FTC and Plaintiff States v. Syngenta Crop Protection AG, No. 22-cv-828 (M.D. N.C. Nov. 2022)
The FTC and 10 states sued pesticide manufacturers Syngenta Crop Protection and Corteva, Inc. two of the largest pesticide manufacturers operating in the United States. For allegedly paying distributors to block competitors from selling their cheaper generic products to farmers. The complaint alleges that these big pesticide firms run so-called “loyalty programs” in which distributors…
Settlement Agreement Between Plaintiff States and Citibank (June 2018)
Forty-two plaintiff states reached a $100 million settlement with Citibank for fraudulent conduct involving interest rate manipulation that had a significant impact on consumers and financial markets around the world. UBS’ fraudulent conduct involved the manipulation of LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate). LIBOR is a benchmark interest rate that affects financial instruments worth trillions…
Utah et al. v. Google LLC, No. 3:21-cv-05227 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2021)
Thirty-seven states filed a lawsuit against Google for monopolizing the smartphone application market in violation of state and federal antitrust laws. According to the complaint, Google operates a web of exclusionary agreements with phone manufacturers and carriers to exert control over app distribution on Android phones through its Google Play Store. By leveraging those anticompetitive…
United States and Plaintiff States v. Google, No. 1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2020)
Eleven states and the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit to prevent Google from unlawfully maintaining monopolies through anticompetitive and exclusionary practices in the search and search advertising markets. According to the complaint, Google accounted for almost 90 percent of all search queries in the United States. Google has entered into a series of…
Alabama et al. v. Endo International, No. 3:19-cv-04157 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2019)
Eighteen states reached a settlement with Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. under which Endo paid $2.3 million to settle allegations it entered into a reverse-payment agreement to obstruct generic competition to Lidoderm, a pain relief patch frequently used to treat shingles. According to the complaint, Endo had an agreement with Watson Laboratories Inc. ensuring Endo would not face…
California et al. v. Teikoku Seikayu Co.(Lidoderm), No. 3:18-cv-00675 (N.D. Cal. 01/31/18)
Plaintiff states alleged that defendant, the producer of Lidoderm (pain medication), paid or incentivized generic drug makers to delay entry into market to protect its monopoly on Lidoderm. (“pay for delay”) The settlement agreement, which expires in twenty years, prohibits Teikoku from entering into agreements that restrict generic drug manufacturers from researching, manufacturing, marketing, or selling products for a period of time and requires Teikoku to cooperate in an ongoing investigation into similarly anticompetitive conduct by other drug manufacturers, among other things.
Florida et al. v. Dollar Tree, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-01052 (D.D.C. July 2, 2015)
Eighteen plaintiff states and the FTC challenged the merger of Dollar Tree, the largest chain of “dollar” stores (deep discount stores) and Family Dollar Stores, the nation’s third largest dollar store chain. The complaint claimed the proposed acquisition would substantially lessen competition in numerous markets by: (1) eliminating direct and substantial competition between Dollar Tree and Family Dollar; and (2) increasing the likelihood that Dollar Tree will unilaterally exercise market power. This, according to the complaint, would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act and each state’s applicable antitrust and consumer protection laws. The states sought a permanent injunction to prevent the merger, along with costs and attorney fees. The parties reached a settlement under which 330 stores in the 18 states would be divested to Sycamore partners and run as a new dollar store chain, Dollar Express. The agreement also required the defendants to report future acquisitions in any of the affected markets and to pay over $865,000 to reimburse the costs and fees of the plaintiff states.
Maryland et al. v. Perrigo Company, No. 1:04CV01398 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004)
The FTC and states alleged that the companies had entered into a “pay-for-delay” arrangement, whereby Perrigo paid Alpharma to withdraw its generic version from the market for Children’t ibuprofen.According to the complaint, in June 1998, Perrigo and Alpharma signed an agreement allocating to Perrigo the sale of OTC children’s liquid ibuprofen for seven years. In exchange for agreeing not to compete, Alpharma received an up-front payment and a royalty on Perrigo’s sales of children’s liquid ibuprofen. The FTC received $6.25 million to compensate injured consumers. The states received $1.5 million in lieu of civil penalties. the parties were enjoined from future agreements.
In re DDAVP Antitrust Litigation
33 states investigated “pay for delay” allegations relating to DDAVP, a drug used to alleviate bed-wetting. States alleged that Aventis, holder of the patent for the medication, engaged in a scheme to delay the regulatory approval and sale of a generic version of DDAVP, in violation of state and federal antitrust law. States and defendants entered into a settlement under which states received $3.45 million, not as a civil penalty and defendants did not admit guilt.
U.S., Illinois, Colorado and Indiana v. AMC Entertaininment Holdings, No. 10-cv00846 (D.D.C. 2010)
AMC, a movie theater chain operates 304 U.S. theaters housing 4,574 screens, most
of which are located in megaplexes operates Kerasotes ShowPlace Theatres operates 96 movie theaters with 973 screens in the United States, mostly in the Midwest. USDOJ and the plaintiff states challenged the acquisition of Kerasotes by AMC on the grounds that it would reduce competition in markets in Colorado, Illinois and Indiana. To resolve the case, AMC agreed to divest eight theaters–four in Illinois, two in Colorado and two in Indiana.