New York et al. v. Cephalon, No. 2:16-cv-04234 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2016)
In May 2015, the FTC settled a “pay-for-delay” suit against Cephalon for injunctive relief and $1.2 billion, which was paid into an escrow account. The FTC settlement allowed for those escrow funds to be distributed for settlement of certain related cases and government investigations. In August 2016, forty-eight states filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Cephalon alleging anticompetitive conduct by Cephalon to protect the profits it earned from having a patent-protected monopoly on the sale of its landmark drug, Provigil. According to the complaint, Cephalon’s conduct delayed generic versions of Provigil from entering the market for several years. The complaint alleged that as patent and regulatory barriers that prevented generic competition to Provigil neared expiration, Cephalon intentionally defrauded the Patent and Trademark Office to secure an additional patent, which a court subsequently deemed invalid and unenforceable. Before it was declared invalid, Cephalon was able to use the patent to delay generic competition for nearly six additional years by filing patent infringement lawsuits. Cephalon settled those lawsuits by paying competitors to delay sale of their generic versions of Provigil until at least April 2012. Consumers, states, and others paid millions more for Provigil than they would have had generic versions of the drug launched by early 2006, as expected. A settlement was filed with the complaint, which includes $35 million for distribution to consumers who bought Provigil.
Massachusetts et al. v. Koninklijke Ahold N.V., No. 1:16-cv-01412 (D.D.C., July 25, 2016)
Plaintiff states and FTC filed suit challenging the merger of Ahold and Delhaize, supermarket chains operating in the United States as Stop & Shop and Hannafords. According to the complaint, supermarkets operated by Ahold and Delhaize compete closely for shoppers based on price, format, service, product offerings, promotional activity, and location. Without a remedy, the merger would eliminate direct supermarket competition to the detriment of consumers in these local markets. As a result, the merger would increase the likelihood that the combined company could unilaterally exercise market power, and that the remaining competitors could coordinate their behavior to raise prices. the parties agreed to divest 76 supermarkets in the plaintiff states. The settlement also required prior notification of future supermarket purchases and $300,000 in attorneys fees and costs.
United States et al. v. Aetna et. al., No. 1:16-cv-01494 (D.D.C. July 21, 2016)
U.S. DOJ and plaintiff states sued to block the merger of two of the country’s largest health insurers. According to the complaint, alleges that their merger would substantially reduce Medicare Advantage competition in more than 350 counties in 21 states, affecting more than 1.5 million Medicare Advantage customers in those counties. Before seeking to acquire Humana, Aetna had pursued aggressive expansion in Medicare Advantage. Aetna, the nation’s fourth-largest Medicare Advantage insurer by membership, has nearly doubled its Medicare Advantage footprint over the past four years. Humana is the nation’s second-largest Medicare Advantage insurer by membership. The lawsuit also alleges that Aetna’s purchase of Humana would substantially reduce competition to sell commercial health insurance to individuals and families on the public exchanges in 17 counties in Florida, Georgia and Missouri, affecting more than 700,000 people in those counties. The lawsuit alleges that by buying Humana, Aetna would eliminate one of its strongest and most capable competitors in these markets. The district court granted the injunction, rejecting the parties arguments that the Medicare Advantage and Medicare programs were competing products that constrained one another’s prices, and noting that Aetna’s exit from several markets, allegedly because of the Affordable Care Act, appeared to be designed to eliminate a problem with the merger, rather than being an unrelated business decision.
Commonwealth of Pennsyvlania v. Chesapeake Energy Corp, No. 2015IR0069 (Ct. Comm. Pleas, Bradford Cty, 2015)
State filed action in state court alleging market allocation agreement affecting leases for hydraulic fracturing on land in central Pennsylvania. The state alleged that the failure to disclose the agreement violated state consumer protection laws, and that the agreement itself violated Pennsylvania antitrust common law. After defendants argued that Pennsylvania has no state antitrust statute, the state filed an amended complaint which included claims of violations of the federal antitrust laws. Defendants sought removal.
Florida et al. v. Dollar Tree, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-01052 (D.D.C. July 2, 2015)
Eighteen plaintiff states and the FTC challenged the merger of Dollar Tree, the largest chain of “dollar” stores (deep discount stores) and Family Dollar Stores, the nation’s third largest dollar store chain. The complaint claimed the proposed acquisition would substantially lessen competition in numerous markets by: (1) eliminating direct and substantial competition between Dollar Tree and Family Dollar; and (2) increasing the likelihood that Dollar Tree will unilaterally exercise market power. This, according to the complaint, would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act and each state’s applicable antitrust and consumer protection laws. The states sought a permanent injunction to prevent the merger, along with costs and attorney fees. The parties reached a settlement under which 330 stores in the 18 states would be divested to Sycamore partners and run as a new dollar store chain, Dollar Express. The agreement also required the defendants to report future acquisitions in any of the affected markets and to pay over $865,000 to reimburse the costs and fees of the plaintiff states.
Pennsylvania v. Arclight Energy Partners Fund VI et al., No. 1:15-CV-2493 Jan. 4, 2016)
Pennsylvania filed suit, alleging the proposed merger of two of the largest gasoline and distillate terminaling services in the state, ArcLight and Gulf Oil would violate both the Clayton Act and Pennsylvania state law by lessening competition in three markets, Altoona, Harrisburg and Scranton. The state sought injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees. The state and the parties entered into a settlement in which the defendants would agree to divest their terminal assets in Pennsylvania – located in Altoona, Pittston, Mechanicsburg and Williamsport – to New York-based Arc Logistics within 20 days of the acquisition being finalized. After the divestiture, ArcLight is further bound to assist Arc Logistics by providing transitional assistance at a reasonable cost for one year, serve as a customer of the divested terminals for two years and supply ethanol and biodiesel fuels and related terminaling services for five years. The settlement also allows any ArcLight petroleum terminal customer to sever its contract with the company without penalty or charge for six months after the divestiture date, and for ArcLight to provide them with notice of the right to do so. The FTC had previously entered into a settlement with the parties.
FTC and Pennsylvania v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center, 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016)
The FTC administratively challenged the combination of Penn State Hershey Medical Center and PinnacleHealth System, alleging that the merger would substantially reduce competition for general acute care inpatient hospital services in the area surrounding Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, leading to higher costs and reduced quality. The FTC and Pennsylvania filed a motion for preliminary injunction in federal court in Pennsylvania. The court denied the motion by the FTC and Pennsylvania in an opinion filed under seal, holding that the plaintiffs did not properly define the relevant geographic market. The FTC and Pennsylvania appealed to the 3rd Circuit, which reversed the district court and granted the preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit rejected the District Court’s reasoning on all counts: market definition, the relevance and persuasiveness of the parties’ 5-year contracts with payers, whether the claimed efficiencies were cognizable and potentially sufficient to overcome the government’s prima facie case, and how the equities should be balanced in an FTC preliminary injunction proceeding. The parties abandoned the merger. The 3d Circuit denied Pennsylvania’s claim for attorneys’ fees on the grounds that the relief was granted under FTC Act Sec. 13(b), which does not authorize attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties.
Maryland et al. v. Perrigo Company, No. 1:04CV01398 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004)
The FTC and states alleged that the companies had entered into a “pay-for-delay” arrangement, whereby Perrigo paid Alpharma to withdraw its generic version from the market for Children’t ibuprofen.According to the complaint, in June 1998, Perrigo and Alpharma signed an agreement allocating to Perrigo the sale of OTC children’s liquid ibuprofen for seven years. In exchange for agreeing not to compete, Alpharma received an up-front payment and a royalty on Perrigo’s sales of children’s liquid ibuprofen. The FTC received $6.25 million to compensate injured consumers. The states received $1.5 million in lieu of civil penalties. the parties were enjoined from future agreements.
U.S. and Pennsylvania v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. (No. 14-cv-01186, D.D.C. 2014)
USDOJ and Pennsylvania filed suit to challenge the acquistion by Sinclair Broadcase Group of Perpetual Corporation, alleging that it would lessen competition in the sale of broadcast televlsion spot advertising in the south central Pennsylvania area. The merged companies would control 38 percent of the advertising market in that area. the parties agreed to the divestiture of a station in the marketing area.
Florida et al. v. Service Corporation International, No. A13CV1082LY (W.D. Texas Jan. 2, 2014)
SCI, the nation’s largest funeral home chain, sought to acquire Stewart Enterprises, another large funeral home chain. Seven states and the FTC entered into consent agreements with SCI specifying which funeral homes would be divested in 59 separate markets. In a separate consent agreement, SCI agreed to provide the state plaintiffs with the same notices, requirements for approval and compliance review as to divestitures and future acquisitions included in the FTC’s consent decree and to pay the state’s costs and attorneys’ fees..