Connecticut v. Marsh & McLennan Companies et al., , No. X05-CV-05-4004360-S (Ct. Super. Ct. 2009)
Plaintiff state originially sued insurance carrier ACE, alleging kickbacks from ACE to Marsh. See In the Matter of ACE Ltd. and ACE Group Holdings, Inc. The state later expanded the lawsuit against Marsh, alleging that, when Marsh customers wanted to purchase insurance or renew insurance they already had, Marsh brokers frequently decided which insurer should be given the business and at what price. Marsh’s quote for insurance was typically a substantial increase — as much as 15 to 20 percent — over the previous year’s price.
New York et al. v. Deutsche Telekom AG et al., No. 1:19-cv-5434 (S.D.N.Y.)
States challenged merger of T-Mobile and Sprint, the third and fourth-largest mobile telecommunications providers in the U.S., alleging that shrinking the national wireless carrier pool down from four to three providers would decrease competition and create higher prices for consumers. The US Department of Justice and seven states entered into a settlement with the parties…
State of Wisconsin et al. v. Indivior, No. 16-5073 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22,2016)
Plaintiff states alleged that the makers of Suboxone, a drug used to treat opioid addiction, engaged in a scheme to block generic competitors and raise prices. Specifically, they are conspiring to wtich Suboxone from a tablet version to a flim in order to prevent or delay generic entry. The states allege that the manufacturers engaged in “product hopping” in which a company makes slight changes to its product to extend patent protections and prvent generic alternatives. The complaint was filed under seal.
Connecticut et al. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals et al. Civ. Action No. (D.Conn. Dec. 15, 2016)
Twenty states filed a federal lawsuit against six generic drug manufacturers, alleging that they entered into long-running and well coordinated illegal conspiracies in order to unreasonably restrain trade, artificially inflate and manipulate prices and reduce competition in the United States for two drugs: doxycycline hyclate delayed release, an antibiotic, and glyburide, an oral diabetes medication. The lawsuit was filed under seal to avoid compromising a continuing investigation. In the complaint, the states allege that the misconduct was conceived and carried out by senior drug company executives and their marketing and sales executives. The complaint further alleges that the defendants routinely coordinated their schemes through direct interaction with their competitors at industry trade shows, customer conferences and other events, as well as through direct email, phone and text message communications. The states further allege that the drug companies knew that their conduct was illegal and made efforts to avoid communicating with each other in writing or, in some instances, to delete written communications after becoming aware of the investigation. The states allege the anticompetitive conduct, including price-fixing and price maintenance, market allocation and other anticompetitive acts, caused significant, harmful and continuing effects in the country’s healthcare system. The states sought an injunction to prevent the companies from engaging in illegal, anticompetitive behavior and also sought equitable relief, including disgorgement. An additional 20 states joined the complaint in March 2017.
New York et al. v. Cephalon, No. 2:16-cv-04234 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2016)
In May 2015, the FTC settled a “pay-for-delay” suit against Cephalon for injunctive relief and $1.2 billion, which was paid into an escrow account. The FTC settlement allowed for those escrow funds to be distributed for settlement of certain related cases and government investigations. In August 2016, forty-eight states filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Cephalon alleging anticompetitive conduct by Cephalon to protect the profits it earned from having a patent-protected monopoly on the sale of its landmark drug, Provigil. According to the complaint, Cephalon’s conduct delayed generic versions of Provigil from entering the market for several years. The complaint alleged that as patent and regulatory barriers that prevented generic competition to Provigil neared expiration, Cephalon intentionally defrauded the Patent and Trademark Office to secure an additional patent, which a court subsequently deemed invalid and unenforceable. Before it was declared invalid, Cephalon was able to use the patent to delay generic competition for nearly six additional years by filing patent infringement lawsuits. Cephalon settled those lawsuits by paying competitors to delay sale of their generic versions of Provigil until at least April 2012. Consumers, states, and others paid millions more for Provigil than they would have had generic versions of the drug launched by early 2006, as expected. A settlement was filed with the complaint, which includes $35 million for distribution to consumers who bought Provigil.
United States et al. v. Anthem et al., No. 1:16-cv-01493 (D.D.C., July 21, 2016)
The US and plaintiff states sued to block the merger of two of the country’s largest health insurers. The complaint alleges that their merger would substantially reduce competition for millions of consumers who receive commercial health insurance coverage from national employers throughout the United States; from large-group employers in at least 35 metropolitan areas, including New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver and Indianapolis; and from public exchanges created by the Affordable Care Act in St. Louis and Denver. The complaint also alleges that the elimination of Cigna threatens competition among commercial insurers for the purchase of healthcare services from hospitals, physicians and other healthcare providers. According to the complaint, the merger would eliminate substantial head-to-head competition in all these markets, and it would remove the independent competitive force of Cigna, which has been a leader in the industry’s transition to value-based care. the court granted the injunction. Anthem appealed to the DC Circuit, which affirmed the district court.
In re Natixis Funding Corp., Agreement, Feb. 18, 2016)
Plaintiff states entered into settlement agreement with Natixis Funding Corp. for fraudulent and anticompetitive conduct in municipal bond derivative transactions with state and local government entities and nonprofits across the country. Natixis will pay $29,950,000 as part of a coordinated 22-state and private class settlement. The funds will mostly be applied to restitution for municipalities, counties, government agencies, school districts and nonprofits that the states allege were harmed when they entered into municipal derivatives contracts with Natixis. In 2008, the plaintiff states, in parallel with the U.S. Department of Justice and federal regulatory agencies, began their investigation of the municipal bond derivatives market. In these markets, tax exempt entities such as municipalities, school districts, and nonprofit organizations issue municipal bonds and reinvest the proceeds until the funds are needed or enter into contracts to hedge interest rate risk. These investigations revealed anticompetitive and fraudulent conduct involving individuals at a number of large financial institutions, including Natixis, and certain brokers with whom they had worked. Certain Natixis employees and their counterparts at other institutions rigged bids, submitted noncompetitive courtesy bids and fraudulent certificates of arms-length bidding to government agencies. The misconduct led local and state governments, as well as nonprofits, to enter into municipal derivatives contracts on less advantageous terms than they would have otherwise. Natixis agreed to pay $23.4 million into a settlement fund and $1.5 million to the attorneys general as an additional payment. Natixis also agreed not to submit non-competitive bids or refrain from bidding on, or coordinate the preparation of bids for municipal derivatives and to cooperate with ongoing investigations.
In re Societe Generale S.A., Agreement
Plaintiff states entered into settlement agreement with Societe Generale for fraudulent and anticompetitive conduct in municipal bond derivative transactions with state and local government entities and nonprofits across the country. Societe Generale agreed to pay $26,750,000 as part of a coordinated 22-state and private class settlement. Pursuant to the settlement, this money will mostly be applied to restitution for municipalities, counties, government agencies, school districts and nonprofits that the states allege were harmed when they entered into municipal derivatives contracts with Societe Generale. In 2008, plaintiff states, in parallel with the U.S. Department of Justice and federal regulatory agencies, began their investigation of the municipal bond derivatives market. In these markets, tax exempt entities such as municipalities, school districts, and nonprofit organizations issue municipal bonds and reinvest the proceeds until the funds are needed or enter into contracts to hedge interest rate risk. These investigations revealed anticompetitive and fraudulent conduct involving individuals at a number of large financial institutions, including Societe Generale, and certain brokers with whom they had worked. Certain Societe Generale employees and their counterparts at other institutions rigged bids, submitted noncompetitive courtesy bids and fraudulent certificates of arms-length bidding to government agencies. The misconduct led local and state governments, as well as nonprofits, to enter into municipal derivatives contracts on less advantageous terms than they would have otherwise. Societe Generale agreed to pay $25.1 million into a settlement fund to provide restitution for injured parties and $1.4 million to the attorneys general as an additional payment. Societe Generale also agreed not to submit non-competitive bids or refrain from bidding on, or coordinate the preparation of bids for municipal derivatives and to cooperate with ongoing investigations.
United States and Connecticut v. AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-02181 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2015)
U.S. and Connecticut filed complaint and proposed settlement with AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. (AMC) and SMH Theaters, Inc. (Starplex Cinemas) to resolve concerns that AMC’s purchase of a Connecticut Starplex theater would substantially harm competition for Connecticut consumers. AMC is the second largest commercial movie exhibitor in the United States, with two theaters in Connecticut. Starplex Cinemas is an independent, privately held commercial movie exhibitor operating 33 theaters with 346 screens in 12 states, including two theaters in Connecticut. In their complaint, Connecticut and the DOJ allege that the Berlin market is concentrated and that AMC and Starplex Cinemas are the other’s most significant competitor, given their close proximity. The agreement with Connecticut and the DOJ requirew that the Berlin 12 theater in Berlin be sold as part of the acquisition, which will help to maintain a competitive market and the best-possible service for Connecticut consumers. The agreement also requires the divestiture of a theater in New Jersey.
Maryland et al. v. Perrigo Company, No. 1:04CV01398 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004)
The FTC and states alleged that the companies had entered into a “pay-for-delay” arrangement, whereby Perrigo paid Alpharma to withdraw its generic version from the market for Children’t ibuprofen.According to the complaint, in June 1998, Perrigo and Alpharma signed an agreement allocating to Perrigo the sale of OTC children’s liquid ibuprofen for seven years. In exchange for agreeing not to compete, Alpharma received an up-front payment and a royalty on Perrigo’s sales of children’s liquid ibuprofen. The FTC received $6.25 million to compensate injured consumers. The states received $1.5 million in lieu of civil penalties. the parties were enjoined from future agreements.
