October 17, 2025 | Volume 33, Issue 1
This Report summarizes cases granted review on October 1, 3, and 10, 2025 (Part I).
Cases Granted Review
Wolford v. Lopez, 24-1046.
At issue is “[w]hether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding . . . that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit the carry of handguns by licensed concealed carry permit holders on private property open to the public unless the property owner affirmatively gives express permission to the handgun carrier[.]” Following the decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), Hawaii enacted a law (Act 52) that (among other things) prohibits the carry of firearms on private property held open to the public without the express written or verbal authorization of the property owner. Petitioners—individual Hawaii citizens who possess concealed-carry licenses and the Hawaii Firearms Coalition—filed a §1983 pre-enforcement facial challenge to Act 52 in federal court claiming this rule violates the Second Amendment. The district court, upon converting petitioners’ facial challenge into an as-applied one, granted a temporary restraining order against the statute and later converted that order into a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. 116 F.4th 959.
Looking to Bruen’s two steps for guidance, the Ninth Circuit first determined that one’s ability to carry arms onto private properties held open to the public was conduct that likely fell within the plain text of the Second Amendment. But at the second step, the court ruled that petitioners’ constitutional challenge fell short, as “relevant national historical tradition”—in particular a 1771 New Jersey law and an 1865 Louisiana law—supported the imposition of the rule. The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc over the dissent of eight judges.
Petitioners claim that Act 52 flipped the Bruen ruling on its head and rendered illusory the right to carry firearms in public. Petitioners do not deny that property owners possess the power to exclude people and their arms, but insist that power resides with property owners, not the government. Moreover, they argue, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance upon non-Founding Era analogues allows states to enact laws the “founding generation” would have never tolerated. Petitioners contend that the Louisiana law cited by the Ninth Circuit was aimed at depriving newly freed slaves of their civil rights and comes too late to reflect the beliefs held by the “founding generation,” while the New Jersey law was a solitary outlier aimed at preventing trespassing and poaching on private, “improved” lands. According to petitioners, such scant support does not meet the standard established in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).
Hawaii responds that it “has set forth sufficient historical evidence to establish that its rule is compatible with the Second Amendment. And the rule can be upheld for the independent reason that it represents a valid governmental effort to vindicate property owners’ fundamental right to exclude by enacting a default rule that comports with the community’s reasonable expectations regarding armed entry onto private property.” On the former point, Hawaii added that it “will be able to further develop the evidence it set forward concerning the other 18th-century laws that precluded persons from ‘carry[ing] a gun, upon any person’s land, . . . without the owner’s leave.’”
Trump v. Cook, 25A312.
At issue is whether the Court should stay a district court ruling enjoining the president from firing for alleged cause a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The Court deferred ruling on the president’s application for stay pending oral argument in January 2026. The Federal Reserve Act broadly authorizes the president to dismiss members of the Board “for cause,” without specifying the parameters of that phrase. 12 U.S.C. §242. The statute, unlike those governing the removal of members of the Federal Labor Relations Board or the National Labor Relations Board, contains no specific provisions concerning the process due an aggrieved party. Id.; 5 U.S.C. §7104(b); 29 U.S.C. §153(a).
In August 2025, President Trump stated that cause existed to remove one of the Board’s members―respondent Lisa Cook, a Biden appointee with years left on her term. The president pointed to Cook’s allegedly contradictory representations in two mortgage agreements made prior to her time on the Board. According to the president, Cook had previously represented separately to two mortgage lenders that each property, one in Michigan and one in Georgia, would serve as her principal residence. Such representations, he said, are material and typically result in lower mortgage rates for the borrower. President Trump posted on social media a letter stating that Cook was removed “[p]ursuant to [his] authority under Article II of the Constitution of the United States and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, as amended.” The letter further provided that Cook was being dismissed in light of her “deceitful and potentially criminal conduct in a financial matter” and “gross negligence in financial transactions.”
Cook filed suit three days after President Trump’s social media post. She claimed that the president’s purported removal was not “for cause” and deprived her of her due process rights by not granting her a hearing on the matter. Cook sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted. The court concluded that Cook was likely to succeed on her claims that (1) the president had not validly removed her “for cause” because the cited conduct occurred prior to her time on the Board, and (2) the president had denied her due process. The district court also concluded that the equitable factors favored preliminary relief because Cook’s removal would cause irreparable harm to the public’s interest in the Board’s independence. A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit denied the president’s request to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal based on the strength of Cook’s due process claim alone; the panel did not opine on Cook’s “for cause” arguments. As for the equitable factors, the panel found that the Board’s independence in the arena of monetary policy outweighed the president’s interest in immediately effectuating Cook’s removal.
President Trump asked the Supreme Court to stay the district court’s preliminary injunction. First, he asserts that Cook is not entitled to the due process she asserts because she has no vested interest or “property” right as a tenure-protected officer. Even if that were not the case, the president claims he provided Cook several days in which to respond to the allegations; when Cook declined to bring a defense, he removed her. Second, the president contends that “for cause” removal of an officer is not limited by her conduct in her official capacity—meaning it can precede her taking up the office. And, he adds, when not specifically defined by statute, the “for cause” provision is not open to interpretation or review by any other branch of government regardless of the presidential motivation for the removal. Even so, the president claims he acted with serious concerns as to Cook’s conduct and integrity. Limiting his discretion or restricting the pertinent inquiry to behavior occurring only while in office, the President argues, would lead to absurd results. On the other injunction factors, the president claims the government faces irreparable harm from permitting Cook to continue exercising executive power contrary to his wishes and risks further erosion of public trust in the Board. In holding otherwise, the president asserts, the district court exceeded its authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, 24-123.
At issue is whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempts “a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver[.]” Title 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1) preempts state laws “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” But the statute has a safety exception, providing that the statute “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(2)(A).
Petitioner Shawn Montgomery suffered injuries when he was hit by a truck in Illinois. He sued the truck driver, the motor carrier that employed the driver, and (most relevant here) the freight broker (C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.). Relying upon its circuit’s precedent―Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023)―the district court granted Robinson’s motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that decision and declined petitioner’s invitation to reconsider its precedent. In Ye, the Seventh Circuit first concluded that a claim of this sort was “related to” broker services because it sought to hold the broker liable for its selection of a motor carrier. Thus, the court held, the claim fell under §14501(c)(1). The court next held that the safety exception of §14501(c)(2)(A) did not apply. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the safety exception “requires state laws to have a direct link to motor vehicles to be saved from the preemption provision in [Section] 14501(c)(1).” But, if found, the connection between a broker hiring standard and motor vehicles was “too attenuated” to save the plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim.
Petitioner argues that the Seventh Circuit erred for several reasons. First, he says, a negligent-selection claim does not have a “significant impact” on the “price, route, or service” of a broker, as required for §14501(c)(1) to apply. Second, the Seventh Circuit reads the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception too narrowly by requiring a direct relationship between a claim and motor vehicles. Third, he argues, the Seventh Circuit erred in emphasizing that the safety exception does not specifically reference brokers; according to petitioner, the safety exception was intended to distinguish between modes of transportation, not classes of persons. Fourth, the Court’s decision in Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251 (2013), which the Seventh Circuit relied upon to limit the safety exception, did not address the language of the safety exception. Finally, he maintains that even if a “direct” relationship is required, a negligent-selection claim like his satisfies that relationship through a demonstration of proximate cause between the negligent act(s) of the broker and the underlying crash.
Hunter v. United States, 24-1063.
The Court will consider two questions related to the enforceability of a defendant’s appeal waiver when entering a federal guilty plea: (1) “[w]hether the only permissible exceptions to a general appeal waiver are for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; and (2) “[w]hether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal and the government does not object.”
In February 2024, petitioner Munson Hunter entered in federal district court a negotiated guilty plea to wire fraud affecting a financial institution. His plea agreement contained boilerplate language generally waiving his right to appeal his sentence. At sentencing, the district court (over Hunter’s objection) imposed a mandatory-medication provision to his supervised release that provided he “take all mental health medications that are prescribed by [his] treating physician.” The district court also informed Hunter of his “right to appeal.” Despite the language in the plea agreement, the government voiced no objection. Hunter appealed the mandatory-medication condition, arguing that it “infringe[d] on [his] fundamental due process liberty interest in being free of unwanted mental health medication.” In doing so, he claimed his appeal waiver did not bar this constitutional claim and, alternatively, that the sentencing judge’s declaration that he possessed a “right to appeal,” coupled with the government’s non-objection, rendered the appeal waiver void. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that Hunter’s claim was “barred by the waiver.” 2024 WL 5003582. The court further held that the judge’s statement at sentencing “did not impact the validity of the appeal waiver.”
On the first question, Hunter argues that the Fifth Circuit’s approach, which recognizes exceptions to an appeal waiver only for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and sentences that exceed the statutory maximum, is too narrow and runs the risk of leaving in place constitutionally repugnant sentences. The far better approach, according to Hunter, is to allow defendants to raise a broad range of constitutional challenges to their sentences so long as they do not expressly waive the specific constitutional right forming the basis of the claim. Such an approach, he says, is supported by contract law principles construing the terms of an agreement against its drafter (the government) and deeming unenforceable provisions of any agreement seen as unconscionable or contrary to public policy. The government responds that the “Court has recognized that a defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive constitutional or statutory rights—including appellate rights—as part of a plea agreement.” Here, the government argues, “[t]he court of appeals correctly held petitioner to the terms of the deal he accepted and rightly dismissed his appeal.” Indeed, “[t]he entire point of an appeal waiver is for a defendant to waive the right to challenge a sentence he believes is illegal—be it on statutory or constitutional grounds.”
On the second question, Hunter again contends that the Fifth Circuit’s approach is too limiting. He argues that the Court should recognize that a judge’s declaration at sentencing that a defendant has a right to appeal, in the absence of any objection by the government, renders a prior waiver unenforceable. Any other approach, he says, erodes trust in the oral pronouncements of the district courts, fails to account for a judge’s relying on the possibility of an appeal in crafting a given sentence, and rewards the government for sitting idly by or—worse yet—intentionally misleading the accused to his detriment. The government responds by noting that, “[e]xcept for the Ninth Circuit, every court of appeals to expressly address the issue has correctly recognized that a misstatement by a district judge made months after the defendant entered into a plea agreement does not undermine the knowing and voluntary nature of the defendant’s appeal waiver.”
Pung v. Isabella County, Mich., 25-95.
This case raises two questions: (1) “[w]hether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment when the compensation is based on the artificially depressed auction sale price rather than the property’s fair market value”; and (2) “[w]hether the forfeiture of real property worth far more than needed to satisfy a tax debt but sold for fraction of its real value constitutes an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, particularly when the debt was never actually owed.”
Petitioner is the personal representative of the Estate of Timothy Scott Pung. Pung owned a home in Isabella County, Michigan, for which he received an exemption from certain property taxes under the Principal Residence Exemption (PRE). After Mr. Pung unexpectedly passed away, the local tax assessor retroactively denied the PRE credit for the property for the 2007 to 2011 tax years. The Michigan Tax Tribunal later ordered the credit fully restored, but the tax assessor nonetheless revoked the PRE credit for the 2012 tax year, resulting in an unpaid tax bill of $2,241.93. Michigan courts ultimately authorized the foreclosure of the Pung property because of the unpaid bill (which petitioner maintains was erroneously assessed). The foreclosure concluded, and the county sold the property for $76,008, though it had an assessed value of $194,400 at the time of foreclosure. The buyer of the foreclosed property later resold it for $195,000. Petitioner sued and raised a Fifth Amendment takings claim and an Eighth Amendment excessive fines claim. The district court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim. On the Fifth Amendment issue, the district court held that a taking occurred, but the Estate was only entitled to the “surplus” proceeds from the $76,008 sale: a total of $73,766.07, less than half of the property’s fair market value. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing its own precedent holding that the measure of value for a foreclosed property is the foreclosure sale price and not the fair market value. 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2149.
The Fifth Amendment question is one that the Court left open in Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., Minn., 598 U.S. 631 (2023). Tyler held that a government effects a taking by using “the toehold of [a] tax debt to confiscate more property than [is] due,” but did not decide the measure of appropriate compensation. Petitioner argues that the fair market value of the property―not the “surplus following a fire-sale auction”―is the proper measure of just compensation for takings in tax foreclosure cases because it compensates owners for the true amount of their loss. The Sixth Circuit’s rule, in petitioner’s view, means that governments can “engineer foreclosure sales for the lowest possible return” without regard to the property’s actual worth. On the Eighth Amendment issue, petitioner first contends that forfeitures like the one here are fines because they “impose punishment” to deter noncompliance with the law. Petitioner points to Justice Gorsuch’s Tyler concurrence for this point, which states that “[e]conomic penalties imposed to deter willful noncompliance with the law are fines by any other name.”
On the takings issue, the county responds that “the price obtained at public sale of the foreclosed property has long been deemed ‘the truest test of the value of the landowner’s equitable interest in the land,’ and the surplus is ‘the embodiment in money of the value of that equitable title.’” The county adds that Pung’s position “would render tax foreclosure nonviable as a means of tax collection.” On the Eighth Amendment issue, the county argues that the Court has held that “’[t]he Excessive Fines Clause limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense.’” Yet, it says, “property taxes in Michigan are ‘not punitive in nature.’”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), 24-699.
The question presented is “[w]hether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that Act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.” Two statutes form the backdrop for this case. The first is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which generally immunizes foreign states and their instrumentalities from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless an enumerated exception applies. 28 U.S.C. §1604. The second statute is the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, also called the Helms-Burton Act. Title III of the Act creates a private right of action for any U.S. national who “owns the claim” to property “confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959,” allowing suits against “any person” who “traffics in” the confiscated property. 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A). As defined, the term “person” includes “any agency and instrumentality of a foreign state.” 22 U.S.C. §6023(11).
Petitioner Exxon Mobil (then Standard Oil) owned substantial Cuban oil and gas assets through a subsidiary. After Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, his regime confiscated those assets. Exxon brought a claim under the Cuban Claims Act of 1964, which created a mechanism for U.S. nationals to raise claims for losses experienced because of the Cuban government’s confiscation of foreign property. The Cuban Claims Act tasked the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission with determining the amount and validity of losses suffered but did not provide a mechanism for compensation. The Commission certified that Exxon suffered a loss of over $71 million in 1960 dollars. Until 2019, Exxon could not sue to recover that loss because each president kept Title III of the Helms-Burton Act from taking effect by invoking 22 U.S.C. §6085(b), which allows the suspension of the cause of action for reasons necessary to the national interest. In 2019, the Trump Administration allowed the suspension to lapse. Exxon then sued three Cuban instrumentalities: CUPET, a state-owned oil company, CIMEX, a state-owned conglomerate, and Corporación CIMEX, S.A., allegedly an alter ego of CIMEX. Exxon alleged that CUPET engaged in prohibited trafficking under Title III by operating, exploring, producing, refining, trading, and selling oil products using its confiscated property. Exxon similarly claimed that CIMEX operated service stations built or maintained on confiscated property. Exxon sought damages in the amount of the claim certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, plus pre-judgment interest and treble damages (both authorized by the Helms-Burton Act).
The Cuban defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that the district court lacked jurisdiction over them under FSIA. The district court held that Title III of the Helms-Burton Act does not abrogate the defendants’ foreign sovereign immunity; thus, jurisdiction existed only if Exxon’s claims fell within one of FSIA’s recognized exceptions. Turning to that issue, the court concluded that Exxon’s claims did not satisfy FSIA’s expropriation exception, that the claims against CIMEX satisfied the commercial-activity exception, but the claims against the other two defendants did not (though it allowed limited jurisdictional discovery). A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. 111 F.4th 12.
The D.C. Circuit majority held that FSIA sets out the exclusive mechanism for securing jurisdiction over civil suits against foreign sovereigns, and Title III of the Helms-Burton Act did not independently confer jurisdiction over the Cuba-owned defendants. The court reasoned that FSIA comprehensively addresses immunity for foreign entities, and Title III of the Helms-Burton Act―enacted later in time―contains no language departing from FSIA’s immunity provisions. The court further concluded that Title III and FSIA “harmoniously coexist” if Title III is read as allowing actions against foreign sovereign entities only when a FSIA exception applies. Addressing Exxon’s assertion that its suit satisfies two FSIA exceptions, the majority agreed with the district court that the expropriation exception is inapplicable and reversed for further fact-finding regarding whether CIMEX’s activities satisfy the commercial activity exception’s “direct effect” requirement.
Exxon argues in its petition that Title III of the Helms-Burton Act abrogates the sovereign immunity that the Cuban defendants would otherwise possess under FSIA because it “expressly authorizes damages actions against Cuban instrumentalities.” According to Exxon, the D.C. Circuit’s decision is contrary to Dep’t of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (2024), which held that the Fair Credit Reporting Act waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity when it authorized suits against “[a]ny person” who violates the statute, with the term “person” defined to include governmental agencies. Title III of the Helms-Burton Act uses language that is “substantively identical” to the language addressed in Kirtz. Exxon further contends that the history and purpose of Title III confirm an intent to abrogate immunity: when enacting the statute, Congress found that the federal government was obliged to “provide protection against wrongful confiscations by foreign nations and their citizens” and that the “international judicial system, as currently structured, lacks fully effective remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property.” 22 U.S.C. §6081(8), (10). Exxon asserts that the Helms-Burton Act was intended to remedy this deficiency by allowing suits against Cuban instrumentalities.
Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, 24-983.
This case also concerns Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, which “creates a private right of action for United States nationals who have a claim to property confiscated by [Cuba] against persons who traffic in that property. 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1).” The question presented is “whether a plaintiff must prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban government as to which the plaintiff owns a claim . . ., or instead that the defendant trafficked in property that the plaintiff would have continued to own at the time of trafficking in a counterfactual world ‘as if there had been no expropriation’ (as the divided Eleventh Circuit panel held below).”
Petitioner Havana Docks built the port of Havana’s docks at its own expense in exchange for an agreement with the Cuban Government that granted it temporary possession of, and the right to receive the economic benefit from, the property (a usufructary concession). Havana Docks was to retain the concession for 99 years, beginning in 1905. In 1960―44 years before the concession was set to expire―the Cuban Government forcibly seized the property. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission later certified Havana Docks’ claim to that property, providing “conclusive proof of ownership of an interest in” the property for purposes of the Helms-Burton Act. Between 2016 and 2019, after the Obama Administration authorized maritime travel to Cuba, cruise lines used the property to moor their ships and disembark passengers. They did not seek authorization from Havana Docks. In 2019, Havana Docks filed separate Title III suits against four cruise lines. Some defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Havana Docks’ concession expired in 2004, and Havana Docks thus had no Title III ownership interest at the time the cruise lines used the property. The district court rejected that argument and granted summary judgment for Havana Docks, concluding that the cruise lines were liable for trafficking in confiscated property. The judgment against each cruise line exceeded $100 million. On appeal, a divided Eleventh Circuit panel reversed and remanded. 119 F.4th 1276.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the cruise lines could not have trafficked in Havana Docks’ property because when the “concession expired in 2004, any property interest that Havana Docks had by virtue of that concession ended.” The court reasoned that in actions under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, courts must “view the property interest at issue . . . as if there had been no expropriation and then determine whether the alleged conduct constituted trafficking in that interest.” In the court’s view, that the certified claim proved Havana Docks’ ownership interest in the past “does not speak to the nature of the interest today.”
Havana Docks argues in its petition that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision contravenes the plain text of the Helms-Burton Act. It says that Title III “specifies that the property subject to ‘trafficking’ is the property described in a ‘claim,’ and a ‘claim’ to confiscated property defines the claimant’s property at the time of confiscation. Unless and until the claim is satisfied, it continues to encumber the confiscated property, which cannot be trafficked without giving rise to liability under the Act.” In Havana Docks’ view, a party’s claim under the Act “endures until satisfied, regardless of any time limitation on the underlying concession.” Havana Docks insists that the Eleventh Circuit’s holding “nullifies” certain property interests and “effectively guts” the statute by requiring plaintiffs to prove a counterfactual: that they would still have possessed the property “in an alternate universe where the property had never been confiscated.” Requiring this type of proof, Havana Docks contends, does not square with 22 U.S.C. §6083(a)(1)’s “conclusive” presumption of ownership and blunts the effectiveness of the Act as an instrument of foreign policy. On the latter score, Havana Docks maintains that, “[u]ntil the divided panel decision below, Title III of the [Helms-Burton] Act was a potent weapon in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. Its promise of significant civil liability for trafficking in confiscated property provided a substantial deterrent to doing business in Cuba and thereby propping up that country’s hostile Communist regime.”
NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy Staff
- Dan Schweitzer, Director and Chief Counsel
- Joshua Lockett, Supreme Court Fellow
- Martha Ehlenbach, Supreme Court Fellow
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