FTC and State of Ohio v. Promedica health System, No. 3:11CV0047 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2011)
State and FTC sought preliminary injunction in connection with an already consummated acquisition by Promedica of St. Luke’s hospital. The complaint alleged that ProMedica’s acquisition of St. Luke’s eliminated significant price and non-price competition between the two firms in both the general acute-care and inpatient obstetrical markets in Lucas County. According to the complaint, the acquisition also vests ProMedica with the ability to demand higher rates for services performed at its other hospitals as well, because the addition of St. Luke’s to the ProMedica hospital system has made ProMedica a “must-have” system for health plans seeking to do business in Lucas County, as plans can no longer offer consumers a viable provider network without including ProMedica’s hospitals. The preliminary injunction was granted, and the FTC proceeded with an administrative proceeding.
FTC and State of Idaho v. St. Luke’s Health System, No. 1:13-CV-00116-BLW (Jan. 24, 2014, D. Idaho)
The FTC and the Attorney General of Idaho filed suit to prevent the acquisition by St. Luke’s Health System of Idaho’s largest independent, multi-specialty physician practice group, Saltzer Medical Group. According to the joint complaint , the combination of St. Luke’s and Saltzer would give it the market power to demand higher rates for health care services provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) in Nampa, Idaho and surrounding areas, ultimately leading to higher costs for health care consumers. According to the joint complaint, St. Luke’s acquisition of Saltzer was anticompetitive and violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 48-106 of the Idaho Competition Act. It created a single dominant provider of adult primary care physician (adult PCP) services in Nampa, with the combined entity commanding nearly a 60 percent share of that market. In addition, an alternative network of health care providers that does not include St. Luke’s/Saltzer’s primary care physicians becomes far less attractive for employers with employees living in Nampa. The FTC and Idaho Attorney General allege that the newly combined primary care practices will give St. Luke’s greater bargaining leverage with health care plans, with higher prices for services eventually passed on to local employers and their employees. The parties consummated their transaction several months earlier, and a private antitrust complaint was filed by several competitors. Idaho and the FTC consolidated their suits for trial. The court held that the transaction was anticompetitive and that the acquisition should be unwound. The decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit
Washington v. National Express Group, No. 2:12-cv-00757 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2012)
National Express, a national provider of school bus services, sought to acquire Petermann Partners. After an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Washington and Texas Attorneys General, the parties agreed with USDOJ to sell eight school bus transportation contracts in the states of Texas and Washington to Student Transportation of America Inc. (STA). Under a separate consent decree with the state of Washington, the parties also agreed to notify the Attorney General of Washington before any future acquisitions for the next ten years. The parties also agreed not to take any action to impede a successful bidder on a contract from obtaining leased depot and repair facilities.
In re GE Funding Capital Market Services, Inc. (Municipal Bond Derivatives)
Starting in 2008, the states investigated the municipal bond derivatives market, where tax exempt entities like governments and nonprofit organizations issue bonds and reinvest the proceeds until the funds are needed or enter into contracts to hedge interest rate risk on bonds. GE Funding is the fifth financial institution to settle with the multistate working group in the ongoing municipal bond derivatives investigation following Bank of America, UBS AG, JP Morgan and Wachovia.
The investigation revealed conspiratorial and fraudulent conduct involving individuals at financial institutions and certain brokers with whom they had working relationships. The states’ investigation developed evidence that certain traders at GE Funding, in concert with certain brokers, engaged in conduct that allowed the broker to determine in advance that GE Funding would win a bid for a guaranteed investment contract. The conduct allowed GE Funding to submit a “last look’’ bid, while the broker arranged for other financial institutions to submit purposely non-winning courtesy bids. Because of the “last look,” on many occasions GE Funding was able to lower its bid to the issuer and still win the transaction.The misconduct led state and local entities, such as municipalities, counties, school districts and other government agencies, as well as nonprofits, to enter into municipal derivatives contracts on less advantageous terms than they would have otherwise.
U.S. and Montana v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, No.
USDOJ and Montana sued to prevent agreement between BCBS of Montana and New West, two of three competitors in the Montana health insurance market. Five of the six hospital owners of New West had agreed to purchase health insurance from Blue Cross exclusively for six years. once the five hospital owners stopped purchasing health insurance from New West, they likely would have significantly reduced their support for New West and its efforts to win commercial health-insurance customers. These anticompetitive effects would have been exacerbated by a provision in the parties’ agreement that requires Blue Cross to give the hospital owners two seats on Blue Cross’ board of directors if the hospitals do not compete with Blue Cross in the sale of commercial health insurance. DOJ and Montana required that New West promptly divest its remaining commercial health-insurance business to an acquirer with the intent and capability to be an effective competitor. The hospital owners must enter three-year contracts with the acquirer to provide health-care services on terms that are substantially similar to their existing contractual terms with New West. At the acquirer’s option, New West and the five hospital owners must also use their best efforts to assign the health-care provider contracts that are not under their control to the acquirer or to lease New West’s provider network to the acquirer for up to three years. Under the proposed settlement, Blue Cross must notify the department and the state of Montana before it uses exclusive contracts with health-insurance brokers, or exclusive or most-favored-nation provisions in its agreements with health-care providers.
In re J.P. Morgan Chase (Municipal Bond Derivatives)
Starting in 2008, the states investigated the municipal bond derivatives market, where tax exempt entities like governments and nonprofit organizations issue bonds and reinvest the proceeds until the funds are needed or enter into contracts to hedge interest rate risk on bonds.
The investigation revealed conspiratorial and fraudulent conduct involving individuals at JPMC, other financial institutions, and certain brokers with whom they had working relationships. The states alleged that certain JPMC employees and their counterparts at other institutions rigged bids, submitted noncompetitive courtesy bids and fraudulent certificates of arms-length bidding to government agencies. The misconduct led state and local entities, such as municipalities, counties, school districts and other government agencies, as well as nonprofits, to enter into municipal derivatives contracts on less advantageous terms than they would have otherwise. The $66.5 million multistate settlement is one component of a coordinated settlements (totaling $92 million) between JPMC and the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Internal Revenue Service, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), as well as the states.
Federal Trade Commission and State of Georgia v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.,No. 1:11-cv-00058-WLS (M.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2011)
Georgia Attorney General’s Office filed a joint complaint with the FTC seeking to enjoin any transaction involving Phoebe Putney, the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County or Palmyra Park Hospital under which Phoebe Putney would acquire control of Palmyra Park Hospital’s operations, until the conclusion of the FTC’s administrative proceeding and any subsequent appeals.
The complaint alleges that the transaction as proposed would violate federal law by eliminating the vigorous competition that currently exists between Phoebe Putney and Palmyra Park Hospital in Albany and the surrounding six-county area. The complaint also alleges that Phoebe Putney has used the Hospital Authority to cloak private, anticompetitive activity in governmental guise in the hopes that it would exempt the acquisition from federal antitrust law. Court granted TRO, case filed under seal.
Pennsylvania v. Twin Ponds, Inc., No. 2010-CV-11677 (Ct. Comm. Pleas, Dauphin Cty Penn. Sept. 10, 2010)
Two ice skating rinks operated in the Harrisburg Pennsylvania area. The owners entered into an agreement under which one ice house would melt its ice and provide only indoor roller skating and indoor soccer services. State filed suit, charging market allocation and violation of the prohibition against monopolies. Settlement included permanent injunction voiding market allocation agreement and restrictive covenant that prevented property from being used as a skating rink. Defendants paid $65,000, to be used as a settlement fund to support youth hockey in Dauphin County and to reimburse the state for its costs.
U.S. and Texas v. United Regional Healthcare System, No. 7:11-cv-00030 (N.D.Tex. Feb. 25, 2011)
USDOJ and Texas reached a settlement with United Regional Health Care System of Wichita Falls, Texas, that prohibits it from entering into contracts that improperly inhibit commercial health insurers from contracting with United Regional’s competitors. Plaintiffs alleged that United Regional unlawfully used these contracts to maintain its monopoly for hospital services in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
U.S. and Plaintiff States v. American Express Co. et al. No. 10-4496 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
U.S. DOJ and plaintiff states filed suit challenging rules made by American Express, MasterCard and Visa that prevent merchants from offering consumers discounts, rewards and information about card costs, ultimately resulting in consumers paying more for their purchases. Visa and MasterCard settled with the Department of Justice and the litigating states immediately after the complaint was filed. Under the terms of the settlement, the two companies will be required to allow merchants to offer discounts, incentives and information to consumers to encourage the use of payment methods that are less costly. The proposed settlement requires MasterCard and Visa to allow their merchants to: 1) offer consumers an immediate discount or rebate or a free or discounted product or service for using a particular credit card network, low-cost card within that network or other form of payment; 2) express a preference for the use of a particular credit card network, low-cost card within that network or other form of payment; 3) promote a particular credit card network, low-cost card within that network or other form of payment through posted information or other communications to consumers; 4) communicate to consumers the cost incurred by the merchant when a consumer uses a particular credit card network, type of card within that network or other form of payment.
American Express did not agree to settle,and a trial was held, in which the court found for the plaintiffs. . The trial focused on credit card “swipe fees” which generate over $50 billion annually for credit card networks. Plaintiffs argued that price competition over merchant swipe fees has been almost non-existent and for decades the credit card networks have not competed on price because of the rules imposed by each of the networks that limit merchants’ ability to take advantage of a basic tool to keep prices competitive. That tool – commonly used elsewhere in the economy – is merchants’ freedom to “steer” transactions to a network willing to lower its price. Each network has long prohibited such steering to lower-cost cards. The court held that the American Express anti-steering rules block merchants from using competition to keep credit card swipe fees down, which means higher costs to merchants’ customers. The decision means that agreements the plaintiffs reached previously with MasterCard and Visa can be fully implemented pending the conclusion of any appeals.
After remedy submissions from the parties, the court entered an order prohibiting American Express from adopting rules or entering contracts that block merchants from encouraging their customers to use a particular credit card. Under the order, merchants must be permitted to: offer discounts for the use of particular cards; express a preference for particular cards; disclose to customers the cost merchants incur when the customer uses particular credit cards; and engage in other conduct to encourage use of favored credit cards. The order also requires American Express to: repeal any rules that block merchant steering; notify merchants of their freedom to engage in steering activities; and adopt compliance measures to ensure that its employees understand that they cannot continue to block steering by merchants that accept American Express cards.
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court decision that the restraints had an actual anticompetitive effect on interbrand competition. The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating an anticompetitive effect on the whole market because “without evidence of the NDPs’ net effect on both merchants and cardholders, the District Court could not have properly concluded that the NDPs unreasonably restrain trade in violation of § 1.”
