October 22, 2025 | Volume 33, Issue 2
This Report summarizes cases granted review on October 20, 2025 (Part I).
Cases Granted Review
United States v. Hemani, 24-1234.
The Court will resolve whether “18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), the federal statute that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who ‘is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,’ violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent.” The United States prosecuted respondent Ali Hemani under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) for possessing a pistol while unlawfully using marijuana. Hemani moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violates the Second Amendment. The district court granted Hemani’s motion and, after ordering further briefing addressing United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 2025 WL 354982. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit looked to its precedent United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269 (5th Cir. 2024), which concerned essentially the same issue. In Connelly, the Fifth Circuit held that §922(g)(3) was unconstitutional as applied because, while the defendant was a regular drug user, she was not intoxicated at the time of her arrest and there was “no historical justification for disarming a sober citizen not presently under an impairing influence.” The government conceded that Connelly was dispositive as to Hemani’s as-applied challenge while maintaining it was wrongly decided.
In its petition, the United States argues that the Fifth Circuit misapplied the history and tradition test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and Rahimi. Under Bruen, the Second Amendment presumptively applies when its “plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” The government must then “demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Looking to laws regarding vagrancy, civil commitment, and surety, the government contends that §922(g)(3) is “closely analogous” to laws restricting the rights of “drunkards” that existed in the founding era because it “addresses the risks posed by persons who habitually use intoxicating substances.” Post-ratification history, the government adds, also supports the validity of the statute because there is a long tradition of legislatures prohibiting drug addicts from buying, possessing, and carrying guns. Finally, the government contends, common sense and precedent confirm that the statute serves a legitimate purpose because habitual users of illegal drugs are at a greater risk of misusing firearms than law-abiding individuals. Section 922(g)(3), the government says, prevents the misuse of firearms and imposes only a “limited burden”: it applies to a discrete category of individuals, and the restriction lasts only so long as the individual chooses to continue habitually using illegal drugs.
Hemani responds by defending Connelly and arguing that there is a “critical distinction” between the statute and earlier laws: prior laws “bann[ed] carrying weapons while under the influence of alcohol, but none barred gun possession by regular drinkers.” In Hemani’s view, the government’s proffered historical analogues “do not support disarming individuals who are not actively intoxicated.” Hemani also says that historical precursors addressing handguns are “far less broad” than §922(g)(3), which prohibits anyone who is “addicted to or uses a controlled substance” from possessing any firearm. As to the government’s appeal to common sense, Hemani maintains that “nothing in the plain text of the statute requires ‘habitual use,’” undercutting the government’s defense of the statute on the basis that habitual drug users pose a particular danger.
Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, 24-935.
At issue is whether the Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) transportation-worker exemption applies to workers who “deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce” but “who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders.” Under 9 U.S.C. §2, arbitration agreements are generally “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” in any contract “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” Title 9 U.S.C. §1, however, provides that the FAA’s provisions do not apply to contracts of any “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Employees falling within §1’s exemption are shielded from compelled arbitration under the FAA.
Petitioner Flowers Foods makes baked goods that are sold in stores throughout the United States. Flowers sells the right to distribute its goods to independent distributors who market, sell, and distribute Flowers products within discrete territories. Respondent Angelo Brock owns a Colorado company that has distribution rights solely within Colorado. He does not cross state lines to deliver Flowers products. Further, while he receives some products from out of state, Brock has no role in that aspect of the distribution process: Flowers, not Brock, delivers those products to a warehouse in Colorado and unloads them there. Brock’s involvement begins when he picks up the products from the warehouse to deliver to Colorado customers. Brock filed a class action suit in federal district court claiming that Flowers violated state and federal law by misclassifying him and others as independent contractors. Flowers moved to dismiss on the basis that the lawsuit should be arbitrated and, in the alternative, moved to stay the lawsuit pending arbitration. The district court denied the motion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. 121 F.4th 753.
The Tenth Circuit held that Brock falls within §1’s exemption for transportation workers. Looking to Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022), the court first defined the relevant “class of workers” and then examined whether those workers are “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” On the first question, the court accepted that Brock is a transportation worker under the FAA. On the second, the court determined that Brock is directly engaged in interstate commerce because the delivery of the goods forms “one continuous interstate journey” where Brock is the “last mile driver” for Flowers products. Relevant to this conclusion, in the court’s view, is that Flowers’ “real interest” is delivering the products not to Brock’s company but to their ultimate retail destinations.
Flowers argues that the Tenth Circuit’s holding contravenes the plain text of §1 because it focuses on the movement of goods through the interstate supply chain rather than examining whether a particular class of workers has an “active or direct role in interstate or foreign transport.” Flowers contends that §1’s language providing the exemption to workers “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” shows that the statute “is trained on the worker’s work, not the good’s travel.” Thus, according to Flowers, workers like Brock who deliver goods within a state and do not “interact with vehicles moving across borders” do not trigger the exemption. On a practical level, Flowers says, an analysis focusing on the movement of goods would mean that “almost any worker” is exempt from the FAA’s arbitration provisions because many workers handle goods that have traveled across state lines. Thus, Flowers concludes, the Tenth Circuit’s rule would transform a “narrow exemption” into a “broad carveout that would preclude arbitration throughout the national economy.”
Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc, 25-6.
The question presented is “[w]hether the doctrine of judicial estoppel can be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a potential motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in fact acted in bad faith.” Petitioner Thomas Keathley filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in federal court in 2019. The bankruptcy court approved his repayment plan the following year. In 2021, a truck under the employ of Buddy Ayers Construction (BAC) collided with Keathley, causing him various injuries. Keathley informed his bankruptcy counsel of the accident, but counsel did not inform the bankruptcy court. Later that same year, Keathley filed suit against BAC in a different federal district court. Keathley’s bankruptcy counsel subsequently filed several amended plans with the bankruptcy court that did not reflect Keathley’s lawsuit against BAC. Catching wind of this, BAC moved for summary judgment in the civil case on the ground that Keathley had failed to disclose his personal injury lawsuit to the bankruptcy court. The court granted BAC’s motion, reasoning that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Keathley from pursuing his claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 2025 WL 673434.
Judicial estoppel, the Fifth Circuit noted, has three elements, the third of which is that “the party did not act inadvertently.” On that element, the court said it was bound by circuit precedent to consider only whether Keathley either “lack[ed] knowledge of the undisclosed claims” or “stood to potentially benefit” from their concealment. The court concluded that Keathley had a plausible motive to mislead. The court pointed to circuit precedent “ma[king] clear” that “‘the motivation sub-element is almost always met if a debtor fails to disclose a claim or possible claim to the bankruptcy court.’”
Keathley’s petition argues that the Fifth Circuit’s approach to the third element of judicial estoppel is wrong. According to Keathley, the doctrine of judicial estoppel was intended to thwart “deliberate” and “intentional” shifts in a litigant’s position to secure unfair advantages in different suits. A rule that ignores the subjective intent of the party and instead relies merely upon a “potential motive to mislead” perverts that purpose. Emphasizing judicial estoppel’s role as an equitable doctrine, Keathley points to the ways the Fifth Circuit’s rigid approach leads to unjust results by granting a boon to tortious wrongdoers at the expense of innocent debtors and their creditors. Such an approach, he argues, also undermines Congress’s policy aims within the bankruptcy system, which generally allows for the correction of disclosures. Moreover, Keathley says, the system already has in place deterrents to punish a debtor who purposefully seeks to deceive their creditors or the courts.
NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy Staff
- Dan Schweitzer, Director and Chief Counsel
- Joshua Lockett, Supreme Court Fellow
- Martha Ehlenbach, Supreme Court Fellow
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