Richardson v. Akzo Nobel (In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation), 1:09-cv-02112-TFH(D.D.C. 2009)
As part of a private class action lawsuit, states, as parens patriae for their citizens, reached a settlement with vitamin manufacturers accused of fixing prices on certain vitamins (The vitamins affected by this alleged price fixing conspiracy are: vitamin A,
astaxanthin, vitamin B1 (thiamin), vitamin B2 (riboflavin), vitamin B3 (niacin), vitamin B4 (choline chloride), vitamin B5 (calpan), vitamin B6, vitamin B9 (folic acid), vitamin B12 (cyanocobalamine pharma), betacarotene, vitamin C, canthaxanthin, vitamin E, and vitamin H (biotin), as well as all blends and forms of these vitamins) sold purchased between 1988 and 2000. This case is related to the case New York et al. v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,et al. with different defendants.
Florida et al. v. Abbott Laboratories et al., No. 1:08-cv-00155-SLR (D.Del. 2007)
States alleged Abbott Laboratories; Fournier
Industrie Et Sante and Laboratoires Fournier, S.A., blocked competition from less expensive
generics by continuously making minor changes in the formulations of TriCor to prevent therapeutically equivalent generic substitutions. The states alleged that the product switches helped thwart generic competition, allowing the companies to charge monopoly prices for TriCor.
The lawsuit also allegd the companies used patents, which they obtained by deceiving the Patent and Trademark Office and improperly enforced and brought a series of patent infringement lawsuits against two generic companies. According to the complaint, Abbott and Fournier filed at least ten lawsuits against two generic companies who were attempting to obtain FDA approval for their generic versions of TriCor. Abbott and Fournier eventually lost or dismissed all of the lawsuits. As a result of the product switches and patent litigation, Abbott and Fournier have successfully thwarted generic competition and denied consumers and state agencies the choice of a lower priced therapeutically equivalent generic.
The states settled their claims for $22.5 milion, which covered governmental purchases, as well as injunctive relief to prevent “product hopping” by the defendants in the future.
Florida v. Travelers Companies, Inc. (Leon County Court)
Plaintiff states filed identical complaints and consent orders in their respective state courts. See case listings under other settling states. The complaint alleged that Travelers
participated in a bid rigging scheme in which broker Marsh & McLennan predesignated which insurance company’s bid would “win” a particular account. To create the appearance of a competitive bidding process, Marsh would instruct certain insurers to submit inflated, intentionally uncompetitive bids. These schemes gave commercial policyholders, including large and small companies, nonprofit organizations, and public entities, the impression that they were receiving the most competitive commercial premiums available, when they were actually being overcharged.
Additionally, Travelers was involved with a “pay-to-play” arrangement centered on their
payment of contingent commissions, in addition to standard commissions and fees, to insurance brokers. Contingent commissions, often undisclosed to consumers, provided an incentive for brokers to steer business to the insurer who offered the most lucrative contingent commissions, often in violation of their clients’ interests.
States settled for $6 million plus injunctive relief mandating disclosure of types and amounts of compensation.
Oregon v. Travelers Companies (Multnomah County Court)
Plaintiff states filed identical complaints and consent orders in their respective state courst. See case listings under other settling states. The complaint alleged that Travelers
participated in a bid rigging scheme in which broker Marsh & McLennan predesignated which insurance company?s bid would ?win? a particular account. To create the appearance of a competitive bidding process, Marsh would instruct certain insurers to submit inflated, intentionally uncompetitive bids. These schemes gave commercial policyholders, including large and small companies, nonprofit organizations, and public entities, the mpression that they were receiving the most competitive commercial premiums available, when they were actually being overcharged.
Additionally, Travelers was involved with a ?pay-to-play? arrangement centered on their
payment of contingent commissions, in addition to standard commissions and fees, to insurance brokers. Contingent commissions, often undisclosed to consumers, provided an incentive for brokers to steer business to the insurer who offered the most lucrative contingent commissions, often in violation of their clients? interests.
States settled for $6 million plus injunctive relief mandating disclosure of types and amounts of compensation.
Massachusetts v. Travelers Companies (Suffolk Superior Court)
Plaintiff states filed identical complaints and consent orders in their respective state courst. See case listings under other settling states. The complaint alleged that Travelers
participated in a bid rigging scheme in which broker Marsh & McLennan predesignated which insurance company?s bid would ?win? a particular account. To create the appearance of a competitive bidding process, Marsh would instruct certain insurers to submit inflated, intentionally uncompetitive bids. These schemes gave commercial policyholders, including large and small companies, nonprofit organizations, and public entities, the mpression that they were receiving the most competitive commercial premiums available, when they were actually being overcharged.
Additionally, Travelers was involved with a ?pay-to-play? arrangement centered on their
payment of contingent commissions, in addition to standard commissions and fees, to insurance brokers. Contingent commissions, often undisclosed to consumers, provided an incentive for brokers to steer business to the insurer who offered the most lucrative contingent commissions, often in violation of their clients? interests.
States settled for $6 million plus injunctive relief mandating disclosure of types and amounts of compensation.
Oregon v. ACE Holdings, Inc.
Consent decrees filed by states in state court required $4.5 million payment and conduct relief to remedy alleged bid-rigging and false insurance quotes, as well as payment of secret “contingent commissions” to brokers.
District of Columbia v. ACE Holdings, Inc.
Consent decrees filed by states in state court required $4.5 million payment and conduct relief to remedy alleged bid-rigging and false insurance quotes, as well as payment of secret “contingent commissions” to brokers.
Texas v. ACE Holdings, Inc.
Consent decrees filed by states in state court required $4.5 million payment and conduct relief to remedy alleged bid-rigging and false insurance quotes, as well as payment of secret “contingent commissions” to brokers.
Florida v. ACE Holdings, Inc.
Consent decrees filed by states in state court required $4.5 million payment and conduct relief to remedy alleged bid-rigging and false insurance quotes, as well as payment of secret “contingent commissions” to brokers.
State of Colorado et al v. Warner Chilcott, 1:05-cv-02182 (D.D.C.2005)
34 states filed suit alleging that Warner Chilcott entered into an illegal agreement with Barr Pharmaceuticals to raise the prices of Ovcon, an oral contraceptive. The lawsuit alleged that after Barr Pharmaceuticals publicly announced that it planned to have a generic version of Ovcon on the market by the end of the year, Warner Chilcott paid Barr Pharmaceuticals $1 million for an agreement designed to prevent Barr’s generic product from coming to market. Under the terms of the alleged agreement, once Barr received FDA approval to market generic Ovcon, Warner Chilcott had 90 days to pay Barr $19 million, after which Barr would refuse to bring the cheaper generic version to the market. The lawsuit alleged that as a result of the agreement, Warner Chilcott paid Barr a total of $20 million to keep it from marketing its generic version of Ovcon. In additon to a payment of $5.5 million, the settlement prohibits Warner Chilcott, for ten years, from entering into any agreement that would have the effect of limiting the research, development, manufacture, or sale of a generic alternative to one of its drugs. Furthermore, Warner Chilcott must provide the states notice of certain agreements it has entered into with generic manufacturers, and must continue to make its records available to the states for inspection to determine whether the company is complying with the terms of the agreement.
