Florida et al. v. Abbott Laboratories et al., No. 1:08-cv-00155-SLR (D.Del. 2007)
States alleged Abbott Laboratories; Fournier
Industrie Et Sante and Laboratoires Fournier, S.A., blocked competition from less expensive
generics by continuously making minor changes in the formulations of TriCor to prevent therapeutically equivalent generic substitutions. The states alleged that the product switches helped thwart generic competition, allowing the companies to charge monopoly prices for TriCor.
The lawsuit also allegd the companies used patents, which they obtained by deceiving the Patent and Trademark Office and improperly enforced and brought a series of patent infringement lawsuits against two generic companies. According to the complaint, Abbott and Fournier filed at least ten lawsuits against two generic companies who were attempting to obtain FDA approval for their generic versions of TriCor. Abbott and Fournier eventually lost or dismissed all of the lawsuits. As a result of the product switches and patent litigation, Abbott and Fournier have successfully thwarted generic competition and denied consumers and state agencies the choice of a lower priced therapeutically equivalent generic.
The states settled their claims for $22.5 milion, which covered governmental purchases, as well as injunctive relief to prevent “product hopping” by the defendants in the future.
State of Colorado et al v. Warner Chilcott, 1:05-cv-02182 (D.D.C.2005)
34 states filed suit alleging that Warner Chilcott entered into an illegal agreement with Barr Pharmaceuticals to raise the prices of Ovcon, an oral contraceptive. The lawsuit alleged that after Barr Pharmaceuticals publicly announced that it planned to have a generic version of Ovcon on the market by the end of the year, Warner Chilcott paid Barr Pharmaceuticals $1 million for an agreement designed to prevent Barr’s generic product from coming to market. Under the terms of the alleged agreement, once Barr received FDA approval to market generic Ovcon, Warner Chilcott had 90 days to pay Barr $19 million, after which Barr would refuse to bring the cheaper generic version to the market. The lawsuit alleged that as a result of the agreement, Warner Chilcott paid Barr a total of $20 million to keep it from marketing its generic version of Ovcon. In additon to a payment of $5.5 million, the settlement prohibits Warner Chilcott, for ten years, from entering into any agreement that would have the effect of limiting the research, development, manufacture, or sale of a generic alternative to one of its drugs. Furthermore, Warner Chilcott must provide the states notice of certain agreements it has entered into with generic manufacturers, and must continue to make its records available to the states for inspection to determine whether the company is complying with the terms of the agreement.
California v. Infineon Technologies, No. 3:06-cv-04333 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2007)
33 Plaintiff States generally alleged a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy in the U.S.
market for dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”), carried out by numerous manufacturer defendants. Samsung an
another company, Winbond, reached settlement for $113 million in 2007.. States and private parties settled with the remaining defendants for $173 million and injunctive relief.
In the Matter of GlaxoSmithKline, PLC (Augmentin)
States alleged that GlaxoSmithKline fraudulently obtained patent protection for Augmentin and then delayed generic entry through sham patent litigation. Through this conduct, GlaxoSmithKline unlawfully maintained its monopoly over Augmentin. A $3.5 million multistate settlement for state proprietary claims was entered into by the participating states and GlaxoSmithKline.
In Re Relafen Antitrust Litigation
States sued manufacturer of antidepressant Relafen, alleging patent misuse and sham litigation designed to prevent generic entry. Parties settled the state proprietary claims for $10 million.
Maryland v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 2:06-cv-01298-JP (E.D.Pa Mar. 27, 2006)
States sued manufacturer of antitdepressant Paxil, alleging patent misuse and sham litigation designed to prevent generic entry. Parties settled for $14 million.
Connecticut v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. (In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation), MDL No. 1290 (D.D.C. June 15, 2000) 205 F.R.D. 369 (D.D.C. 2002); No. 98 CV 3115 (D.D.C. 2000) – complaint
Plaintiff States alleged that Mylan Laboratories, Inc.(Mylan) and other drug companies entered into illegal agreements to monopolize the market for certain generic anti-anxiety drugs.
Texas v. Zeneca, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13153 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
States sought an injunction and monetary damages from Zeneca, Inc. (Zeneca), alleging that the company conspired with distributors of its crop protection chemicals to maintain the resale price of the chemicals.
In re Clozapine Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 874 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
Plaintiff States sought monetary damages and injunctive relief against Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation (Sandoz), alleging the company unlawfully required those who purchased its drug, Clozapine, to also purchase distribution and patient monitoring services from Sandoz.
In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation MDL No. 1361 (D. Me. 2002) MDL-1391; No. 00-CIV-5853 (BSJ) (S.D.N.Y Aug. 8, 2000) (complaint)
Plaintiff States sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging that Defendant CD distributors unlawfully conspired to implement stringent minimum advertised price (MAP) policies in violation of antitrust laws.
