IN the matter of Wachovia

Wachovia and its successor, Wells Fargo, settled charges by 25 states and several federal agencies (the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Federal Reserve) that it participated in a nationwide scheme to allegedly rig bids and engage in other anticompetitive conduct relating to municipal bond derivatives that defrauded state agencies, local governmental entities and not-for-profit entities. The multistate settlement is part of a $148 million settlement Bank of America entered into simultaneously with the federal agencies.

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U.S. and Michigan v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 10-14155 (E.D.Mich. 2013)

USDOJ and plaintiff state challenged the use by Blue Cross/BlueShield of Michigan of Most Favored Nation clauses, alleging that their power in the market, combined with these clauses, violated state and federal antitrust law by stifling competition, leading to higher costs, and preventing new entry into the market. After the state legislature enacted a statute prohibiting health insurers from using most-favored-nation clauses in contracts with health care providers, USDOJ and Michigan dismissed the case.

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U.S. and Plaintiff States v. American Express Co. et al. No. 10-4496 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

U.S. DOJ and plaintiff states filed suit challenging rules made by American Express, MasterCard and Visa that prevent merchants from offering consumers discounts, rewards and information about card costs, ultimately resulting in consumers paying more for their purchases. Visa and MasterCard settled with the Department of Justice and the litigating states immediately after the complaint was filed. Under the terms of the settlement, the two companies will be required to allow merchants to offer discounts, incentives and information to consumers to encourage the use of payment methods that are less costly. The proposed settlement requires MasterCard and Visa to allow their merchants to: 1) offer consumers an immediate discount or rebate or a free or discounted product or service for using a particular credit card network, low-cost card within that network or other form of payment; 2) express a preference for the use of a particular credit card network, low-cost card within that network or other form of payment; 3) promote a particular credit card network, low-cost card within that network or other form of payment through posted information or other communications to consumers; 4) communicate to consumers the cost incurred by the merchant when a consumer uses a particular credit card network, type of card within that network or other form of payment.
American Express did not agree to settle,and a trial was held, in which the court found for the plaintiffs. . The trial focused on credit card “swipe fees” which generate over $50 billion annually for credit card networks. Plaintiffs argued that price competition over merchant swipe fees has been almost non-existent and for decades the credit card networks have not competed on price because of the rules imposed by each of the networks that limit merchants’ ability to take advantage of a basic tool to keep prices competitive. That tool – commonly used elsewhere in the economy – is merchants’ freedom to “steer” transactions to a network willing to lower its price. Each network has long prohibited such steering to lower-cost cards. The court held that the American Express anti-steering rules block merchants from using competition to keep credit card swipe fees down, which means higher costs to merchants’ customers. The decision means that agreements the plaintiffs reached previously with MasterCard and Visa can be fully implemented pending the conclusion of any appeals.
After remedy submissions from the parties, the court entered an order prohibiting American Express from adopting rules or entering contracts that block merchants from encouraging their customers to use a particular credit card. Under the order, merchants must be permitted to: offer discounts for the use of particular cards; express a preference for particular cards; disclose to customers the cost merchants incur when the customer uses particular credit cards; and engage in other conduct to encourage use of favored credit cards. The order also requires American Express to: repeal any rules that block merchant steering; notify merchants of their freedom to engage in steering activities; and adopt compliance measures to ensure that its employees understand that they cannot continue to block steering by merchants that accept American Express cards.
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court decision that the restraints had an actual anticompetitive effect on interbrand competition. The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating an anticompetitive effect on the whole market because “without evidence of the NDPs’ net effect on both merchants and cardholders, the District Court could not have properly concluded that the NDPs unreasonably restrain trade in violation of § 1.”

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Cox ex rel. Michigan v. Home City Ice, No. 10-1080-CP (30th Jud. Dist. Ingham Cty. 2010)

After companies pleaded guilty to federal criminal price-fixing, Michigan alleged that between 2001 and 2007 Arctic Glacier and Home City Ice conspired to reduce competition between the two ice manufacturers in the southeast Michigan market. The companies allocated geographic territories and customers between themselves, lessening competition and potentially resulting in higher prices
for consumers. The companies agreed to pay $740,000 ($350,000 from Arctic Glacier and $390,000 from Home City) in the form of penalties.

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Cox ex rel. Michigan v. Arctic Glacier Int’l, No. 10-1050-CP (30th Jud. Cir. Ingham Cty. 2010)

After companies pleaded guilty to federal criminal price-fixing, Michigan alleged that between 2001 and 2007 Arctic Glacier and Home City Ice conspired to reduce competition between the two ice manufacturers in the southeast Michigan market. The companies allocated geographic territories and customers between themselves, lessening competition and potentially resulting in higher prices
for consumers. The companies agreed to pay $740,000 ($350,000 from Arctic Glacier and $390,000 from Home City) in the form of penalties.

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Missouri v. AU Optronics Corp., (N.D. Cal. pending transfer to MDL 1827, 2010)

Following guilty pleas to criminal price-fixing by several LCD manufacturers, and a conviction after trial of another, plaintiff states filed suit against LCD manufacturers, alleging that top executives of several companies held numerous secret meetings from at least 1999 through at least 2006 for the purpose of exchanging information and setting prices on LCD panels. According to the complaint, companies such as Dell, Apple, and Hewlett Packard were among those targeted by the manufacturers’ price-fixing scheme. According to the lawsuit, the illegal overcharges were ultimately borne by state consumers and state government purchasers. The suit also alleges fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy. The lawsuit seeks monetary damages, civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Sherman Act and state antitrust statutes. The first settlement covered Chimei Innolux, Chimei Optoelectronics, Hannstar, Hitachi, Samsung, and Sharp and their subsidiaries. The second settlement, for $543.5 million, was with AU Optronics, Toshiba and LG Display and subsidiaries.

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Texas et al. v. Organon (Remeron), No. 04-5126 (D.N.J. 2004)

Plaintiff states settled with drug maker Organon USA, Inc. and its parent company, Akzo Nobel N.V., resolving antitrust claims involving the antidepressant drug Remeron between June 2001 and October 2004. The states’ complaint alleged that Organon unlawfully extended its monopoly by improperly listing a new “combination therapy” patent with the U.S. Federal Drug Administration. In addition, the complaint alleged that Organon delayed listing the patent with the FDA in another effort to delay the availability of lower-cost generic substitutes. The $26 million settlement resolved claims brought by state attorneys general, as well as a private class action brought on behalf of a class of end payors. Organon also agreed to make timely listings of patents and to submit accurate and truthful information to the FDA.

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United States, Wisconsin, Illinois and Michigan v. Dean Foods, Co. No. 10-C-0059 (E.D. Wisc. 2010)

States and USDOJ challenged already consummated acquisition by Dean Foods Co of Foremost Farms USA. Complaint alleged loss of competition in two markets: School milk contracts in Wisconsin and the upper peninsula of Michigan, and fluid milk sales in Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin, because Dean and Foremost were the first and fourth largest sellers in those states. The settlement requires Dean to divest a significant milk processing plant in Waukesha, Wis., and related assets that it acquired from the Foremost Farms USA Cooperative, including the Golden Guernsey brand name. The settlement also requires that Dean notify USDOJ before it makes any future acquisition of milk processing plants for which the purchase price is more than $3 million. In addition, the attorney general for the state of Michigan filed a separate settlement which required Dean Foods to continue to bid on school milk contracts in the Upper Peninsula until 2016, and required that their bid be based either on a Cap Price which varies based on the price of raw milk, or a set price that does not vary.

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New York et al. v. Herman Miller, Inc. (

Three states alleged Herman Miller (HMH) sought to raise and maintain retail prices on its “AERON” chairs. According to the complaint, HMH responded to complaints and urging by HMH’s retailers, beginning in 2001, by establishing and announcing minimum prices, below which retailers were prohibited from advertising any HMH furniture. Under HMH’s Suggested Retail Price policy, HMH retailers had to agree with HMH not to advertise below HMH’s dictated prices for Aeron chairs in any medium where prices can be seen by consumers. HMH was enjoined from using the SRP program for two years,and from telling dealers how much to sell their chairs for. HMH paid $750,00 to the plaintiff states.

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Richardson v. Akzo Nobel (In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation), 1:09-cv-02112-TFH(D.D.C. 2009)

As part of a private class action lawsuit, states, as parens patriae for their citizens, reached a settlement with vitamin manufacturers accused of fixing prices on certain vitamins (The vitamins affected by this alleged price fixing conspiracy are: vitamin A,
astaxanthin, vitamin B1 (thiamin), vitamin B2 (riboflavin), vitamin B3 (niacin), vitamin B4 (choline chloride), vitamin B5 (calpan), vitamin B6, vitamin B9 (folic acid), vitamin B12 (cyanocobalamine pharma), betacarotene, vitamin C, canthaxanthin, vitamin E, and vitamin H (biotin), as well as all blends and forms of these vitamins) sold purchased between 1988 and 2000. This case is related to the case New York et al. v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,et al. with different defendants.

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