FTC, Pennsylvania and D.C. v. Staples
Two office supply “superstore” chains sought to merge. The FTC, Pennsylvania and D.C. challenged the merger and were successful in obtaining an injunction. After the parties abandoned the merger, the states sought attorneys’ fees, which were denied by the court.
FTC and Plaintiff States (CA and DC) v. Draft Kings, No. 17-cv-01195 (D.D.C. 2017)
States and the FTC sued to block the merger of the two largest daily fantasy sports sites, alleging that the combined firm would control more than 90 percent of the US market for paid daily fantasy sports contests. Plaintiff states and the FTC allege that the defendants compete with each other on price and quality.
The State of California, et al. v. Samsung SDI, Co., Ltd., et al., Case No. CGC-11-515784, Calif. Superior Court, San Fran. Cty. Nov. 8, 2011
California sued makers of CRTs alleging they were part of a price-fixing scheme that resulted in overcharges in the price of products that contained CRTs, such as televisions and computer monitors. The alleged price fixing scheme occurred between March 1, 1995 and November 25, 2007. According to the complaint, the conspiracy involved top-level meetings of key executive decision-makers in Asia and Europe to set prices and outputs of CRTs. It also involved worldwide meetings among lower-level executives to exchange confidential information. The settlements, which were filed in San Francisco Superior Court, require all five companies to pay a total of $4.95 million to settle claims of overcharges paid by California government entities, general damages suffered by the State’s economy, and civil penalties. The settlements require that the companies pay back the illegally obtained profits to those affected by their actions. In addition, the settlements include injunctive relief, which requires that each company engage in company-wide antitrust compliance training and reporting that involves products in addition to CRTs and extends to foreign companies and subsidiaries. Finally, the settlements include requirements, enforceable by the court via fines and imprisonment, to prevent future violations of antitrust law. There was a parallel class action by indirect purchasers nationwide that was brought in federal court by private parties. The state worked with the private plaintiffs and a settlement agreement was reached, under which California consumers recovered damages.
Oregon ex rel. Rosenbloom v. LG Electronics, No. 120810246, (Ore. Cir. Ct., Multnomah Cty)
Oregon filed suit against cathode ray tube (CRT) manufacturers, alleging that they illegally agreed upon the pricing of CRTs. The Attorney General filed this action on behalf of the State of Oregon and Oregon natural persons, and sought restitution, civil penalties, disgorgement and injunctive relief.
Florida v. General Chemical Corp. No. 2:17-00384 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2017)
Plaintiff state filed action in federal court alleging market allocation and price-fixing among manufacturers of the chemical liquid aluminum sulfate, which is a coagulant used to remove impurities and other substances from water. It is used primarily by municipalities in wastewater treatment. There are high barriers to entry and substitution is difficult. There have been several USDOJ indictments in the industry. The complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to circumvent competitive bidding and independent pricing and to raise liquid aluminum sulfate prices by submitting artificially inflated bids in Florida from 1997 through at least February 2012. The state alleged that fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy tolled the statute of limitations.
FTC and Plaintiff States v. Mallilnckrodt Ard Inc. (formerly Questcor), No. 1:17-cv-00120 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2017)
Four states and the FTC reached a $100 million settlement with Mallinckrodt plc and its US subsidiary, formerly known as Questcor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. resolving a lawsuit accusing Questcor of monopolizing the market for Achthar, the only adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH) based therapeutic drug sold in the United States. ACTH is used as a last resort to treat infantile spasms and multiple sclerosis. Questcor allegedly blocked competition for Acthar by disrupting the bidding process and acquiring the U.S. rights for Synacthen Depot, the only other ACTH based drug sold in the world. In 2001, Questcor bought the rights to Acthar and increased the price of it by 85,000 percent, charging over $34,000 for a vial of the drug that used to cost $40 per vial. In 2012, Novartis Pharma A.G sold the U.S. rights of Synacthen, Achthar’s only competitor. The complaint alleges that three other companies had all conducted due diligence and submitted formal offers for Synacthen with plans to develop and launch Synacthen in the United States in direct competition with Questcor. However, perceiving the threat to its U.S. monopoly if a rival drug company purchased the assets, Questcor stepped in to outbid the three other companies, offering Novartis $135 million in guaranteed payments with only vague plans for Synacthen and after very limited due diligence. Through the acquisition, Questcor sought to extinguish the most likely challenges to its Acthar monopoly. According to the complaint, this allowed Questcor to continue charging over $34,000 per vial for H.P. Acthar Gel. In addition to paying $100 million in disgorgement, Under the settlement, Mallinckrodt will pay $100 million. The company will also be required to license a competitor to the rights it acquired from Novartis to commercialize and develop Synacthen in the United States, including the Synacthen trademark, along with clinical trial data and certain intellectual property related to manufacturing and formulation. Mallinckrodt is also prohibited from taking actions that would interfere with clinical trials or clinical plans for Synacthen.
State of California v. T.Rad Co. Ltd., No. 2:16-cv-13199 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2016)
California filed a complaint and settled with T.Rad Co, a maker of automobile radiators and automatic transmission fluid warmers, alleging that the company rigged bids and fixed the prices of its parts from at least 2002 to 2010. California received $162,500 in damages and attorneys fees and Florida received $81,250.T.RAD agreed to cooperate with the states by providing documents and information related to the investigations into the price fixing conspiracy.
State of Wisconsin et al. v. Indivior, No. 16-5073 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22,2016)
Plaintiff states alleged that the makers of Suboxone, a drug used to treat opioid addiction, engaged in a scheme to block generic competitors and raise prices. Specifically, they are conspiring to wtich Suboxone from a tablet version to a flim in order to prevent or delay generic entry. The states allege that the manufacturers engaged in “product hopping” in which a company makes slight changes to its product to extend patent protections and prvent generic alternatives. The complaint was filed under seal.
West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. CRH, PLC, No. 17-C-41 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha Cty. Jan. 11, 2017)
CRH, PLC, through its subsidiary Oldcastle, is the largest producer of asphalt and the third-largest producer of aggregate in the U.S. the complaint alleges that through a series of acquisitions and anticompetitive actions, CRH has effectively exercised significant market power in West Virginia aggregate and asphalt markets. The conduct alleged includes inducing boycotts against competitors, threatening to put new competitors out of business; mandating statewide covenants not to compete for up to 10 years from competitors. The state alleged that CRH’s conduct has significantly increased prices for state road paving contracts in the three markets in the state between 2010 and 2014. the complaint included counts of violations of W.Va. Code 47-18-3 (restraint of trade); W.Va. Code 47-18-4 (monopolization and attempt to monopolize) and unjust enrichment. the complaint seeks injunctive relief, treble damages, disgorgement and restitution, divestiture; civil penalties and costs,
In the Matter of NFL Ticketing Investigation, Assurance No. 16-181(NY Attorney General Antitrust Bureau (Nov. 15, 2016)
Plaintiff states entered into a settlement agreement with the National Football League under which the NFL would discontinue its league-wide mandatory price floor (no tickets could be sold on the NFL secondary market platform for a price less than a season ticket holder’s price) and would not direct or require ticketing practices designed to preclude fans from using competing ticket exchanges.
