Kansas v. Meds-Stat (
Plaintiff state sued Flrida vaccine firm , Meds-Stat,alleging the company planned to sell flu vaccine at prices almost 1,000 percent higher than the original list prices in the wake of the U.S. flu vaccine shortage.
The settlement required Meds-Stat to affirm the company sold no vaccine in the state at exorbitant prices, reimburse the state for costs of the investigation as well as legal fees and expenses, and assist the state in identifying problems in the vaccine distribution network to prevent future price gouging.
Texas et al. v. Organon (Remeron), No. 04-5126 (D.N.J. 2004)
Plaintiff states settled with drug maker Organon USA, Inc. and its parent company, Akzo Nobel N.V., resolving antitrust claims involving the antidepressant drug Remeron between June 2001 and October 2004. The states’ complaint alleged that Organon unlawfully extended its monopoly by improperly listing a new “combination therapy” patent with the U.S. Federal Drug Administration. In addition, the complaint alleged that Organon delayed listing the patent with the FDA in another effort to delay the availability of lower-cost generic substitutes. The $26 million settlement resolved claims brought by state attorneys general, as well as a private class action brought on behalf of a class of end payors. Organon also agreed to make timely listings of patents and to submit accurate and truthful information to the FDA.
Louisiana v. Amgen, No. 08-0373 (Louisiana, Civ. Dist. Ct. for Parish of Orleans, 2009)
State parens patriae action, wholly under state law, alleging anticompetitive tying and pricing. The tying product was White Blood Cell Growth Factor, in which Amgen had a monopoly position, according to the complaint. The tied product was Red Blood Cell Growth Factor. Amgen’s product, Aranesp, competed with Procrit for this market. The complaint alleged that oncology clinics, which use these drugs, receive rebates on WBCGF purchases if they purchase above a certain amount of the RBCGF from Amgen. The case was removed to federal court, and the state filed a motion to remand, but the newly-elected Attorney General dismissed the case without prejudice before the motion was heard.
FTC and California ex rel. Brown v. Watson Pharmaceuticals No. CV-09-00598 (C.D. Cal Feb. 12, 2009)
Plaintiff State and the FTC challenged so-called “reverse payment” agreement between Solvay Pharmaceuticals (patent holder) and Watson Pharmaceuticals, Par Pharmaceuticals and Paddock Laboratories that delayed the entry of a generic substitute for Androgel, a testosterone-replacement drug. State and the FTC alleged that Solvay, fearing the entry of lower-cost generic substitutes for Androgel, resolved patent litigation with the other three companies by making substantial payments to them, on the condition that they not enter the market with their generic version. the parties seek injunctive relief and fines of $2500 per violation under California antitrust law. Case was transferred to district court in Georgia and state did not re-file in Georgia, although the FTC did.
Minnesota v. Ovation Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 08 cv 6381, D.Minn.
Minnesota and the FTC filed companion cases in federal court, alleging that Ovation monopolized the market for drugs to treat PDA, a heart ailment in newborns. The complaint alleged that Ovation acquired the rights to the only two drugs used to treat PDA. Patents were expiring on the first drug, Indocin, when Ovation purchased the second drug approved for treatment of PDA. Upon making this purchase, Ovation raised the price of both drugs from $36 per vial to $500 per vial. The purchase of the rights to Indocin was below the HSR reporting threshhold.
Florida et al. v. Abbott Laboratories et al., No. 1:08-cv-00155-SLR (D.Del. 2007)
States alleged Abbott Laboratories; Fournier
Industrie Et Sante and Laboratoires Fournier, S.A., blocked competition from less expensive
generics by continuously making minor changes in the formulations of TriCor to prevent therapeutically equivalent generic substitutions. The states alleged that the product switches helped thwart generic competition, allowing the companies to charge monopoly prices for TriCor.
The lawsuit also allegd the companies used patents, which they obtained by deceiving the Patent and Trademark Office and improperly enforced and brought a series of patent infringement lawsuits against two generic companies. According to the complaint, Abbott and Fournier filed at least ten lawsuits against two generic companies who were attempting to obtain FDA approval for their generic versions of TriCor. Abbott and Fournier eventually lost or dismissed all of the lawsuits. As a result of the product switches and patent litigation, Abbott and Fournier have successfully thwarted generic competition and denied consumers and state agencies the choice of a lower priced therapeutically equivalent generic.
The states settled their claims for $22.5 milion, which covered governmental purchases, as well as injunctive relief to prevent “product hopping” by the defendants in the future.
State of Colorado et al v. Warner Chilcott, 1:05-cv-02182 (D.D.C.2005)
34 states filed suit alleging that Warner Chilcott entered into an illegal agreement with Barr Pharmaceuticals to raise the prices of Ovcon, an oral contraceptive. The lawsuit alleged that after Barr Pharmaceuticals publicly announced that it planned to have a generic version of Ovcon on the market by the end of the year, Warner Chilcott paid Barr Pharmaceuticals $1 million for an agreement designed to prevent Barr’s generic product from coming to market. Under the terms of the alleged agreement, once Barr received FDA approval to market generic Ovcon, Warner Chilcott had 90 days to pay Barr $19 million, after which Barr would refuse to bring the cheaper generic version to the market. The lawsuit alleged that as a result of the agreement, Warner Chilcott paid Barr a total of $20 million to keep it from marketing its generic version of Ovcon. In additon to a payment of $5.5 million, the settlement prohibits Warner Chilcott, for ten years, from entering into any agreement that would have the effect of limiting the research, development, manufacture, or sale of a generic alternative to one of its drugs. Furthermore, Warner Chilcott must provide the states notice of certain agreements it has entered into with generic manufacturers, and must continue to make its records available to the states for inspection to determine whether the company is complying with the terms of the agreement.
In the Matter of GlaxoSmithKline, PLC (Augmentin)
States alleged that GlaxoSmithKline fraudulently obtained patent protection for Augmentin and then delayed generic entry through sham patent litigation. Through this conduct, GlaxoSmithKline unlawfully maintained its monopoly over Augmentin. A $3.5 million multistate settlement for state proprietary claims was entered into by the participating states and GlaxoSmithKline.
In Re Relafen Antitrust Litigation
States sued manufacturer of antidepressant Relafen, alleging patent misuse and sham litigation designed to prevent generic entry. Parties settled the state proprietary claims for $10 million.
Maryland v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 2:06-cv-01298-JP (E.D.Pa Mar. 27, 2006)
States sued manufacturer of antitdepressant Paxil, alleging patent misuse and sham litigation designed to prevent generic entry. Parties settled for $14 million.
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