Florida v. AU Optronics
Plaintiff state filed suit against the world’s largest manufacturers of thin-film transistor
liquid crystal display panels, or “TFT-LCD panels,” alleging the companies conspired
to fix the prices of their products. The civil lawsuit, filed in federal district court in California, alleges that the defendants conspired to prevent competition and to increase prices for TFT-LCD panels, the most common form of LCD panels used in popular electronic devices such as desktop monitors, laptop screens, and flat panel televisions.
The state alleges that the defendants organized the conspiracy at the highest level of their organizations in various secret meetings and telephone conversations over a period of years. The United States Department of Justice has indicted a number of the defendants and their employees in the same federal court, resulting in more than $890 million in criminal fines. The lawsuit also alleges fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy. claims the companies violated the Florida Antitrust Act, the Sherman Act, and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, and seeks injunctive relief, treble damages, restitution and/or disgorgement, civil penalties and costs.
Attorney General of Florida v. ASAP Meds No. 04-16032 (09) (Fl. Cir. Ct., Broward Cty. Oct. 27 2004)
State brought price-gouging action against distributor of flu vaccine during a flu vaccine shortage. The distributor’s prices were allegedly 1000 percent of the actual price of the vaccine. Defendant agreed to consent order enjoining it from sales of the vaccine and turned its supply of vaccine over to the Florida Department of Health. Several months later, the state and the defendant entered into a settlement under which the defendant agreed to refrain from intentionally making false statements to consumers relating to how much of a given drug is in stock, how quickly it is being sold and how long the current supply will last. In addition, the company paid $150,000 for a training and educational program for at-risk youth and $71,000 to be used to assist pharmacies that were affected by Meds-Stat’s activities.
Texas et al. v. Organon (Remeron), No. 04-5126 (D.N.J. 2004)
Plaintiff states settled with drug maker Organon USA, Inc. and its parent company, Akzo Nobel N.V., resolving antitrust claims involving the antidepressant drug Remeron between June 2001 and October 2004. The states’ complaint alleged that Organon unlawfully extended its monopoly by improperly listing a new “combination therapy” patent with the U.S. Federal Drug Administration. In addition, the complaint alleged that Organon delayed listing the patent with the FDA in another effort to delay the availability of lower-cost generic substitutes. The $26 million settlement resolved claims brought by state attorneys general, as well as a private class action brought on behalf of a class of end payors. Organon also agreed to make timely listings of patents and to submit accurate and truthful information to the FDA.
United States and Plaintiff States v. Election Systems and Software, Inc. No. 10-cv-00380 (D.D.C. 2010)
The U.S. Department of Justice and nine plaintiff states filed suit against Election Systems and Software, Inc.’s (“ES&S”) acquisition of Premier Election Solutions, Inc. (“Premier”). ES&S, the largest provider of voting systems in the United States, acquired Premier, a subsidiary of Diebold, Inc. and the second largest provider of voting equipment systems. The acquisition was well under the HSR reporting thresholds. After this acquisition, ES&S provided more than 70 percent of the voting equipment systems used in elections held in the United States. The complaint alleged that because ES&S’s acquisition of Premier joined the two closest competitors in the provision of voting systems, it was likely that states and local governments would have seen higher prices and a decline in quality and innovation in voting equipment systems.
The states and USDOJ reached a settlement with ES&S under which ES&S will sell Premier’s intellectual property for all past, present and in-development voting equipment systems to another competitor. The buyer will have the ability to compete for contracts to install new voting systems using the Premier product. ES&S is prohibited for 10 years from competing for new
installations using a Premier product. The buyer will also receive copies of all existing
Premier service contracts so that it can compete for contracts that are up for renewals.
United States et al. v. Ticketmaster, No. 1:10-cv-00139(D.D.C. 2010)
U.S. and 17 states sued to enjoin merger of Ticketmaster, the nation’s largest ticketing services company, and Live Nation, the nation’s largest concert promoter.
According to the Complaint, the parties announced their merger shortly after Live Nation had entered the concert ticketing business as Ticketmaster’s closest competitor. The complaint alleged that consumers and major concert venues would
face higher ticket service charges as a result of the merger
The settlement requires the merging parties to license its ticketing software to Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG). AEG is the nation’s second largest promoter and the operator of some of the largest concert venues in the country. The merging parties are further required to divest Ticketmaster’s entire Paciolan business, which provides a venue-managed platform for selling tickets through the venue’s own web site. Paciolan is to be divested to Comcast/Spectacor, a sports and entertainment company with a management relationship with a number of concert venues. Comcast also has ticketing experience through its New Era ticketing company.The settlement also prohibits the merging parties from retaliating against venue owners who contract with the merging parties’ competitors.
Richardson v. Akzo Nobel (In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation), 1:09-cv-02112-TFH(D.D.C. 2009)
As part of a private class action lawsuit, states, as parens patriae for their citizens, reached a settlement with vitamin manufacturers accused of fixing prices on certain vitamins (The vitamins affected by this alleged price fixing conspiracy are: vitamin A,
astaxanthin, vitamin B1 (thiamin), vitamin B2 (riboflavin), vitamin B3 (niacin), vitamin B4 (choline chloride), vitamin B5 (calpan), vitamin B6, vitamin B9 (folic acid), vitamin B12 (cyanocobalamine pharma), betacarotene, vitamin C, canthaxanthin, vitamin E, and vitamin H (biotin), as well as all blends and forms of these vitamins) sold purchased between 1988 and 2000. This case is related to the case New York et al. v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,et al. with different defendants.
Florida v. Champion Laboratories, No. 1:09-cv-02321 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
State filed against nine manufacturers of aftermarket auto filters, alleging a scheme to illegally fix prices, allocate customers and eliminate price competition since at least 1999. The suit alleges that high-level filter company executives conspired to maintain artificially high prices for
their companies� filters by agreeing among themselves to fix, increase, maintain and/or stabilize the prices of filters sold in the United States, in violation of state and federal antitrust laws and state consumer protection laws. The executives allegedly communicated about prices and even met with each other on numerous occasions, including at filter industry trade association meetings, to fix the prices and allocate customers and markets. The lawsuit further alleges the defendant companies used misleading information in letters seeking to justify their price increases. The suit seeks treble damages, injunctive relief and attorneys� fees and costs as well as civil penalties of up to $1 million per violation against each defendant. Private litigation is pending, USDOJ investigated but did not pursue case.
In re Marsh & McLennan
Plaintiff states alleged that Marsh, an insurance broker, made collusive arrangements whereby brokers entered into agreements with insurers to receive undisclosed compensation and engaged in anticompetitive conduct in the market for commercial liability insurance. March agreed to reveal all commissions paid, and to pay the states $7 million.
Florida et al. v. Abbott Laboratories et al., No. 1:08-cv-00155-SLR (D.Del. 2007)
States alleged Abbott Laboratories; Fournier
Industrie Et Sante and Laboratoires Fournier, S.A., blocked competition from less expensive
generics by continuously making minor changes in the formulations of TriCor to prevent therapeutically equivalent generic substitutions. The states alleged that the product switches helped thwart generic competition, allowing the companies to charge monopoly prices for TriCor.
The lawsuit also allegd the companies used patents, which they obtained by deceiving the Patent and Trademark Office and improperly enforced and brought a series of patent infringement lawsuits against two generic companies. According to the complaint, Abbott and Fournier filed at least ten lawsuits against two generic companies who were attempting to obtain FDA approval for their generic versions of TriCor. Abbott and Fournier eventually lost or dismissed all of the lawsuits. As a result of the product switches and patent litigation, Abbott and Fournier have successfully thwarted generic competition and denied consumers and state agencies the choice of a lower priced therapeutically equivalent generic.
The states settled their claims for $22.5 milion, which covered governmental purchases, as well as injunctive relief to prevent “product hopping” by the defendants in the future.
Florida v. Travelers Companies, Inc. (Leon County Court)
Plaintiff states filed identical complaints and consent orders in their respective state courts. See case listings under other settling states. The complaint alleged that Travelers
participated in a bid rigging scheme in which broker Marsh & McLennan predesignated which insurance company’s bid would “win” a particular account. To create the appearance of a competitive bidding process, Marsh would instruct certain insurers to submit inflated, intentionally uncompetitive bids. These schemes gave commercial policyholders, including large and small companies, nonprofit organizations, and public entities, the impression that they were receiving the most competitive commercial premiums available, when they were actually being overcharged.
Additionally, Travelers was involved with a “pay-to-play” arrangement centered on their
payment of contingent commissions, in addition to standard commissions and fees, to insurance brokers. Contingent commissions, often undisclosed to consumers, provided an incentive for brokers to steer business to the insurer who offered the most lucrative contingent commissions, often in violation of their clients’ interests.
States settled for $6 million plus injunctive relief mandating disclosure of types and amounts of compensation.
