US, Illinois, Iowa and Missouri v. Tyson Foods, No. 1:14-cv-01474, D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2014)
USDOJ and three states challenged the acquisition of Hilshire by Tyson. According to the complaint, Tyson and Hillshire compete against each other and against others to
procure sows from farmers in the United States. Tyson’s proposed acquisition of Hillshire would eliminate head-to head
competition between the companies and create a firm that would account for over a
third of all sows purchased from farmers in the United States. the merging parties agreed to divest all the assets of Heinold Hog Markets, including 8 buying stations, to a purchaser approved by USDOJ, after consultation with the states.
In re DDAVP Antitrust Litigation
33 states investigated “pay for delay” allegations relating to DDAVP, a drug used to alleviate bed-wetting. States alleged that Aventis, holder of the patent for the medication, engaged in a scheme to delay the regulatory approval and sale of a generic version of DDAVP, in violation of state and federal antitrust law. States and defendants entered into a settlement under which states received $3.45 million, not as a civil penalty and defendants did not admit guilt.
In re GE Funding Capital Market Services, Inc. (Municipal Bond Derivatives)
Starting in 2008, the states investigated the municipal bond derivatives market, where tax exempt entities like governments and nonprofit organizations issue bonds and reinvest the proceeds until the funds are needed or enter into contracts to hedge interest rate risk on bonds. GE Funding is the fifth financial institution to settle with the multistate working group in the ongoing municipal bond derivatives investigation following Bank of America, UBS AG, JP Morgan and Wachovia.
The investigation revealed conspiratorial and fraudulent conduct involving individuals at financial institutions and certain brokers with whom they had working relationships. The states’ investigation developed evidence that certain traders at GE Funding, in concert with certain brokers, engaged in conduct that allowed the broker to determine in advance that GE Funding would win a bid for a guaranteed investment contract. The conduct allowed GE Funding to submit a “last look’’ bid, while the broker arranged for other financial institutions to submit purposely non-winning courtesy bids. Because of the “last look,” on many occasions GE Funding was able to lower its bid to the issuer and still win the transaction.The misconduct led state and local entities, such as municipalities, counties, school districts and other government agencies, as well as nonprofits, to enter into municipal derivatives contracts on less advantageous terms than they would have otherwise.
U.S. and Plaintiff States v. AT&T, No. 11-01560 (D.D.C, 2011)
AT&T sought to acquire T-Mobile. The transaction would have combined two of the only four wireless carriers with nationwide networks. US DOJ and six states filed suite to block the merger. The parties abandoned the merger three months later.
In re J.P. Morgan Chase (Municipal Bond Derivatives)
Starting in 2008, the states investigated the municipal bond derivatives market, where tax exempt entities like governments and nonprofit organizations issue bonds and reinvest the proceeds until the funds are needed or enter into contracts to hedge interest rate risk on bonds.
The investigation revealed conspiratorial and fraudulent conduct involving individuals at JPMC, other financial institutions, and certain brokers with whom they had working relationships. The states alleged that certain JPMC employees and their counterparts at other institutions rigged bids, submitted noncompetitive courtesy bids and fraudulent certificates of arms-length bidding to government agencies. The misconduct led state and local entities, such as municipalities, counties, school districts and other government agencies, as well as nonprofits, to enter into municipal derivatives contracts on less advantageous terms than they would have otherwise. The $66.5 million multistate settlement is one component of a coordinated settlements (totaling $92 million) between JPMC and the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Internal Revenue Service, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), as well as the states.
U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Marquee Holdings, No. 05 CV 10722 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
US DOJ and plaintiff states filed a complaint alleging that the merger of AMC Entertainment and Loews Cineplex Entertainment would eliminate head-to-head competition between AMC and Loews and likely would have resulted in higher prices for tickets to first-run, commercial movies in sections of five major American cities: Boston, Chicago, Dallas, New York, and Seattle. DOJ and the plaintiff states agreed to a consent decree to resolve the complaint. Under the terms of the consent decree, AMC and Loews must divest movie theaters: two in Chicago and one each in New York, Boston, Seattle and Dallas. The parties must inform the parties if it proposes to acquire movie theater assets in those markets over the next 10 years.
U.S., Illinois, Colorado and Indiana v. AMC Entertaininment Holdings, No. 10-cv00846 (D.D.C. 2010)
AMC, a movie theater chain operates 304 U.S. theaters housing 4,574 screens, most
of which are located in megaplexes operates Kerasotes ShowPlace Theatres operates 96 movie theaters with 973 screens in the United States, mostly in the Midwest. USDOJ and the plaintiff states challenged the acquisition of Kerasotes by AMC on the grounds that it would reduce competition in markets in Colorado, Illinois and Indiana. To resolve the case, AMC agreed to divest eight theaters–four in Illinois, two in Colorado and two in Indiana.
United States et al. v. Ticketmaster, No. 1:10-cv-00139(D.D.C. 2010)
U.S. and 17 states sued to enjoin merger of Ticketmaster, the nation’s largest ticketing services company, and Live Nation, the nation’s largest concert promoter.
According to the Complaint, the parties announced their merger shortly after Live Nation had entered the concert ticketing business as Ticketmaster’s closest competitor. The complaint alleged that consumers and major concert venues would
face higher ticket service charges as a result of the merger
The settlement requires the merging parties to license its ticketing software to Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG). AEG is the nation’s second largest promoter and the operator of some of the largest concert venues in the country. The merging parties are further required to divest Ticketmaster’s entire Paciolan business, which provides a venue-managed platform for selling tickets through the venue’s own web site. Paciolan is to be divested to Comcast/Spectacor, a sports and entertainment company with a management relationship with a number of concert venues. Comcast also has ticketing experience through its New Era ticketing company.The settlement also prohibits the merging parties from retaliating against venue owners who contract with the merging parties’ competitors.
United States, Wisconsin, Illinois and Michigan v. Dean Foods, Co. No. 10-C-0059 (E.D. Wisc. 2010)
States and USDOJ challenged already consummated acquisition by Dean Foods Co of Foremost Farms USA. Complaint alleged loss of competition in two markets: School milk contracts in Wisconsin and the upper peninsula of Michigan, and fluid milk sales in Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin, because Dean and Foremost were the first and fourth largest sellers in those states. The settlement requires Dean to divest a significant milk processing plant in Waukesha, Wis., and related assets that it acquired from the Foremost Farms USA Cooperative, including the Golden Guernsey brand name. The settlement also requires that Dean notify USDOJ before it makes any future acquisition of milk processing plants for which the purchase price is more than $3 million. In addition, the attorney general for the state of Michigan filed a separate settlement which required Dean Foods to continue to bid on school milk contracts in the Upper Peninsula until 2016, and required that their bid be based either on a Cap Price which varies based on the price of raw milk, or a set price that does not vary.
New York et al. v. Herman Miller, Inc. (
Three states alleged Herman Miller (HMH) sought to raise and maintain retail prices on its “AERON” chairs. According to the complaint, HMH responded to complaints and urging by HMH’s retailers, beginning in 2001, by establishing and announcing minimum prices, below which retailers were prohibited from advertising any HMH furniture. Under HMH’s Suggested Retail Price policy, HMH retailers had to agree with HMH not to advertise below HMH’s dictated prices for Aeron chairs in any medium where prices can be seen by consumers. HMH was enjoined from using the SRP program for two years,and from telling dealers how much to sell their chairs for. HMH paid $750,00 to the plaintiff states.
