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Director, Center for Supreme Court AdvocacyNational Association of Attorneys General
May 6, 2024 | Volume 31, Issue 10
This Report summarizes opinions issued on April 12, 16, and 17, 2024 (Part I).
Opinion
Rudisill v. McDonough, 22-888.
In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that servicemembers who accrue educational benefits under separate GI bills by virtue of separate periods of service may use either entitlement, in any order, up to the 48-month aggregate-benefits cap set forth in 38 U.S.C. §3695(a). Since World War II, the federal government has enacted numerous GI bills to offer educational assistance to the country’s servicemembers. This case involves “the overlap between two recent GI bills,” namely, the Montgomery GI Bill Act of 1984 and the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008. The Montgomery GI Bill provides servicemembers who enter active duty between 1985 and 2030 with a “limited stipend” that typically “does not pay the full costs of a veteran’s education.” Meanwhile, the Post-9/11 GI Bill, covering service that began on or after September 11, 2001, provides “enhanced” educational benefits, such as the “net cost of in-state tuition,” partial coverage at private institutions, and a housing stipend. Each bill is subject to “a detailed series of statutory provisions that include” entitlement and durational limits. Of note, a qualifying servicemember is entitled to 36 months of benefits under the Montgomery Bill (38 U.S.C. §3013) and 36 months of benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill (38 U.S.C. §3312). Each entitlement is “subject to a 48-month aggregate-benefits cap,” pursuant to §3695. Moreover, to address the fact that eligibility for benefits under the aforementioned bills overlap, the “Post-9/11 GI Bill includes a provision, set forth in §3322, entitled “Bar to duplication of educational assistance benefits.” Pursuant to §3322, “servicemembers who are eligible for educational benefits under either the Montgomery . . . or Post-9/11 . . . [bills]―from a period of service that could qualify for either program―can opt to credit that service toward one educational benefits program or the other. If servicemembers serve for long enough, they may be entitled to both. But such servicemembers cannot receive disbursements from both entitlement programs at the same time, nor may they receive any combination of benefits for longer than 48 months.” Otherwise, if servicemembers’ service entitles them to certain earned benefits, then the “the VA ‘shall pay’ them these benefits.” Finally, to address the approximately eight-year gap between the Post-9/11 Bill’s entitlement and effective dates, Congress devised a statutory fix to allow “servicemembers who were entitled to Post-9/11 benefits but had been funneled through the Montgomery program until the Post-9/11 GI Bill went into effect . . . a way to access the more generous Post-9/11 benefits program.” Specifically, §3322 instructs servicemembers that the coordination of their educational assistance benefits between the Montgomery and Post-9/11 Bills is governed by §3327. “[U]nder §3327, an individual who meets the criteria for Montgomery benefits and Post-9/11 benefits based on the same (overlapping) period of service can elect to exchange the Montgomery benefits he has received for the Post-9/11 benefits that he wants.” This “election” statute clarifies that, if a servicemember has already used some Montgomery benefits before making an irrevocable §3327-election, his entitlement is limited by his unused months of benefits under the Montgomery Bill, “not a full 36 months of Post-9/11 benefits.”
In 2000, petitioner James Rudisill enlisted in the U.S. Army and, over the next 10 years, he reenlisted twice. All told, he served eight years of active duty over three separate terms of military service. Rudisill’s first period of service entitled him to 36 months of benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill; his subsequent periods of service entitled him to 36 months of benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Both were subject to the 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. Rudisill “used 25 months and 14 days of his Montgomery benefits” in connection with his undergraduate degree. After his third period of military service, Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits for a graduate degree. Rudisill believed that, consistent with §3695’s 48-month cap, he was entitled to 22 months and 16 days of Post-9/11 benefits. The VA disagreed, asserting that, pursuant to §3327, “by requesting Post-9/11 benefits before exhausting all of his Montgomery benefits, Rudisill could receive only 36 months of benefits in total, not the 48 months to which he would otherwise be entitled.” “The Board of Veteran’s Appeals affirmed the VA’s decision, but the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims reversed.” The en banc Federal Circuit reversed, holding that, when Rudisill “sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits, he had made an ‘election’ under §3327(a)(1), making his benefits subject to §3327(d)(2)’s [36-month] limit.” In an opinion by Justice Jackson, the Court reversed and remanded.
In holding that Rudisill was entitled to use his separately accrued benefits, in any order, up the statutory 48-month aggregate-benefits cap, the Court relied on the plain text of the relevant provisions. Specifically, the Court explained that “[§]3327(a)’s limit applies only to an individual who makes a §3327(a) election. But Rudisill never made an election under §3327(a), nor must he have done so, because §3327 is triggered only if a servicemember is ‘coordinat[ing]’ an entitlement per §3322(d). Someone in Rudisill’s situation―who just uses one of his two entitlements―is not coordinating anything.” The Court’s view was further reinforced by its reading of §3327(a). That provision’s “election mechanism is an optional means of trading an existing benefits entitlement for Post-9/11 benefits.” Rudisill “does not forfeit his entitlements” simply “by declining to make a §3327(a) election.” In other words, in this case, based on his periods of service, Rudisill was “separately entitled to each of two educational benefits” (the Montgomery and Post-9/11 Bills). “Neither §3322(d) nor §3327 restrict[s] veterans with two separate entitlements who simply seek to use either one.” As a result, the “VA [was] statutorily obligated to pay him 48 months of benefits . . . .” In closing, the Court added that, because the statute in this case was clear, it “resolve[d] this case based on statutory text alone.” If, however, the relevant statute was ambiguous, the pro-veteran canon would have favored Rudisill.
Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Barrett, filed a concurring opinion to express concern with the Court’s reflexive repetition, in this case and its prior jurisprudence, of the existence of a veterans canon of statutory interpretation, which construes veterans benefits statutes in favor of veterans. Justice Kavanaugh explained that, rather than resting on background constitutional principles, this canon derives from “a loose judicial assumption . . . that Congress intends for courts to read ambiguous veterans-benefits statutes more broadly than the courts otherwise would reach such statutes.” Moreover, he asserted that “any canon that construes benefits statutes in favor of a particular group―rather than just construing the statutes as written―appears to be inconsistent both with actual congressional practice on spending laws and with the Judiciary’s proper constitutional role in the federal spending process.” Although it was unnecessary to do so here, Justice Kavanaugh advised that “it may be important in a future case for this Court to address the justification for any benefits-related canon that favors one group over others.”
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented. Although Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that the relevant statutory text was unambiguous, he concluded that the majority’s approach conflicts with the plain text of §3327. In Justice Thomas’s view, because Rudisill could not use his sets of his earned GI Bill benefits concurrently, §3322(d) “required that Rudisill coordinate his entitlements, and that such coordination would be governed by §3327.” Rudisill accomplished this by using §3327’s election mechanism “to switch to Post-9/11 benefits after he had used some, but not all, of his Montgomery benefits.” This coordination of benefits was further demonstrated by Rudisill’s completion of the VA form in which he elected “to receive Post-9/11 benefits ‘in lieu of’ Montgomery benefits and acknowledged that his months of entitlement would be limited to those months remaining under his Montgomery benefits.” As a result of this election, Justice Thomas maintained, Rudisill was subject to §3327’s statutory limit on his benefits entitlement, which, in this case, was the remaining time period from his Montgomery benefits. As an aside, Justice Thomas, like the concurring justices, expressed his concern regarding the foundation and development of the veterans canon, and he “question[ed] whether this purported canon should ever have a role in [the Court’s] interpretation.”
NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy Staff
- Dan Schweitzer, Director and Chief Counsel
- Melissa Patterson, Supreme Court Fellow
- Amanda Schwartz, Supreme Court Fellow
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