Smith Food & Drug Centers, Inc. Settlement Agreement
Smiths Food & Drug Centers, Inc. exited California market and sought antitrust review of proposed sales of supermarket sites to other supermarket operators. The sale of 18 stores to various supermarket operators were approved. Smiths? agreed to obtain prior approval or provide prior notice of future sales of sites to supermarket operators for a period of 5 years.
People v. Omnimed Medical Services, et al
Supplier of radiology services offered to divide markets with radiologist who was bidding on contracts to supply radiology services to California prisons.
California ex rel. Lockyer v. Safeway371 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
Challenge to a revenue sharing plan by four supermarket employers to share revenues based on fixed market share and fixed profit percentage during and after a labor dispute involving three of these employers.
New York et al. v. Deutsche Telekom AG et al., No. 1:19-cv-5434 (S.D.N.Y.)
States challenged merger of T-Mobile and Sprint, the third and fourth-largest mobile telecommunications providers in the U.S., alleging that shrinking the national wireless carrier pool down from four to three providers would decrease competition and create higher prices for consumers. The US Department of Justice and seven states entered into a settlement with the parties…
Alaska v. Crowley Marine Services et al., No. 3AN-04-100 Civil. (Alaska Superior Court, 2005)
Alaska initiated an investigation of the merger between two companies providing barge-delivered petroleum products to western Alaska. A consent decree was reached between the parties that requires significant divestiture of vessels, storage facilities, and property to a qualified buyer approved by the state. The consent decreed was filed for approval in the Alaska Superior Court, and was approved in September, 2005 after a hearing to consider strong opposition from fuel customers in western Alaska.
The State of California, et al. v. Samsung SDI, Co., Ltd., et al., Case No. CGC-11-515784, Calif. Superior Court, San Fran. Cty. Nov. 8, 2011
California sued makers of CRTs alleging they were part of a price-fixing scheme that resulted in overcharges in the price of products that contained CRTs, such as televisions and computer monitors. The alleged price fixing scheme occurred between March 1, 1995 and November 25, 2007. According to the complaint, the conspiracy involved top-level meetings of key executive decision-makers in Asia and Europe to set prices and outputs of CRTs. It also involved worldwide meetings among lower-level executives to exchange confidential information. The settlements, which were filed in San Francisco Superior Court, require all five companies to pay a total of $4.95 million to settle claims of overcharges paid by California government entities, general damages suffered by the State’s economy, and civil penalties. The settlements require that the companies pay back the illegally obtained profits to those affected by their actions. In addition, the settlements include injunctive relief, which requires that each company engage in company-wide antitrust compliance training and reporting that involves products in addition to CRTs and extends to foreign companies and subsidiaries. Finally, the settlements include requirements, enforceable by the court via fines and imprisonment, to prevent future violations of antitrust law. There was a parallel class action by indirect purchasers nationwide that was brought in federal court by private parties. The state worked with the private plaintiffs and a settlement agreement was reached, under which California consumers recovered damages.
Oregon ex rel. Rosenbloom v. LG Electronics, No. 120810246, (Ore. Cir. Ct., Multnomah Cty)
Oregon filed suit against cathode ray tube (CRT) manufacturers, alleging that they illegally agreed upon the pricing of CRTs. The Attorney General filed this action on behalf of the State of Oregon and Oregon natural persons, and sought restitution, civil penalties, disgorgement and injunctive relief.
Florida v. General Chemical Corp. No. 2:17-00384 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2017)
Plaintiff state filed action in federal court alleging market allocation and price-fixing among manufacturers of the chemical liquid aluminum sulfate, which is a coagulant used to remove impurities and other substances from water. It is used primarily by municipalities in wastewater treatment. There are high barriers to entry and substitution is difficult. There have been several USDOJ indictments in the industry. The complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to circumvent competitive bidding and independent pricing and to raise liquid aluminum sulfate prices by submitting artificially inflated bids in Florida from 1997 through at least February 2012. The state alleged that fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy tolled the statute of limitations.
United States et al. v. Aetna et. al., No. 1:16-cv-01494 (D.D.C. July 21, 2016)
U.S. DOJ and plaintiff states sued to block the merger of two of the country’s largest health insurers. According to the complaint, alleges that their merger would substantially reduce Medicare Advantage competition in more than 350 counties in 21 states, affecting more than 1.5 million Medicare Advantage customers in those counties. Before seeking to acquire Humana, Aetna had pursued aggressive expansion in Medicare Advantage. Aetna, the nation’s fourth-largest Medicare Advantage insurer by membership, has nearly doubled its Medicare Advantage footprint over the past four years. Humana is the nation’s second-largest Medicare Advantage insurer by membership. The lawsuit also alleges that Aetna’s purchase of Humana would substantially reduce competition to sell commercial health insurance to individuals and families on the public exchanges in 17 counties in Florida, Georgia and Missouri, affecting more than 700,000 people in those counties. The lawsuit alleges that by buying Humana, Aetna would eliminate one of its strongest and most capable competitors in these markets. The district court granted the injunction, rejecting the parties arguments that the Medicare Advantage and Medicare programs were competing products that constrained one another’s prices, and noting that Aetna’s exit from several markets, allegedly because of the Affordable Care Act, appeared to be designed to eliminate a problem with the merger, rather than being an unrelated business decision.
