FTC and Plaintiff States v. Mallilnckrodt Ard Inc. (formerly Questcor), No. 1:17-cv-00120 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2017)
Four states and the FTC reached a $100 million settlement with Mallinckrodt plc and its US subsidiary, formerly known as Questcor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. resolving a lawsuit accusing Questcor of monopolizing the market for Achthar, the only adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH) based therapeutic drug sold in the United States. ACTH is used as a last resort to treat infantile spasms and multiple sclerosis. Questcor allegedly blocked competition for Acthar by disrupting the bidding process and acquiring the U.S. rights for Synacthen Depot, the only other ACTH based drug sold in the world. In 2001, Questcor bought the rights to Acthar and increased the price of it by 85,000 percent, charging over $34,000 for a vial of the drug that used to cost $40 per vial. In 2012, Novartis Pharma A.G sold the U.S. rights of Synacthen, Achthar’s only competitor. The complaint alleges that three other companies had all conducted due diligence and submitted formal offers for Synacthen with plans to develop and launch Synacthen in the United States in direct competition with Questcor. However, perceiving the threat to its U.S. monopoly if a rival drug company purchased the assets, Questcor stepped in to outbid the three other companies, offering Novartis $135 million in guaranteed payments with only vague plans for Synacthen and after very limited due diligence. Through the acquisition, Questcor sought to extinguish the most likely challenges to its Acthar monopoly. According to the complaint, this allowed Questcor to continue charging over $34,000 per vial for H.P. Acthar Gel. In addition to paying $100 million in disgorgement, Under the settlement, Mallinckrodt will pay $100 million. The company will also be required to license a competitor to the rights it acquired from Novartis to commercialize and develop Synacthen in the United States, including the Synacthen trademark, along with clinical trial data and certain intellectual property related to manufacturing and formulation. Mallinckrodt is also prohibited from taking actions that would interfere with clinical trials or clinical plans for Synacthen.
New York et al. v. Cephalon, No. 2:16-cv-04234 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2016)
In May 2015, the FTC settled a “pay-for-delay” suit against Cephalon for injunctive relief and $1.2 billion, which was paid into an escrow account. The FTC settlement allowed for those escrow funds to be distributed for settlement of certain related cases and government investigations. In August 2016, forty-eight states filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Cephalon alleging anticompetitive conduct by Cephalon to protect the profits it earned from having a patent-protected monopoly on the sale of its landmark drug, Provigil. According to the complaint, Cephalon’s conduct delayed generic versions of Provigil from entering the market for several years. The complaint alleged that as patent and regulatory barriers that prevented generic competition to Provigil neared expiration, Cephalon intentionally defrauded the Patent and Trademark Office to secure an additional patent, which a court subsequently deemed invalid and unenforceable. Before it was declared invalid, Cephalon was able to use the patent to delay generic competition for nearly six additional years by filing patent infringement lawsuits. Cephalon settled those lawsuits by paying competitors to delay sale of their generic versions of Provigil until at least April 2012. Consumers, states, and others paid millions more for Provigil than they would have had generic versions of the drug launched by early 2006, as expected. A settlement was filed with the complaint, which includes $35 million for distribution to consumers who bought Provigil.
Massachusetts et al. v. Koninklijke Ahold N.V., No. 1:16-cv-01412 (D.D.C., July 25, 2016)
Plaintiff states and FTC filed suit challenging the merger of Ahold and Delhaize, supermarket chains operating in the United States as Stop & Shop and Hannafords. According to the complaint, supermarkets operated by Ahold and Delhaize compete closely for shoppers based on price, format, service, product offerings, promotional activity, and location. Without a remedy, the merger would eliminate direct supermarket competition to the detriment of consumers in these local markets. As a result, the merger would increase the likelihood that the combined company could unilaterally exercise market power, and that the remaining competitors could coordinate their behavior to raise prices. the parties agreed to divest 76 supermarkets in the plaintiff states. The settlement also required prior notification of future supermarket purchases and $300,000 in attorneys fees and costs.
FTC and North Dakota v. Sanford Health
The FTC and the state of North Dakota filed suit seeking to block Sanford Health’s proposed acquisition of Mid Dakota Clinic, alleging that the deal would violate antitrust law by significantly reducing competition for adult primary care physician services, pediatric services, obstetrics and gynecology services, and general surgery physician services in the greater Bismarck and Mandan metropolitan area. Sanford and Mid Dakota were each other’s closest rivals in the four-county Bismarck-Mandan region of North Dakota, and the merger would create a group of physicians with at least 75 to 85 percent share in the provision of adult primary care physician services, pediatric services, obstetrics and gynecology services. The district court granted the injunction. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the parties abandoned the transaction.
Florida et al. v. Dollar Tree, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-01052 (D.D.C. July 2, 2015)
Eighteen plaintiff states and the FTC challenged the merger of Dollar Tree, the largest chain of “dollar” stores (deep discount stores) and Family Dollar Stores, the nation’s third largest dollar store chain. The complaint claimed the proposed acquisition would substantially lessen competition in numerous markets by: (1) eliminating direct and substantial competition between Dollar Tree and Family Dollar; and (2) increasing the likelihood that Dollar Tree will unilaterally exercise market power. This, according to the complaint, would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act and each state’s applicable antitrust and consumer protection laws. The states sought a permanent injunction to prevent the merger, along with costs and attorney fees. The parties reached a settlement under which 330 stores in the 18 states would be divested to Sycamore partners and run as a new dollar store chain, Dollar Express. The agreement also required the defendants to report future acquisitions in any of the affected markets and to pay over $865,000 to reimburse the costs and fees of the plaintiff states.
Pennsylvania v. Arclight Energy Partners Fund VI et al., No. 1:15-CV-2493 Jan. 4, 2016)
Pennsylvania filed suit, alleging the proposed merger of two of the largest gasoline and distillate terminaling services in the state, ArcLight and Gulf Oil would violate both the Clayton Act and Pennsylvania state law by lessening competition in three markets, Altoona, Harrisburg and Scranton. The state sought injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees. The state and the parties entered into a settlement in which the defendants would agree to divest their terminal assets in Pennsylvania – located in Altoona, Pittston, Mechanicsburg and Williamsport – to New York-based Arc Logistics within 20 days of the acquisition being finalized. After the divestiture, ArcLight is further bound to assist Arc Logistics by providing transitional assistance at a reasonable cost for one year, serve as a customer of the divested terminals for two years and supply ethanol and biodiesel fuels and related terminaling services for five years. The settlement also allows any ArcLight petroleum terminal customer to sever its contract with the company without penalty or charge for six months after the divestiture date, and for ArcLight to provide them with notice of the right to do so. The FTC had previously entered into a settlement with the parties.
FTC and Pennsylvania v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center, 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016)
The FTC administratively challenged the combination of Penn State Hershey Medical Center and PinnacleHealth System, alleging that the merger would substantially reduce competition for general acute care inpatient hospital services in the area surrounding Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, leading to higher costs and reduced quality. The FTC and Pennsylvania filed a motion for preliminary injunction in federal court in Pennsylvania. The court denied the motion by the FTC and Pennsylvania in an opinion filed under seal, holding that the plaintiffs did not properly define the relevant geographic market. The FTC and Pennsylvania appealed to the 3rd Circuit, which reversed the district court and granted the preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit rejected the District Court’s reasoning on all counts: market definition, the relevance and persuasiveness of the parties’ 5-year contracts with payers, whether the claimed efficiencies were cognizable and potentially sufficient to overcome the government’s prima facie case, and how the equities should be balanced in an FTC preliminary injunction proceeding. The parties abandoned the merger. The 3d Circuit denied Pennsylvania’s claim for attorneys’ fees on the grounds that the relief was granted under FTC Act Sec. 13(b), which does not authorize attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties.
FTC and Illinois v. Advocate Health Care Network
The FTC administratively challenged the proposed merger of Advocate Health Care Network and NorthShore University HealthSystem, alleging it would create the largest hospital system in the North Shore area of Chicago. According to the complaint, the combined entity would operate a majority of the hospitals in the area and control more than 50 percent of the general acute care inpatient hospital services. The FTC and the State of Illinois filed for a preliminary injunction to prevent the merger before the FTC’s administrative trial. The district court denied the motion for preliminary injunction based on a finding that “plaintiffs ha[d] not shouldered their burden of proving a relevant geographic market.” The state and the FTC appealed. The 7th Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The court of appeals held that the district court’s geographic market finding was clearly erroneous, and approved the hypothetical monopolist test. The court also cited the “silent majority” fallacy, which overlooks the market power of the patients who are not willing to travel for hospital care.
Maryland et al. v. Perrigo Company, No. 1:04CV01398 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004)
The FTC and states alleged that the companies had entered into a “pay-for-delay” arrangement, whereby Perrigo paid Alpharma to withdraw its generic version from the market for Children’t ibuprofen.According to the complaint, in June 1998, Perrigo and Alpharma signed an agreement allocating to Perrigo the sale of OTC children’s liquid ibuprofen for seven years. In exchange for agreeing not to compete, Alpharma received an up-front payment and a royalty on Perrigo’s sales of children’s liquid ibuprofen. The FTC received $6.25 million to compensate injured consumers. The states received $1.5 million in lieu of civil penalties. the parties were enjoined from future agreements.
Florida et al. v. Service Corporation International, No. A13CV1082LY (W.D. Texas Jan. 2, 2014)
SCI, the nation’s largest funeral home chain, sought to acquire Stewart Enterprises, another large funeral home chain. Seven states and the FTC entered into consent agreements with SCI specifying which funeral homes would be divested in 59 separate markets. In a separate consent agreement, SCI agreed to provide the state plaintiffs with the same notices, requirements for approval and compliance review as to divestitures and future acquisitions included in the FTC’s consent decree and to pay the state’s costs and attorneys’ fees..
