State of Wisconsin et al. v. Indivior, No. 16-5073 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22,2016)
Plaintiff states alleged that the makers of Suboxone, a drug used to treat opioid addiction, engaged in a scheme to block generic competitors and raise prices. Specifically, they are conspiring to wtich Suboxone from a tablet version to a flim in order to prevent or delay generic entry. The states allege that the manufacturers engaged in “product hopping” in which a company makes slight changes to its product to extend patent protections and prvent generic alternatives. The complaint was filed under seal.
New York et al. v. Cephalon, No. 2:16-cv-04234 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2016)
In May 2015, the FTC settled a “pay-for-delay” suit against Cephalon for injunctive relief and $1.2 billion, which was paid into an escrow account. The FTC settlement allowed for those escrow funds to be distributed for settlement of certain related cases and government investigations. In August 2016, forty-eight states filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Cephalon alleging anticompetitive conduct by Cephalon to protect the profits it earned from having a patent-protected monopoly on the sale of its landmark drug, Provigil. According to the complaint, Cephalon’s conduct delayed generic versions of Provigil from entering the market for several years. The complaint alleged that as patent and regulatory barriers that prevented generic competition to Provigil neared expiration, Cephalon intentionally defrauded the Patent and Trademark Office to secure an additional patent, which a court subsequently deemed invalid and unenforceable. Before it was declared invalid, Cephalon was able to use the patent to delay generic competition for nearly six additional years by filing patent infringement lawsuits. Cephalon settled those lawsuits by paying competitors to delay sale of their generic versions of Provigil until at least April 2012. Consumers, states, and others paid millions more for Provigil than they would have had generic versions of the drug launched by early 2006, as expected. A settlement was filed with the complaint, which includes $35 million for distribution to consumers who bought Provigil.
Maryland et al. v. Perrigo Company, No. 1:04CV01398 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004)
The FTC and states alleged that the companies had entered into a “pay-for-delay” arrangement, whereby Perrigo paid Alpharma to withdraw its generic version from the market for Children’t ibuprofen.According to the complaint, in June 1998, Perrigo and Alpharma signed an agreement allocating to Perrigo the sale of OTC children’s liquid ibuprofen for seven years. In exchange for agreeing not to compete, Alpharma received an up-front payment and a royalty on Perrigo’s sales of children’s liquid ibuprofen. The FTC received $6.25 million to compensate injured consumers. The states received $1.5 million in lieu of civil penalties. the parties were enjoined from future agreements.
Texas et al. v. Organon (Remeron), No. 04-5126 (D.N.J. 2004)
Plaintiff states settled with drug maker Organon USA, Inc. and its parent company, Akzo Nobel N.V., resolving antitrust claims involving the antidepressant drug Remeron between June 2001 and October 2004. The states’ complaint alleged that Organon unlawfully extended its monopoly by improperly listing a new “combination therapy” patent with the U.S. Federal Drug Administration. In addition, the complaint alleged that Organon delayed listing the patent with the FDA in another effort to delay the availability of lower-cost generic substitutes. The $26 million settlement resolved claims brought by state attorneys general, as well as a private class action brought on behalf of a class of end payors. Organon also agreed to make timely listings of patents and to submit accurate and truthful information to the FDA.
United States et al. v. Ticketmaster, No. 1:10-cv-00139(D.D.C. 2010)
U.S. and 17 states sued to enjoin merger of Ticketmaster, the nation’s largest ticketing services company, and Live Nation, the nation’s largest concert promoter.
According to the Complaint, the parties announced their merger shortly after Live Nation had entered the concert ticketing business as Ticketmaster’s closest competitor. The complaint alleged that consumers and major concert venues would
face higher ticket service charges as a result of the merger
The settlement requires the merging parties to license its ticketing software to Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG). AEG is the nation’s second largest promoter and the operator of some of the largest concert venues in the country. The merging parties are further required to divest Ticketmaster’s entire Paciolan business, which provides a venue-managed platform for selling tickets through the venue’s own web site. Paciolan is to be divested to Comcast/Spectacor, a sports and entertainment company with a management relationship with a number of concert venues. Comcast also has ticketing experience through its New Era ticketing company.The settlement also prohibits the merging parties from retaliating against venue owners who contract with the merging parties’ competitors.
Richardson v. Akzo Nobel (In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation), 1:09-cv-02112-TFH(D.D.C. 2009)
As part of a private class action lawsuit, states, as parens patriae for their citizens, reached a settlement with vitamin manufacturers accused of fixing prices on certain vitamins (The vitamins affected by this alleged price fixing conspiracy are: vitamin A,
astaxanthin, vitamin B1 (thiamin), vitamin B2 (riboflavin), vitamin B3 (niacin), vitamin B4 (choline chloride), vitamin B5 (calpan), vitamin B6, vitamin B9 (folic acid), vitamin B12 (cyanocobalamine pharma), betacarotene, vitamin C, canthaxanthin, vitamin E, and vitamin H (biotin), as well as all blends and forms of these vitamins) sold purchased between 1988 and 2000. This case is related to the case New York et al. v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,et al. with different defendants.
State of Colorado et al v. Warner Chilcott, 1:05-cv-02182 (D.D.C.2005)
34 states filed suit alleging that Warner Chilcott entered into an illegal agreement with Barr Pharmaceuticals to raise the prices of Ovcon, an oral contraceptive. The lawsuit alleged that after Barr Pharmaceuticals publicly announced that it planned to have a generic version of Ovcon on the market by the end of the year, Warner Chilcott paid Barr Pharmaceuticals $1 million for an agreement designed to prevent Barr’s generic product from coming to market. Under the terms of the alleged agreement, once Barr received FDA approval to market generic Ovcon, Warner Chilcott had 90 days to pay Barr $19 million, after which Barr would refuse to bring the cheaper generic version to the market. The lawsuit alleged that as a result of the agreement, Warner Chilcott paid Barr a total of $20 million to keep it from marketing its generic version of Ovcon. In additon to a payment of $5.5 million, the settlement prohibits Warner Chilcott, for ten years, from entering into any agreement that would have the effect of limiting the research, development, manufacture, or sale of a generic alternative to one of its drugs. Furthermore, Warner Chilcott must provide the states notice of certain agreements it has entered into with generic manufacturers, and must continue to make its records available to the states for inspection to determine whether the company is complying with the terms of the agreement.
California v. Infineon Technologies, No. 3:06-cv-04333 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2007)
33 Plaintiff States generally alleged a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy in the U.S.
market for dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”), carried out by numerous manufacturer defendants. Samsung an
another company, Winbond, reached settlement for $113 million in 2007.. States and private parties settled with the remaining defendants for $173 million and injunctive relief.
Connecticut v. Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc., et al. (In re: Electrical Wiring Devices Antitrust Litigation)No. H-79-64 (D. Conn. 1978)
Various manufacturers of electrical wiring devices settled Attorney General’s claims of price fixing via entry of consent decree prohibiting such conduct and payment of monetary forfeiture. Parallel USDOJ criminal case
Connecticut, et al. v. BL Makepeace, Inc., et al., No. 79-642 (D.Conn.)
Retail vendors of architectural, engineering and drafting supplies, equipment and blueprint services settled Attorney General?s claims of price fixing and unlawful market allocation via entry of a consent decree which prohibited such conduct and payment of a monetary forfeiture.
