United States and North Carolina v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority d/b/a Carolinas Healthcare System
North Carolina and USDOJ filed suit alleging that Atrium Health, formerly known as Carolinas HealthCare System illegally reduced competition in the health care market in Charlotte and limited consumers’ ability to shop around for better deals on health care. Atrium is based in Charlotte and operates Carolinas Medical Center and nine other hospitals in the Charlotte area. It dominates the hospital market in the Charlotte region with a 50 percent share of the market and approximately $8.7 billion in annual revenues. The state alleged that Atrium acted unlawfully to preserve its dominance in the Charlotte health care market by using its market power to require steering restrictions in its contracts with every major insurer. These provisions have prevented insurers from, among other things, introducing health plans that encourage patients to use medical providers that offer lower priced, higher-quality services. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and attorneys fees. After the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, the parties settled. Under the terms of the settlement, Atrium is prohibited from using anticompetitive steering restrictions in contracts between commercial health insurers and its providers in the Charlotte, North Carolina metropolitan area. These steering restrictions prevented health insurers from promoting innovative health benefit plans and more cost-effective healthcare services to consumers.
Oregon ex rel. rosenblum v. AU Optronics Corp.
Following guilty pleas to criminal price-fixing by several LCD manufacturers, and a conviction after trial of another, Oregon filed suit against LCD manufacturers, alleging that top executives of several companies held numerous secret meetings from at least 1999 through at least 2006 for the purpose of exchanging information and setting prices on LCD panels. According to the complaint, companies such as Dell, Apple, and Hewlett Packard were among those targeted by the manufacturers’ price-fixing scheme. According to the lawsuit, the illegal overcharges were ultimately borne by state consumers and state government purchasers. The suit also alleges fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy. The lawsuit seeks monetary damages, civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Sherman Act and state antitrust statutes. A number of states filed in the MDL, but Oregon filed originally in federal district court in Oregon, and was transferred, with its consent, to the MDL. Oregon reached individual settlements with many defendants, totaling $21 million (Hitachi Displays, $565,000; Chi Mai, $1,634,600; Epson, $105,000; LG Display, $6,975,000; Sharp, $1,950,000; Samsung, $4.5 million; AU Optronics, $4.25 million; Toshiba, $525,000; HannStar, $1 million)
United States and Michigan v. Hillsdale Community Health Center et al., No. 2:15-cv-12311 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2015)
The United States and Michigan filed suit in federal court against four Michigan hospital systems, alleging that for years they unlawfully agreed to allocate territories for marketing. The complaint alleged Hillsdale, Allegiance, Branch and ProMedica’s Bixby and Herrick Hospitals, the only hospitals in their respective counties, each competed through marketing to attract patients, including advertising, direct mailings to patients, outreach to physicians and employers, conducting health fairs and offering free health screenings. The complaint alleges that Hillsdale curtailed this competition for years by entering into agreements with Allegiance, Branch and ProMedica to limit the marketing of competing healthcare services. Three of the systems, Hillsdale Community Health Center, Community Health Center of Branch County, Michigan, and ProMedica Health System Inc., agreed to settle the charges in 2015. The settlement prohibits Hillsdale, Branch and ProMedica from agreeing with other healthcare providers, including hospitals and physicians, to limit marketing or to divide any geographic market or territory, prohibits communications among the defendants about their marketing activities and requires the hospitals to implement compliance measures tailored to prevent the recurrence of these types of anticompetitive practices in the future. The parties paid $5,000 each to Michigan for costs and attorneys’ fees. W.A. Foote Memorial Hospital, doing business as Allegiance Health, settled in 2018. The Allegiance settlement expands on the terms of the previous settlements, specifically, the proposed settlement prevents Allegiance from engaging in improper communications with competing providers regarding their respective marketing activities and entering into any improper agreement to allocate customers or to limit marketing. It explicitly prevents Allegiance from continuing to carve out Hillsdale County from its marketing and business development activities. Allegiance must report any violations and must annually certify compliance with the terms of the final judgment. Allegiance must also submit to compliance inspections at the Department’s request. Allegiance must also pay $40,000 to the state and the US to reimburse costs.
United States and Connecticut v. AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-02181 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2015)
U.S. and Connecticut filed complaint and proposed settlement with AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. (AMC) and SMH Theaters, Inc. (Starplex Cinemas) to resolve concerns that AMC’s purchase of a Connecticut Starplex theater would substantially harm competition for Connecticut consumers. AMC is the second largest commercial movie exhibitor in the United States, with two theaters in Connecticut. Starplex Cinemas is an independent, privately held commercial movie exhibitor operating 33 theaters with 346 screens in 12 states, including two theaters in Connecticut. In their complaint, Connecticut and the DOJ allege that the Berlin market is concentrated and that AMC and Starplex Cinemas are the other’s most significant competitor, given their close proximity. The agreement with Connecticut and the DOJ requirew that the Berlin 12 theater in Berlin be sold as part of the acquisition, which will help to maintain a competitive market and the best-possible service for Connecticut consumers. The agreement also requires the divestiture of a theater in New Jersey.
U.S. and Pennsylvania v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. (No. 14-cv-01186, D.D.C. 2014)
USDOJ and Pennsylvania filed suit to challenge the acquistion by Sinclair Broadcase Group of Perpetual Corporation, alleging that it would lessen competition in the sale of broadcast televlsion spot advertising in the south central Pennsylvania area. The merged companies would control 38 percent of the advertising market in that area. the parties agreed to the divestiture of a station in the marketing area.
US, Illinois, Iowa and Missouri v. Tyson Foods, No. 1:14-cv-01474, D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2014)
USDOJ and three states challenged the acquisition of Hilshire by Tyson. According to the complaint, Tyson and Hillshire compete against each other and against others to
procure sows from farmers in the United States. Tyson’s proposed acquisition of Hillshire would eliminate head-to head
competition between the companies and create a firm that would account for over a
third of all sows purchased from farmers in the United States. the merging parties agreed to divest all the assets of Heinold Hog Markets, including 8 buying stations, to a purchaser approved by USDOJ, after consultation with the states.
U.S. and State of Texas v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc.
USDOJ and State of Texas challenged the acquisition of Texas Industries by Martin Marietta Materials on the grounds that the proposed merger would have likely resulted in increased prices for customers handling Texas Department of Transportation projects in parts of the Dallas metropolitan area. The
Texas Department of Transportation sets specifications for the type of aggregate approved for use in those projects. In Dallas County and parts of the surrounding area,
Martin Marietta and Texas Industries are two of the only three suppliers of Texas Department of Transportation-approved aggregate. Under the terms of the proposed consent decree, Martin Marietta must divest its North Troy aggregate quarry in Mill Creek, Oklahoma, its rail yard in Dallas, and its rail yard in Frisco, Texas. All of these assets
predominantly serve parts of the Dallas metropolitan area. Under the proposed settlement, USDOJ Antitrust Division, after consultation with Texas, must approve the buyer of the divested assets.
United States and Texas v. Cinemark Holdings et al., No. 13-727 (D.D.C. 2013)
United States and Texas challenged $220 million acquisition by Cinemark of Rave Holdings. Cinemark is the third-biggest movie chain in the U.S., with 298 theaters in 39 states. Rave Holdings owns 35 theaters in 12 states and specializes in digital and 3-D presentations, According to the complaint, the proposed acquisition would reduce competition in the Voorhees-Somerdale area of New Jersey and the eastern section of Louisville, where Cinemark and Rave are each other’s chief competitors. Cinemark and Rave operate theaters in the western region of Fort Worth. In addition, if the acquisition were to go through as originally planned, the theaters would be less likely to improve or maintain the quality of their sound systems, screens, and food and drinks. Cinemark agreed to divest Movie Tavern Inc. — a Dallas company operating 16 theaters in Fort Worth and Denton, Texas — and three additional Texas theaters to settle the suit.
Florida v. NSK Ltd.
State alleged price-fixing in the market for automotive ball bearings, including bearings used throughout the automobile, from 2000 to the present. The defendants control 75 percent of the market, and entry is not easy. Several of the defendants entered guilty pleas to criminal charges brought by USDOJ.
In the Matter of Aggregate Industries, PLC, No. 02-3947 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk Cty., Sept. 6, 2002)
USDOJ and plaintiff state challenged acquisition by British aggregate company of a local aggregate company with concrete plants serving eastern Massachusetts and New Hampshirealleging that the acquisition would reduce the number of ready-mix concrete suppliers able to service large construction projects in northern metropolitan Boston from three to two. In northern metropolitan Boston, Aggregate Industries and Wakefield often were each other’s most significant competitor. Aggregate Industries was required to divest the Wakefield facility to a third-party buyer. The state entered into an Assurance of Discontinuance with Aggregate Industries requiring it to relinquish a lease on another concrete plant in central Massachusetts.
