Maryland et al. v. Perrigo Company, No. 1:04CV01398 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004)
The FTC and states alleged that the companies had entered into a “pay-for-delay” arrangement, whereby Perrigo paid Alpharma to withdraw its generic version from the market for Children’t ibuprofen.According to the complaint, in June 1998, Perrigo and Alpharma signed an agreement allocating to Perrigo the sale of OTC children’s liquid ibuprofen for seven years. In exchange for agreeing not to compete, Alpharma received an up-front payment and a royalty on Perrigo’s sales of children’s liquid ibuprofen. The FTC received $6.25 million to compensate injured consumers. The states received $1.5 million in lieu of civil penalties. the parties were enjoined from future agreements.
District of Columbia v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp.,
The District of Columbia filed a lawsuit against ExxonMobil Oil Corporation and its gasoline distributors for Washington, D.C., to stop enforcement of exclusive‐supply agreements that make one group of affiliated distributors the only suppliers of Exxon‐branded gasoline in D.C. The complaint, filed in D.C. Superior Court, alleges that the exclusive‐supply agreements violate the District’s Retail Service Station Act. The affiliated distributors – Capitol Petroleum Group, LLC, Anacostia Realty, LLC, and Springfield Petroleum Realty, LLC – are the exclusive gasoline suppliers for about 60% of the 107 gasoline stations in D.C., including all 31 Exxon stations, 19 of 20 Shell stations, all 12 Valero stations, and 3 unbranded stations. The District’s lawsuit challenges agreements that make these affiliated distributors the exclusive suppliers of Exxon‐branded gasoline for the 27 independently‐operated Exxon stations in D.C., or about 25% of the gasoline stations in the city. The exclusive‐supply agreements, or earlier versions of them, were established by ExxonMobil and were transferred in 2009 to the affiliated distributors, along with ExxonMobil’s ownership of the 30 D.C. Exxon stations to which the agreements then pertained. According to the District’s complaint, these supply agreements can now be enforced either by the affiliated distributors or by ExxonMobil through its separate agreements with other area distributors.
The District alleges that the exclusive‐supply agreements allow the affiliated distributors to “set the wholesale prices paid for Exxon‐branded gasoline in D.C., depriving D.C. residents . . . of the benefits of competition in the wholesale supply of Exxon‐branded gasoline.”
U.S. and Plaintiff States v. US Airways Group et al., No. 1:13-CV-01236 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013)
US DOJ and plaintiff states filed a complaint in federal court challenging the proposed merger between American Airlines and U.S. Airways. The complaint alleged the proposed merger would result in decreased competition, higher airfares and fees, reduced service and downgraded amenities. The dollar impact nationwide could exceed $100 million a year. The merger would make a combined U.S. Airways/American Airlines the largest worldwide carrier and reduce the number of the larger “legacy” airlines from four to three – U.S. Airways/American, United/Continental and Delta/Northwest – and the number of major airlines from five to four. If the merger were approved, the three remaining legacy airlines combined with Southwest Airlines would account for more than 80 percent of domestic travel. American Airlines is U.S. Airways’ chief competitor in the marketplace, meaning that the merger will likely only serve to increase fares and fees. Texas settled its case, entering into an agreement under which the merged airlines would maintain their operations at Texas airports, maintain DFW as a hub, and maintain its corporate headquarters in the Dallas area. DOJ and the remaining states reached settlements with the merging parties. The settlement requires US Airways and American to divest or transfer to low cost carrier purchasers approved by the department: 1) All 104 air carrier slots (i.e. slots not reserved for use only by smaller, commuter planes) at Reagan National and rights and interest in other facilities at the airport necessary to support the use of the slots; 2) Thirty-four slots at LaGuardia and rights and interest in other facilities at the airport necessary to support the use of the slots; and 3) Rights and interests to two airport gates and associated ground facilities at each of Boston Logan, Chicago O’Hare, Dallas Love Field, Los Angeles International and Miami International. The settlement reached by the states requires maintenance of existing hubs in those states, consistent with their historical operations, for three years, and continued daily service for five years to each airport in the affected states that American and US Airways serviced at the time of filing.
In re DDAVP Antitrust Litigation
33 states investigated “pay for delay” allegations relating to DDAVP, a drug used to alleviate bed-wetting. States alleged that Aventis, holder of the patent for the medication, engaged in a scheme to delay the regulatory approval and sale of a generic version of DDAVP, in violation of state and federal antitrust law. States and defendants entered into a settlement under which states received $3.45 million, not as a civil penalty and defendants did not admit guilt.
Oregon v. ACE Holdings, Inc.
Consent decrees filed by states in state court required $4.5 million payment and conduct relief to remedy alleged bid-rigging and false insurance quotes, as well as payment of secret “contingent commissions” to brokers.
District of Columbia v. ACE Holdings, Inc.
Consent decrees filed by states in state court required $4.5 million payment and conduct relief to remedy alleged bid-rigging and false insurance quotes, as well as payment of secret “contingent commissions” to brokers.
Florida v. ACE Holdings, Inc.
Consent decrees filed by states in state court required $4.5 million payment and conduct relief to remedy alleged bid-rigging and false insurance quotes, as well as payment of secret “contingent commissions” to brokers.
Texas v. ACE Holdings, Inc.
Consent decrees filed by states in state court required $4.5 million payment and conduct relief to remedy alleged bid-rigging and false insurance quotes, as well as payment of secret “contingent commissions” to brokers.
State of Colorado et al v. Warner Chilcott, 1:05-cv-02182 (D.D.C.2005)
34 states filed suit alleging that Warner Chilcott entered into an illegal agreement with Barr Pharmaceuticals to raise the prices of Ovcon, an oral contraceptive. The lawsuit alleged that after Barr Pharmaceuticals publicly announced that it planned to have a generic version of Ovcon on the market by the end of the year, Warner Chilcott paid Barr Pharmaceuticals $1 million for an agreement designed to prevent Barr’s generic product from coming to market. Under the terms of the alleged agreement, once Barr received FDA approval to market generic Ovcon, Warner Chilcott had 90 days to pay Barr $19 million, after which Barr would refuse to bring the cheaper generic version to the market. The lawsuit alleged that as a result of the agreement, Warner Chilcott paid Barr a total of $20 million to keep it from marketing its generic version of Ovcon. In additon to a payment of $5.5 million, the settlement prohibits Warner Chilcott, for ten years, from entering into any agreement that would have the effect of limiting the research, development, manufacture, or sale of a generic alternative to one of its drugs. Furthermore, Warner Chilcott must provide the states notice of certain agreements it has entered into with generic manufacturers, and must continue to make its records available to the states for inspection to determine whether the company is complying with the terms of the agreement.
District of Columbia v. CVS Corporation et al. (not reported)
The District of Columbia sought injunctive relief, alleging that CVS illegally acquired market power when it purchased Anchor Pharmacy’s customer prescription lists (as well as certain other assets) and secured Anchor’s agreement to exit the market. The District also alleged that, by virtue of the acquisition, CVS monopolized, or attempted to monopolize, the local pharmacy market.
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