQ scores, when “none can exist” based on the Court’s precedent. Rather, he says, the “Court’s precedent requires courts to consider additional evidence related to intellectual disability when IQ scores fall within the range of 70 to 75, as occurred here.” All told, Smith maintains, the lower courts conducted fact-intensive reviews that are legally sound.

Rutherford v. United States, 24-820; Carter v. United States, 24-860.

The Court will resolve whether a district court, when deciding if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a sentence reduction, may consider the sentencing disparities created by the First Step Act’s nonretroactive changes in sentencing law. Under the so-called “compassionate release” statute, a district court may reduce a prisoner’s sentence if, among other things, “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” a reduced sentence. 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress expressly delegated to the United States Sentencing Commission the authority to define what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. It placed one express limitation on that authority: a defendant’s rehabilitation “alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.” 28 U.S.C. §994(t). The Sentencing Commission issued several policy statements in which it identified examples of “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” including terminal illness, health, and age. The policy statements also included a catch-all category under which an unspecified reason could be considered either by itself or in combination with the specified examples. Because the Bureau of Prisons rarely filed a reduced-sentence (compassionate-release) motion in the decades that followed—and was the only party that could file such a motion—the courts had few opportunities to discuss “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”

In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act. The Act permits prisoners themselves to move for reduced sentences after exhausting all administrative remedies. More pertinently, the Act amended the sentencing laws for convictions of 18 U.S.C. §924(c), which proscribes using or carrying a firearm during certain felonies. Prior to the Act, §924(c) mandated a 25-year consecutive sentence for a ”second or subsequent” §924(c) conviction, even if it occurred in the same case as the first §924(c) conviction. This practice generally resulted in “stacked” sentences. The Act sought to alleviate stacking. Under the amended version of §924(c), the mandatory 25-year sentence applied only if there was a “final” §924(c) conviction. This amendment applied only to defendants convicted of violating §924(c) who were still awaiting sentencing and to future §924(c) convictions. In this regard, the §924(c) amendment was not retroactive. The Sentencing Commission did not immediately issue any guidance about the amendments. Meanwhile, courts divided over whether they could consider “the fact that a defendant would have received a significantly lower sentence if sentenced today, as a result of the First Step Act’s changes.” The Third Circuit was in the majority. In United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3rd Cir. 2021), it held that the nonretroactive changes, whether by themselves or in combination with other factors, could not be considered. In response to the circuit split on this issue, the Sentencing Commission issued a policy statement that became effective in 2023. Section (b)(6) of that policy states that a court could consider a change in the law when deciding if extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for a reduced sentence, provided the “change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed.”

Johnnie Markel Carter and Daniel Rutherford were separately convicted of multiple felonies in the 2000s. Their convictions included several §924(c) convictions, for which they both received stacked sentences. Pursuant to the First Step Act, Rutherford and Carter each filed a motion for a reduced sentence. Rutherford filed his motion in 2021, before the Sentencing Commission issued its 2023 policy statement. He argued that his 32-year stacked sentence was unusually long and too punitive because, had he been sentenced under the amended version of §924(c), he “would have received” 14 years for his two §924(c) convictions. The district court denied Rutherford’s motion. Citing Andrews as controlling authority, the court explained that it could not consider the nonretroactive changes to §924(c) as part of its analysis. Rutherford appealed to the Third Circuit. While his appeal was pending, the Sentencing Commission’s 2023 policy statement became effective. But the Third Circuit found the Commission’s policy statement invalid and affirmed the district court. 120 F.4th 360. The Third Circuit concluded that Andrews controlled because Andrews’ interpretation of the “unambiguous statute” was based on Congress’ will, unlike the policy statement. In its view, the policy statement exceeded Congress’ will because it would effectively contradict the explicit and unambiguous nonretroactive provision applicable to the §924(c) amendment. Carter made a similar claim and also lost in the Third Circuit.

In their petitions, Carter and Rutherford argue that the Third Circuit is wrong for several reasons. First, Carter opines that the Third Circuit’s decision partly “rests on an erroneous understanding of [the Sentencing Commission’s] authority.” He states that Congress expressly delegated to the Commission the authority to define the meaning of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” through policy statements. He concludes that the Commission acted within the scope of its authority when it issued the 2023 policy statement. He further contends that the Commission’s policy is “binding,” according to Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022).

Second, both men contend that, by prohibiting a court from considering the pre- and post-Act sentence disparities for §924(c) convictions, the Third Circuit has created a categorical bar that improperly limits a district court’s discretion in the sentencing context. While Carter and Rutherford’s arguments to that end vary slightly, they have a similar foundation. They are based on the principle that district courts have wide discretion in deciding what evidence is acceptable for sentencing, and that discretion may be limited only through express acts of Congress or by the Constitution. They state that nothing in the First Step Act, §924(c), or any other statute expressly prohibits a district court from considering §924(c)-sentence disparities in the reduced-sentence context. Also, both men remark that Congress knew how to (yet did not) impose a limitation to that effect when it enacted the First Step Act. For this proposition, they refer to 28 U.S.C. §994(t), which provides the only express limitation in the First Step Act (namely, that rehabilitation alone cannot be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduced sentence). Both men insist that, absent a congressional or constitutional limitation that would prohibit a court from considering §924(c)-sentence disparities, the Third Circuit’s categorical limitation on a court’s sentencing discretion should be rejected.

The United States contends that the Third Circuit correctly rejected the notion that nonretroactive changes to §924(c) could constitute an extraordinary or compelling reason for a sentence reduction. It asserts two primary arguments in defense of that holding. First, the United States contends that the changes to §924(c) do not fall within the ordinary meanings of “extraordinary” or “compelling.” “Extraordinary” means the most unusual or uncommon, while “compelling” means powerful and convincing. Building on those definitions, the United States contends that it is not extraordinary that a person’s sentence would reflect the laws that were in effect at the time of sentencing because that is to be expected. The United States also contends that the §924(c) amendment does not constitute a powerful or convincing reason because Congress expressly included the nonretroactive provision in the First Step Act, and that provision reflects Congress’ “deliberate decision” not to disturb past sentences. Relatedly, in the United States’ view, if Congress wished to allow courts to consider §924(c)-sentence disparities in the reduced-sentence context, Congress would have made express accommodations to that effect in the First Step Act. Second, the United States contends that the Sentencing Commission’s authority to define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” is not unlimited and must give way to congressional directives, including the congressional directive that the amendment to §924(c) be nonretroactive.

Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 24-874.

At issue is whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. In November 2014, Vista-Pro Automotive, the debtor, and its creditors commenced a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in federal bankruptcy court in Tennessee. On February 11, 2015, the debtor began proceedings to recover unpaid invoices against Coney Island Auto Parts, the petitioner in this case. Debtor’s counsel served the summons and complaint through first class mail to Coney Island. Debtor’s counsel also signed a motion for default attesting that the documents were delivered by U.S. mail. The bankruptcy court entered a default judgment against Coney Island in the amount of $48,696.21, plus $7 per diem. Jeanne Ann Burton, respondent, was appointed as trustee for the debtor’s Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. In the following years, Burton attempted to collect the judgment and sent letters and documents to Coney Island. In 2020, Burton registered the judgment against Coney Island in bankruptcy court in New York. Coney Island’s bank eventually put a hold on its bank account in the amount of $97,392.42. Coney Island then moved the bankruptcy court in New York to vacate the judgment due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court agreed that service “seemed to be improper” but found Coney Island’s recourse was in the Tennessee bankruptcy court.

Coney Island then moved the Tennessee bankruptcy court to vacate the default judgment. Coney Island conceded that it knew about the default judgment in 2016, but argued that judgments that are void for lack of personal jurisdiction can be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4) at any time. The court denied the motion and found that the Sixth Circuit requires Rule 60(c)(1) vacatur motions to be made within a “reasonable time,” even when the judgment is void. (Rule 60(c)(1) states in relevant part that a “motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.”) A federal district court affirmed, as did a divided Sixth Circuit panel. The Sixth Circuit majority acknowledged that its approach was different than other circuits, but believed it to be consistent with the Rule’s text.

Coney Island argues that all of the other circuits disagree with the Sixth Circuit on whether there is a time limitation on moving to vacate a default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. Coney Island says that the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all recognized in various ways that void judgments can be set aside at any time because they are inherently null. Coney Island argues that a judgment procured through defective personal service is void and a nullity and that there should therefore be no time limitation to move to vacate such a judgment.

Burton argues that the timeliness requirement “flows from the plain text” of Rule 60(c), and no exception should be recognized for contesting personal jurisdiction. Burton maintains that the Sixth Circuit’s decision to bar Coney Island’s “six-year-tardy” motion “unremarkably” applied that text. And Burton insists that many of the other circuits are inconsistent in their application of Coney Island’s proposed rule.

NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy Staff

• Dan Schweitzer, Director and Chief Counsel
• Lauren Campbell, Supreme Court Fellow
• Gracynthia Claw, Supreme Court Fellow

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