State of Nevada v. Universal Health Services, Inc., Alan B. Miller, and Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-01984 (D.Nev. 2010)
Sate and FTC reached settlement requiring divestitures of several acute-care inpatient psychiatric hospitals in the Las Vegas area.
U.S. and Michigan v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 10-14155 (E.D.Mich. 2013)
USDOJ and plaintiff state challenged the use by Blue Cross/BlueShield of Michigan of Most Favored Nation clauses, alleging that their power in the market, combined with these clauses, violated state and federal antitrust law by stifling competition, leading to higher costs, and preventing new entry into the market. After the state legislature enacted a statute prohibiting health insurers from using most-favored-nation clauses in contracts with health care providers, USDOJ and Michigan dismissed the case.
U.S. and New Jersey v. Waste Management, Inc., No. 1:03CV01409 (D.D.C. 2003)
USDOJ and New Jersey challenged the merger of Waste Management, Inc. and Allied Waste Industries, Inc., the nation’s two largest commercial waste hauling and disposal companies, alleging that the transaction would have resulted in higher prices for waste collection or disposal or both in seven metropolitan areas. The companies agreed to a settlement under which they divested commercial waste hauling and disposal assets in these areas.
U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Verizon Communications, Inc., No. 08-cv-01878 (D.D.C. 2008)
USDOJ and plaintiff states filed suit to stop the acquisition of Alltel Corp. by Verizon Communications Corp. Verizon agreed to divest assets in 100 areas in 22 states in order to proceed with the acquisition.
Cox ex rel. Michigan v. Home City Ice, No. 10-1080-CP (30th Jud. Dist. Ingham Cty. 2010)
After companies pleaded guilty to federal criminal price-fixing, Michigan alleged that between 2001 and 2007 Arctic Glacier and Home City Ice conspired to reduce competition between the two ice manufacturers in the southeast Michigan market. The companies allocated geographic territories and customers between themselves, lessening competition and potentially resulting in higher prices
for consumers. The companies agreed to pay $740,000 ($350,000 from Arctic Glacier and $390,000 from Home City) in the form of penalties.
Cox ex rel. Michigan v. Arctic Glacier Int’l, No. 10-1050-CP (30th Jud. Cir. Ingham Cty. 2010)
After companies pleaded guilty to federal criminal price-fixing, Michigan alleged that between 2001 and 2007 Arctic Glacier and Home City Ice conspired to reduce competition between the two ice manufacturers in the southeast Michigan market. The companies allocated geographic territories and customers between themselves, lessening competition and potentially resulting in higher prices
for consumers. The companies agreed to pay $740,000 ($350,000 from Arctic Glacier and $390,000 from Home City) in the form of penalties.
Washington v. AU Optronics, No. 10-2-29164-4 (Super. Ct., King Cty., 2010)
Plaintiff state filed an antitrust action against several major technology companies for illegally fixing prices for liquid crystal display (“LCD”) screens used in computers, televisions, and cell phones. The lawsuit seeks to recover damages suffered from 1998 to 2006 by Washington and other public purchasers that purchased computers and other goods containing the price-fixed screens. The suit seeks damages, restitution, and civil penalties on behalf of the state and as parens patriae for state consumers.
After decisions declining to allow the defendants to remove the cases to federal court under CAFA, and affirming the state’s jurisdiction over foreign corporations, the state reached settlements with the defendants totalling $63 million. Defendants also agreed to future monitoring and to implementing antitrust compliance programs.
Missouri v. AU Optronics Corp., (N.D. Cal. pending transfer to MDL 1827, 2010)
Following guilty pleas to criminal price-fixing by several LCD manufacturers, and a conviction after trial of another, plaintiff states filed suit against LCD manufacturers, alleging that top executives of several companies held numerous secret meetings from at least 1999 through at least 2006 for the purpose of exchanging information and setting prices on LCD panels. According to the complaint, companies such as Dell, Apple, and Hewlett Packard were among those targeted by the manufacturers’ price-fixing scheme. According to the lawsuit, the illegal overcharges were ultimately borne by state consumers and state government purchasers. The suit also alleges fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy. The lawsuit seeks monetary damages, civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Sherman Act and state antitrust statutes. The first settlement covered Chimei Innolux, Chimei Optoelectronics, Hannstar, Hitachi, Samsung, and Sharp and their subsidiaries. The second settlement, for $543.5 million, was with AU Optronics, Toshiba and LG Display and subsidiaries.
In the Matter of A Plus Driving School and Peter Schmirler, No. 10-C-04 (Wis. Dept. of Ag. Trade and Cons. Prot. 2010)
The Attorney General’s office became involved in this case after a confidential tip that Mr. Schmirler had attempted to fix prices with his rivals. After an investigation by the Division of Criminal Investigation, the case was brought as an administrative action before the Department of Agriculture,
Trade and Consumer Protection. The parties reached an agreement, embodied in a Special Order that requires Schmirler and A-Plus to refrain from unfair trade practices, including attempts to fix prices, allocate territory or threaten rivals with predatory pricing for five years.
People v. Tempur-Pedic, No. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., NY Cty. Mar. 29, 2010)
State filed suit against Tempur-Pedic, a mattress manufacturer, alleging resale price maintenance. The state did not sue under its antitrust statute, but rather under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369(a). The State alleged that Tempur-Pedic’s Retail Partner Agreement restrained discounting in a variety of ways. the trial court held that the state’s General Business law did not make resale price maintenance illegal, but only made contractual provisions embodying resale price maintenance uneforceable.
